POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Edited for the Academy of Political Science by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University

Volume LXXX **September 1965** **Number 3**

LIBRARY
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
PERIODICALS
OCT 1± 1965
COPY

Four Problems in Lawmaking for Peace ..... Louis Lusky 341

African Tribalism: Some Reflections on Uganda May Edel 357

The Social Analysis of American Political History, 1880–1920 ..... Samuel P. Hays 373

NATO and Congress ..... Annette Baker Fox 395

Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: Leon D. Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis—*A Discussion*
The Rt. Hon. Lord Henderson, P. C.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Derek Walker-Smith, Q.C., M.P. 415

Reviews 427

In Memoriam: Harry J. Carman and Carlton J. H. Hayes ..... Facing page 516

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Namier and Brooke, The History of Parliament: The House of Commons, 1754–1790, 3 Volumes ..... *Jacob M. Price* 427
Gordon, Our Parliament
Crick, The Reform of Parliament ..... *Leon D. Epstein* 429
Wilkinson, Gentlemanly Power: British Leadership and the Public School Tradition ..... *Paul Nash* 431
Curtis, Coercion and Conciliation in Ireland, 1880–1892: A Study in Conservative Unionism ..... *Emmet Larkin* 433
Gilbert and Gott, The Appeasers ..... *René Albrecht-Carrié* 435
Jacob, German Administration Since Bismarck: Central Authority Versus Local Autonomy ..... *Vernon K. Dibble* 436
Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich .. *Gerhard L. Weinberg* 439
Johnson, Guizot: Aspects of French History, 1787–1874 *Louise Dalby* 441
Wright, Rural Revolution in France: The Peasantry in the Twentieth Century ..... *Philip M. Williams* 442
Clough, The Economic History of Modern Italy .... *Rondo Cameron* 444
Schapiro (ed.), The U.S.S.R. and the Future:
An Analysis of the New Program of the CPSU
Mosely (ed.), The Soviet Union, 1922–1962:
A Foreign Affairs Reader *William H. McNeill* 445
Thornton (ed.), The Third World in Soviet Perspective: Studies by Soviet Writers on the Development Areas .. *Kaethe Mengelberg* 447
Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics
Laqueur and Labedz (eds.), The Future of Communist Society .... *Ralph T. Fisher Jr.* 449
Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918–48 ..... *Wayne S. Vucinich* 451
Goebel, The Law Practice of Alexander Hamilton: Documents and Commentary, Volume I ..... *Willard Hurst* 453
Hutchinson and Rachal (eds.), The Papers of James Madison, Volume 3: 3 March 1781–31 December 1781 *William G. Carleton* 454
Aronson, Status and Kinship in the Higher Civil Service *Reinhard Bendix* 456
Lowitt, George W. Norris: The Making of a Progressive, 1861–1912 ..... *John A. Garraty* 457
Preston, Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933 ..... *Stanley Coben* 459
Charles, Minister of Relief: Harry Hopkins and the Depression *Richard Weiss* 460
Ferrell, Frank B. Kellogg–Henry L. Stimson, Volume XI of The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy *Richard W. Leopold* 462
Deener (ed.), Canada-United States Treaty Relations *Robin W. Winks* 463

Published quarterly at 111 East Chestnut Street, Lancaster, Pa., for the Academy of Political Science, Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y. Entered as second-class matter, March 14, 1911, at the Post-Office at Lancaster, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Second-class postage paid at Lancaster, Pa., and additional offices.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

READERSHIP SURVEY

We need to know more about YOU, your

Employment

Age

Income

Travels

. . . for advertising data

NO WORDS TO WRITE—not even your name.

No Postage Required

Employment

Teaching ☐ Government ☐ Retired ☐
Law ☐ Other Profession ☐ Business ☐

Age

Under 30 ☐ 30–40 ☐ 40–50 ☐ 50–60 ☐ Over 60 ☐

Income

Under $10,000 ☐ $10,000–$15,000 ☐
$15,000–$20,000 ☐ Over $20,000 ☐

Travels

Outside U.S. (past 3 years) ☐ Inside U.S. (past year) ☐
By air ☐ By other means ☐

Cars Owned

None ☐ One ☐ Two ☐ Three or more ☐

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIRST CLASS
PERMIT No. 22966
NEW YORK, N. Y.

BUSINESS REPLY MAIL
No Postage Stamp Necessary if Mailed in the United States

POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY

The Academy of Political Science
Columbia University • 413 Fayerweather Hall
New York, New York 10027

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Edited for the Academy of Political Science by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University

Managing Editor

SIGMUND DIAMOND

Associates

PETER B. KENEN

CONRAD M. ARENSBERG

ERIC L. McKITRICK

HERBERT H. HYMAN

HERBERT A. DEANE

Assistant Editor

NANCY LANE

The POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a non-partisan review. Every article is signed and represents the personal view of the writer. Manuscripts, books for review, and communications regarding articles and exchanges should be addressed to the Managing Editor, Political Science Quarterly, Columbia University, New York, N. Y. 10027

Copyright 1965, by the Editors of the Political Science Quarterly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS TO THE SEPTEMBER ISSUE

LOUIS LUSKY is a professor of law at Columbia University, where he conducts a seminar in world law.

MAY EDEL, who, at the time of her death, was a member of the department of sociology and anthropology at the Newark College of Rutgers University, pioneered in the study of the theoretical relations of anthropology and ethics, and in developing anthropological materials for young people. Professor Edel's books include: *The Chiga of Western Uganda* (1957); *Anthropology and Ethics,* with Abraham Edel (1959); *The Story of People* (1953); and *The Story of Our Ancestors* (1955).

SAMUEL P. HAYS, professor of history and chairman of the department at the University of Pittsburgh, is author of *The Response to Industrialism* (1957) and *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency* (1959).

ANNETTE BAKER FOX is a research associate in the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. She is the author of *Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean* (1949) and *The Power of Small States* (1959), and is currently collaborating on a study of "NATO and the Range of United States Choice."

THE RT. HON. LORD HENDERSON, P.C., was Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1948 to 1951 in the Attlee government and official spokesman on foreign affairs for the Labour Opposition in the House of Lords from 1951 to 1964.

THE RT. HON. SIR DEREK WALKER-SMITH has been a Conservative Member of Parliament for twenty years. He is a Privy Councillor and practices at the English Bar as a Queen's Counsel. After holding junior ministerial office at the Board of Trade and the Treasury he was for three years Minister of Health. Before taking office as a Minister, he was chairman of the Conservative Private Members' Committee.

ERRATUM

HERBERT G. GUTMAN, author of "The Failure of the Movement by the Unemployed for Public Works in 1873," which appeared in the June 1965 issue of the QUARTERLY, is an associate professor of history at the State University of New York at Buffalo and associate editor of *Labor History*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Volume LXXX *September 1965* *Number 3*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

FOUR PROBLEMS IN LAWMAKING FOR PEACE *

WE HAVE out-dared Prometheus. We have grasped the power to destroy mankind with our atomic fire. And now we feel the chill of ever-deepening peril.

To be sure, there are significant forces working against war. The United Nations provides a medium of direct communication between most (though not all) nations, and thus reduces the danger that war will break out—as World War I may have done—because governments are badly informed about each other's intentions. And the United Nations facilitates third-party mediation of international controversies. Without its services, civilization might have perished at any of several critical moments during the past two decades.

A measure of security is also provided by "stable deterrence," which results from the tremendous gap between offensive striking power and the means of defending national populations against it. So long as each of two or more nations is able to destroy any attacker utterly, even after absorbing an all-out attack itself—an ability which the United States and the Soviet Union, at least, now appear to possess —it is unlikely that any deliberately-planned major war (such as World War II) will develop.

Yet the danger of major war is great and growing. The

* This article is taken from a manuscript written for the World Law Fund, New York, as a study document for an educational program on world peace through world law. The entire paper was analyzed and discussed by an international group of educators at a colloquium held under the auspices of the Fund and the Harvard University Graduate School of Education, in June 1965, at Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The manuscript developed from a research project in world law, conducted at Columbia Law School during the autumn semester, 1964–65. Thanks are due to Donald E. Wardle and David A. Karetsky, who participated in the project.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United Nations, designed before Hiroshima when the possibility of a third world war was dreadful but not downright unthinkable, does not purport to provide any sure means of preventing war between two or more of the five major powers. "Stable deterrence" does not in fact afford full stability. Granted that no rational government can now deliberately initiate a program of world conquest, there is still the danger of accidental war (*vide Fail-Safe*) or irrationally-caused war (*vide Dr. Strangelove*) or mutually undesired escalation. The mathematicians tell us that although the likelihood of such an outbreak in any given week or month or year may be quite small, the probability that it will take place *at some future time* is virtually one hundred per cent. The simple multiplication of opportunities—even if not compounded by the increasing complexity of weapons—is enough to make it so.

It therefore behooves us, if we are interested in the survival of our civilization and our progeny, to cast about for greater security. In seeking it, of course, we cannot reasonably throw away such security as the United Nations and our arms now afford us. On the other hand, we can afford to give up our present protections in exchange for something better—if something better is truly available. The problem is to increase our *net* security.

As a basis for the present discussion of the difficulties which that problem offers, we posit the following propositions: (1) That the "something better" must include complete and universal disarmament. (2) That such disarmament is not in itself sufficient, and indeed would be dangerous unless coupled with enforceable world law against rearmament and war. (3) That a world federal system would be the most appropriate institutional matrix for such law.

It is not suggested that these propositions are self-evident, or that no one can reasonably dispute them. They have been widely discussed elsewhere, however, and their pros and cons need not be reviewed here. For present purposes it is enough that the propositions have been demonstrated to our own satisfaction by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, in *World Peace Through World Law* (Cambridge, Mass., 2nd ed., 1960), and that we now adopt them as our postulates. The Clark-Sohn illustrative model of a world

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

federal system also serves as a useful aid to concrete visualization of the difficulties which such a system would encounter.

As a final preliminary, we define "war" and "law," as those terms are used here. We use the term "war" to mean the use of physical force by one nation against another, excluding indigenous revolutions and civil wars which (as will presently be seen) involve special considerations. We use the term "law" to mean a rule of conduct which is applicable to individual persons rather than nations, and which is enforced by governmental action—action taken with sufficient regularity and vigor to assure a high level of observance, and enjoying such accepted legitimacy that it will effectively settle controversy without stimulating reprisal or escalation.

I

We know that it is not inherently impossible for a group of nations to form a federal system, establishing a central authority empowered to keep the peace between them by means of enforceable law binding on their people. The United States and other national federations have been so established and have successfully executed the purposes of their creation. The question is whether the ability to form such a federation depends on the existence of certain conditions which may not be present in the world today. If so, it is useful to know what those conditions are. Even if they cannot be changed immediately, we can at least understand what changes must take place before we can gain relief from the instability of "stable deterrence."

The Clark-Sohn proposal calls for world law against the possession and use of national armies and armaments, but not for law resolving economic and political conflicts of interest. Thus it is designed to eliminate the physical *ability* to wage war, but it does not provide for the making of laws to reconcile the clashing objectives that give rise to the *desire* for war. In this respect, their proposed system of world law would differ significantly from existing legal systems. Law, as we know it, does not stop with prohibiting *violence*. It also affords a peaceable means of settling the *quarrels that breed violence*. In effect, it says to each of us:

"Fighting is a bad way to settle a controversy. It wastes human life. It wastes wealth that is devoted to unproductive

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

use such as the making of weapons. It renders life and property insecure not only for the contending parties, but also for bystanders. Moreover, it rarely effects a *final* settlement. Unless the beaten party and his supporters are wholly exterminated, their defeat will rankle and they will watch their chance to gather fresh supporters and turn the tables. Therefore, for the sake of the common good, men should be forbidden to fight over their controversies.

"However, controversies will always be with us. Men will quarrel over the right to possession of land or goods or river water or women, or will differ as to the meaning or binding character of their contracts, or will disagree as to which is the true religion or the best form of government. If fighting were the *only* way to settle these myriad controversies, it would be difficult to enforce the prohibition against it. But it is not the only way. The community can bring its judgment to bear on the merits of controversies, and settle them in conformity with *justice*—that is to say, in accordance with a code of social values which the community deems valid. Such settlements are likely to be accepted as final; for a defeated party is more disposed to acquiesce in a collective determination which the community declares to be just, than in a settlement imposed by the superior strength of an adversary.

"Therefore, at the same time that the law forbids fighting and other forms of violence within the community, it will also declare rules for measuring the merits of controversies by reference to community standards. The community will establish courts with authority not only to decree punishment for those who commit violence, but also to adjudicate questions of right and wrong between man and man. And some person or agency, whether a monarch or an elected legislature or something in between, will have the recognized power—as spokesman for the community—to change the rules of law from time to time in order to keep step with changes in circumstances or community values.

"In short, each man can and should be made to forego the power of self-help in exchange for the community's undertaking itself to help him if it deems his cause to be just. The exchange is a fair and advantageous one, and reasonable men will be content with it. Enforcement of the prohibi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion against violence will thus be reduced to a relatively simple operation against a minority of social misfits, as compared with the much more difficult task that would be encountered if the law kept aloof from the merits of controversies, and did not offer justice (as well as protection from attack) in exchange for the power of self-help."

What is the nature of this "justice" that is offered as part of the bargain? To this question different societies give different answers. In a theocracy, it is said that justice is the will of God as interpreted by an official priesthood. In a totalitarian autocracy, it is said that justice is the will of the community as articulated by a dictator. In a constitutional democracy the concept of justice is more complex; it connotes not only the substantive ideal of government for the people, but preservation of objectively fair *procedures* whereby the people can exercise effective though peaceable control over their government. Such differences do have a significant bearing on the problem of creating world law, and we shall discuss them presently. But before commenting on the dissimilarities between the various legal systems the world has known, let us take note of one feature that all of them appear to have possessed: they have gone beyond the direct prohibition of violence, and have undertaken to settle the right and wrong of underlying controversy. As the source of standards for determining right and wrong, they have tendered a code of values that has made a more than negligible claim on men's loyalties. To be sure, those values have sometimes been primitive or neurotic; but even in Hitler's Germany, the law represented a value system which (however perverted) made an affirmative emotional appeal. Obedience to the law was demanded of Germans in the name of justice; and brazenly cynical though the demand may have been, it connoted a promise of comprehensive personal fulfillment far beyond the bare assurance of continued life.

By way of contrast, the world law proposed by Clark and Sohn would be explicitly related to one social value, and only one—the value of physical survival. True it is that this is the fundamental value on which all others depend. Justice and beauty and truth would have no meaning in a world devoid of life, or populated only by insects or microbes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet, in making a choice between the perils of "stable deterrence" and the security of world law, men will not overlook the fact that world law is offered in the name of necessity rather than justice.

It is not impossible to imagine such a legal system. Conceivably, a government might limit itself to forbidding its people to fight each other, and provide no legislative and judicial system whereby community standards could be brought to bear upon the merits of controversies. If the United States Constitution had denied to Congress such powers as the power to regulate interstate commerce, and had confined our federal government to the prevention of armed conflict between the states, our government might nevertheless be worth having. But the shape of our national society would be quite different from what it is.

States such as New York, Louisiana, and California, where the great seaports are found, could levy tribute on goods passing to or from the hinterland. States possessing important and relatively rare natural resources such as petroleum could ally themselves together to fix monopolistic prices. States with high wage levels could raise immigration and tariff barriers against cheap labor and its products. These and similar measures would stimulate reprisal in kind, and tensions would develop. The question is, would the federal law against interstate war be ungrudgingly obeyed under such circumstances? Or would people throughout the land come to regard that law as an obstacle to achievement of their "legitimate aspirations"? Fear of war would pull one way; rage against foreign imposition or oppression would pull against it. Literally, a tug-of-war.

History affords no basis for predicting the acceptability of a world legal system that is limited to what may be called "survival law," since the menace of war has never before been so hideous. This much, however, is clear: a system which forbids violence without offering justice begets an ambivalence. Men cannot submit to the law as wholeheartedly as they do when it promises peaceable redress of grievances as well as security from deadly attack.

Perhaps the difficulty could be avoided by empowering the world authority not only to prevent war but to make and enforce laws dealing with the substance of international con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

troversies, just as our Congress is empowered to deal with matters occasioning conflicts of interest between states of our Union. Clark and Sohn have not overlooked that alternative. They make the judgment, however, that it involves an even greater difficulty, arising from the deep estrangements that now fragment mankind.

A legislature must function according to some sort of majority rule. Gross unfairness to the minority is always a theoretical possibility, but the degree of actual danger depends on the attitude the legislators have toward one another. If minority legislators are regarded by the majority as *colleagues,* representing people whose needs and desires deserve attention and understanding and objective evaluation, the danger of gross unfairness is small. In that event, the end product of the legislative process will be a good-faith effort to accommodate the competing interests of all segments of the constituent population. That is the essence of just lawmaking. Most legislatures approximate it fairly well, and grant a receptive and sympathetic hearing to the views of the "loyal opposition." If, on the other hand, the majority regard minority members not as colleagues but as *enemies,* whose views can rightly be ignored and overridden, the danger of gross unfairness is great.

Nations which are considering whether to join with other nations in establishing a world legislature will be conscious of this danger and will try to appraise it. All of them must reckon with the chance that their representatives will be in the minority at least some of the time—for no one knows beforehand what coalition of legislators will be in control, and what nations or races or ideologies will be in the minority, on any particular issue. If it seems probable that the minority will be despised and ignored, the nations may not dare to submit their differences for disposition by the world legislature.

Clark and Sohn appear to believe that any proposal which included establishment of a broadly authorized legislature would be rejected because of such fears. In the present state of the world, the fears cannot be dismissed as fanciful. Rich nations such as the United States might fear the wiping out of tariff and immigration barriers. Communist nations might fear, at a minimum, that their borders would be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opened and the discipline of their people impaired by the seductive appeal of consumer goods and individual freedoms. Asians and Africans might fear exploitation at the hands of wealthier nations. Whites might fear the accumulated resentments of the huge non-white populations.

These apprehensions might shrink to manageable dimensions if the peoples of the world formed a true community, bound together by feelings of kinship and mutual concern. But the somber fact is that, in many cases, they see each other less as brothers than as stereotyped caricatures in the form of beasts or devils.

Under these circumstances, Clark and Sohn think it necessary to recommend that the powers of the world legislature be limited to the one subject-matter on which the interests of all nations point in pretty much the same direction, namely, the prevention of war. They do propose a World Development Authority, to make monetary grants and loans for alleviation of disparities in national wealth and productivity. Those disparities doubtless breed deep international discord, and yet it is hard to say that they are the only, or even the primary, source of hostile pressures. They do not appear to have been a major cause of either of the two World Wars. Nor can it be said with assurance that elimination of grave economic inequalities would relax the tensions that now convulse the nations. The Arab-Israeli confrontation; the racial hostility between South Africa and Black Africa; the civil wars in Cyprus and the Congo; the Indonesian threat to Malaysia; Communist expansionism in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, opposed by the determination of the Western democracies to preserve the fundamental personal freedoms—all appear to result, at least in part, from factors other than disparities of national wealth. Therefore the World Development Authority, valuable as it might be, would not constitute a full substitute for legislative power to deal with the causes of war.

To summarize: Without a closer approach to universal brotherhood, the nations may not dare to submit their differences to a world legislature. But unless and until they are ready for that step, world law must limit itself to the objective of human survival, disclaiming jurisdiction to settle international controversies on their merits. Law thus lim-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ited may become acceptable only if utter destruction comes very near, so near that survival law is the only visible alternative.

II

There is a second difficulty. Suppose that some catastrophe or near-catastrophe had convinced all governments that "survival law" was a necessity. Suppose that they were willing to create a world authority possessing a monopoly of military power, but with legislative jurisdiction strictly limited to the prevention of war. The limitations on its powers would necessarily be based on the words of the organic document creating it. Clark and Sohn have framed such limitations as clearly and unambiguously as words can do it. They propose that legislation be limited to (a) laws authorized by the agreed plans for disarmament and for establishment of a world military force (which they call the Peace Force); (b) laws bringing into operation sanctions against non-complying nations; and (c) laws prohibiting and prescribing penalties for injury to UN property or personnel, illegal acts of UN personnel, violations of the disarmament plan, and the threat or use of force by one nation against another. But the question would remain, how efficacious are the words?

Men have become skeptical of the force of words not backed by power. Organizations, once they have been created, have been found to develop imperatives of their own —imperatives that demand fulfillment of the felt needs of the present, and scorn restrictions stipulated by their founders. The United States Constitution specifies the powers to be exercised by the federal government, and declares that powers not so granted are withheld. Yet Thomas Jefferson —the prototype of the strict constructionist—found himself constrained to approve, as President, purchase of the Louisiana territory. The Constitution did not authorize it, but the needs of the nation demanded it. For like cause Lincoln repudiated the right of secession. And as the states grew economically interdependent to a degree probably unforeseen in 1787, the commerce clause (after some delay) was held in the nineteen-thirties to authorize congressional regulation commensurate with the twentieth-century needs of the nation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We have seen the beginnings of a similar development in the United Nations. The stultification of the Security Council has led to the assumption of peace-keeping authority by the General Assembly and the Secretary General, which was not contemplated in 1945. To be sure, certain characteristics of the UN structure, such as its lack of a reliable source of adequate revenue, make uncertain the continuation of this development. But for present purposes it is enough to observe the tendency to disregard the verbal structure of the Charter and press the organization to satisfy the needs of the present.

We do not say that such developments are to be deplored. The United States and the United Nations have rendered far better service because of them. Had the United Nations not been able to transcend the circumstances of its birth, World War III might already have come and gone. Nevertheless, nations contemplating the creation of a world authority empowered to prevent war cannot blink the possibility that it may elect to go farther and deal with the *causes* of war. And again the fear of legislative injustice might appear.

III

Consider a third difficulty. Assume that all governments were agreed upon the need for "survival law," and were willing to take their chances that the stipulated limitations on the powers of the world authority would be observed. In order to gain the one thing they were bargaining for—relief from the danger of war—they would have to obtain solid assurance that the world law against war would be fully enforced. The question is whether full enforcement would involve unwanted side-effects.

Enforcement of prohibitions against armaments would not be a simple matter. Stocks of nuclear materials would have to be searched out wherever they were. Laboratories would have to be policed for activities capable of support to chemical or biological warfare. Caches of conventional weapons would have to be uncovered. Informers would have to be encouraged. And even if there were no significant attempts at evasion of the law, constant vigilance and surveillance would be necessary to provide the continuing assurance of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

universal compliance which alone would dispel the fear of war. Moreover, at least in the early years, enforcement operations would have to be carried out in areas where nationalistic feeling remained strong and xenophobia was rampant.

It is no easy task to enforce the law in a hostile, or even an apathetic, community. The United States government, powerful and accepted as it is, has not yet approached full success in extirpating the narcotics traffic or protecting the long-established rights of Negroes in the Deep South. This is not to say that it is *powerless* to accomplish these things. But they cannot easily be accomplished, in the face of popular apathy or local resistance, without resort to official force on a scale so massive as to jeopardize treasured personal freedoms.

How large a force would be required for the sure enforcement of world law prohibiting the making or possession of tools of war? With the full cooperation of national and local police establishments, the job could perhaps be done by a virtual handful of world police. Clark and Sohn appear to assume that such cooperation would be forthcoming, since they recommend a civil police force of only ten thousand—less than half the number now employed by New York City. (Their proposed Peace Force, with a standing strength of two hundred thousand to six hundred thousand and a Reserve of six hundred thousand to 1,200,000, would evidently be trained for military operations rather than routine police duty; it would be available to cope with organized large-scale resistance, but does not appear to be designed for the day-to-day work of criminal investigation and arrest of individual lawbreakers.) The ten thousand world police—one for about every three hundred thousand people, or an average of a dozen or so for each of the fifty states of our Union—would offer little threat to personal liberty and privacy.

The question remains, however, whether national and local police in all (or nearly all) countries would in fact cooperate. Keep in mind our assumption that world law would consist of "survival law" only, guaranteeing physical security but maintaining neutrality with respect to national aspirations or grievances. It is at least possible that chauvinistic demagogues would condemn the world police as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

watchdogs of an unjust *status quo*. In the United Arab Republic they might be regarded more as protectors of Israel than as guardians of the lives of Arabs and Israelis alike. In China they might be assailed as defenders of Taiwan; in Pakistan, as defenders of Eastern Kashmir; in Nigeria, as defenders of South Africa; in Eire, as defenders of Ulster. In our own country, within the past few years, we have seen states elect governors on a platform of non-cooperation with federal law. We have also witnessed the consequent inadequacy of federal law enforcement, when state and city police have withheld their aid. Such experience suggests that compliance with world law may be achievable only through the creation of a world police force big enough to function effectively without local help.

A force of this kind would have to be much larger and stronger than the one proposed by Clark and Sohn. The problem of equipping it with authority adequate for vigorous and effective discharge of its duties, without exposing the general public to arbitrary and intrusive abuses of that authority, may not be easily solved. The gravity of the problem is indicated by the persistent refusal of Americans to establish a federal police force for enforcement of federal rights, even when certain of those rights are persistently flouted by state and local authorities.

A related, though probably less important, question can be raised with respect to the revenue system through which the world organization would be financed. Clark and Sohn have refrained from recommending a system comparable to our Internal Revenue Service, which operates directly on the taxpayer. Instead, they have proposed that the several nations be left in charge of tax collection. In principle, this would appear to leave the world authority subject to the same danger of paralyzing default that the United Nations now faces. Yet a direct collection system would add still another tier to an already burdensome—though indispensable—bureaucracy.

The existence of such problems does not mean that enforcement of world law is impossible. It does mean that the social cost may be high.

IV

Institution of a world law system would involve yet an-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other difficulty, with respect to nations whose governments are not fully identified with the interests of their people as a whole. In this category are totalitarian governments that rule without the check of free elections, and governments such as the South African, which substantially disfranchises a great segment of its people and rules with the consent of the Caucasian minority only.

We have already noted the terms of the bargain that underlies present legal systems: surrender of the power of individual self-help, in return for security from attack and "justice" in the resolution of controversies. As a common denominator, each system includes the affirmation of social values (which, in the aggregate, officially define the Good Life) through the medium of rules of conduct—laws—premised on those values. (In order to have a name for the institution that formulates the laws, let us call it the "legislature"—even though we recognize that the legislative function is performed in some nations by a dictator or council not ordinarily referred to as a legislature.) We have also noted, however, that there is wide variation in the quality of the "justice" that different systems offer.

In this country and other democracies, the legislature is subjected to the effective control of the people who are bound by its laws. The validity of officially approved values is always open to re-examination. By protection of the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and political association, the government itself shelters the development of public opinion critical of present law. And by protection of the elective franchise, it preserves the people's power to choose legislators who will translate public opinion into new law.

The knowledge that the corrective political processes exist is a powerful inducement to voluntary compliance with the present law. Even if a man regards it as bad law, in the sense that he believes it to embody inferior values or believes that it implements poorly the values it purports to serve, he will very probably obey it. For its very existence is prima facie evidence that most of his neighbors disagree with him, and think it is good law. Moreover, if he is right in thinking that a change in the law would benefit the community, he can reasonably expect the change to be made as soon as his fellow-citizens learn where their true interests lie. And if

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he wants to persuade the community to his view, law protects his right to try it.

Under a non-democratic system, where the people have no effective control over the legislature, a man is likely to have quite a different attitude toward a law he considers to be bad. He has no reason to think that his *neighbors* disagree with him; all he knows is that the *legislature* does. He knows that if he breaks the law the government will disapprove and will punish him if it finds out; but he also knows that his neighbors may not frown on him, and may even admire his action. And so he will ordinarily be less strongly impelled toward voluntary compliance than if he thought the law enjoyed general approval. A non-democratic system must therefore rely more heavily on official coercion than does a democracy, in order to achieve the same degree of obedience to the law. And that means it must have a stronger police force. The term "police state" is a description, not an epithet.

Moreover, revolution is an ever-present danger in a non-democratic system. Since there are no established procedures through which the people can peaceably bring about changes in the law, they can do it only by violence. The government knows it, and knows that the people know it. And the government's uneasiness is intensified by the realization that in the absence of free speech and meaningful elections it is difficult indeed to know whether and how deeply the people are dissatisfied with the existing law. Self-preservation thus dictates the need for a military force, loyal to the government, which is strong enough to suppress any probable insurrection.

The fact that non-democratic systems need stronger police and military forces than democracies, to cope with purely internal problems, has a bearing on the problem of creating world law. Clark and Sohn rightly observe that disarmament involves restrictions on the size and weaponry of internal police establishments. (Hitler showed how readily policemen can be turned into soldiers, and put to aggressive use.) They propose a maximum of two police per thousand of population, which is about the size of the state and local police forces in the United States. But they also observe, again quite rightly, that world law can be instituted only

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the approval of the governments of all the large nations and most of the others. If a strict limitation of internal police forces were accepted by the rulers of such nations as mainland China, the U.S.S.R., Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and South Africa, would they be signing their own death warrants?

Perhaps this difficulty might be avoided if the world authority were obligated to protect the national governments from revolution as well as external attack, just as the United States government is bound to defend the states from domestic violence as well as foreign invasion (Constitution, Article IV, § 4). But this would mean that the world authority, in order to obtain the governmental consent necessary to its creation, must commit itself to perpetuation of the servile status of those unhappy peoples who lack the means of controlling their national governments. This may be part of the price of survival, and perhaps it would be agreed to. But it would be deemed a high price by some other nations —including, it may be, the whole of Black Africa; and they might balk at it.

As a matter of fact, these latter nations might go farther. They might refuse to join in the establishment of world law unless the law included guarantees comparable to the Civil War amendments to the United States Constitution, which protect the fundamental liberties of individuals from invasion by their own state governments. But adoption of a world bill of rights of this character doubtless would exacerbate the objections of totalitarian and racist governments. The question is whether there is *any* course of action which will not render the proposed world law unacceptable to one group or the other.

CONCLUSION

An effort has been made to articulate what are believed to be the major obstacles to institution of a system of world law under present conditions. The obstacles arise not from lack of ingenuity in devising a plan, but from deficiencies in our human societies and institutions—the alienation which flows from men's inability to feel kinship with their brothers of different tongue or creed or color, at home and around the world, and the precariousness of the power held by gov-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ernments not controlled by their people. If these things block us off too long from the establishment of world peace through world law, they must be changed; otherwise they may bring the end of life on earth.

LOUIS LUSKY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AFRICAN TRIBALISM: SOME REFLECTIONS ON UGANDA *

I

GWENDOLYN CARTER once commented that "there is a sense for Africa as a whole which is more real to the educated Africans of the continent than is the notion of Europe to educated Europeans, or of one America to the inhabitants of North and South America." [1] Pan-Africanism, the various All-African Conferences, common interest in the movements for freedom of all the African peoples, the African voting bloc in the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity—these are all expressions of a sense of African identity based on a common experience under colonialism and a common goal of freedom and dignity in the modern world. Among African intellectuals there is a search for common African values and world-views, an attempt to discover, or to forge, a bond of common culture, exemplified in the concepts of Negritude, and expressed in a growing body of sophisticated contemporary literature.

Yet Africa today, even just Africa "south of the Sahara," is far from a single unified cultural and ethnic whole. There are hundreds of languages; differences, both old and new, in ways of getting a living; and matrilineal, patrilineal, and even dual forms of family organization. Despite the attempt to find a common philosophical base for "African religion," there are vast differences in traditional religions in both practice and belief. There are friendly and unfriendly ancestors, great pantheons and areas with little interest in the gods, and varying incidence of witchcraft beliefs, possession cults, and initiation rites. There is the further divisive effect of intrusive religions: Islam, Protestant or Catholic churches, and blends of the new and the old. There are dif-

* This paper was originally presented at the Conference on African Tribalism, sponsored jointly by the University of Pennsylvania and The American Society for African Culture, on April 24, 1961, at the University of Pennsylvania.

1 Gwendolyn Carter, *Independence for Africa* (New York, 1960), 163.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ferences, too, in the old forms of tribal organization. Indigenous African political units ranged from small-scale chieftainships, rooted in kin and clan, to great states, often established by conquest and ruled by the superposition of alien lineages. There were also "tribes without rulers," areas of fragmented, subdividing lineages, with no central authority or common allegiance at all, even within the boundaries of shared language and culture.

There are those who wonder to what extent national or pan-African ideas and ideals, realistic or romantic common causes can transcend the enormous diversities of cultural and "tribal" or ethnic affiliations. The boundaries of the several emerging nations were drawn not according to African political, cultural, and linguistic affinities, but by the accidents of European history. It is asked whether "tribal" loyalties—the ties that bind the individual to his rural home, that spell themselves out as obligations to his kinsmen, that impel him to have respect for traditional authority figures, or that structure developing lines of authority in patterns set by older forms of social organization—are likely to be more active factors in the current social situation than the new nationalisms. Will older antagonisms to other peoples make it difficult to forge new bonds of common allegiance along national lines? To what degree are the boundaries of the moral community —the group within which common moral fellowship is acknowledged [2]—changing, becoming wider and more inclusive? Certainly there are many cleavages, points of considerable tension on the modern scene, which seem to fall along old lines of tribal divisions. To what extent are these a tribal legacy deeply rooted in the divergent loyalties and institutions of the past, and destined to be a genuine source of long-range difficulty in Africa?

II

The general point of this paper is that however much tribal affiliation and identification may enter, the issues and conflicts of today are rooted in problems and social interactions of today, and are not just atavisms rooted in some preexistent past and continuing on a momentum of traditional-

[2] For a fuller exploration of this concept, see May and Abraham Edel, *Anthropology and Ethics* (Springfield, Ill., 1959), Chap. IX.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ism. This is not to say that history does not count; it is a requisite key to understanding any transformations in the present, which can only be transformations *of* the past. But the manifold ways in which varying kinds of tribal identifications will be extended or deepened, the extent to which old cultures and old loyalties will remain stumbling blocks to change, or be transformed, widened, and reinterpreted, seem to me to be functions not of the past as such, but of the genuine issues and problems of the present, to which new answers must be found. At least as a heuristic principle, it seems to be fruitful to keep a careful research orientation on these issues and problems of the present, and on the direction of their development, if we are to understand the role that the past continues to play.

Both Gluckman and Epstein, who have worked in this kind of theoretical framework, have made this point. Speaking of the role of "tribal" organizations and affiliations in the urban area of the Copperbelt, in Northern Rhodesia, Epstein writes, "Intertribal relations on the Copperbelt . . . and the cleavages within political organizations along tribal lines, cannot be explained simply as vestiges from a tribal past which have survived into the present. On the contrary, they reflect processes at work within the urban social system." [3] He points out that while "tribalism refers to a significant category of interaction in everyday social relationships among Africans," the lines of tribal alignment tend to be transformed by the historical accidents of the present. For example, he tells us that peoples of many different tribes from Nyasaland form a community of common interest in the mining area and are regarded as though they were a tribal unit. Similarly Gluckman points out that even in the rural areas, where tribal identifications are still operating in their original regional and community settings, "we are still not dealing merely with survivals," but rather that "membership of a tribe involves participation in a working political system, and sharing domestic life with kinfolk; and that this continued participation is based on present economic and social needs, and not merely on conservatism." [4]

[3] A. L. Epstein, *Politics in an Urban African Community* (Manchester, 1958), 239.

[4] Max Gluckman, "Tribalism in Modern British Central Africa," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africains*, I (1960), 55.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

I should like to explore the situation in Uganda as one illustration of this complex process of interaction between modern interests and older loyalties. Uganda is not "typical" in any simple sense, but it is probably no less so than any other specific area of Africa. It embraces a characteristic heterogeneity of ethnic make-up. Its peoples speak various Bantu, Sudanic, and Nilotic languages. There are herdsmen in the north and west, fisherfolk on the great lakes, and farmers dependent on quite distinct food staples—millet in some areas, plantain in others. The present boundaries of Uganda include the great kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro, and Ankole, quite a number of smaller states, and a large number of non-centralized peoples who had no chiefs at all. These were disparate peoples, with no possible sense of common allegiance or obligation. Indeed, between many of these different peoples—tribes, if you like—there was an active condition of warfare at the time of British intervention, in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Uganda was governed by the British as a protectorate. There were few permanent European residents, no great areas of European plantations, coppermines, or industrial centers, although there were some small-scale European and Indian-owned cotton mills, and later a growing focus of factory production around the electric-power center in Jinja. Most important, from the point of view of the difficulties in the current situation, is the fact that throughout the history of the protectorate, Buganda, a separate province about twice the size of the ancient kingdom of Uganda, enjoyed a special and privileged status. By the terms of the Uganda Agreement, signed in 1900, and supplemented by further legislation over the years, Buganda received a considerable measure of self-government. The Kabaka was recognized as hereditary monarch. Wide areas of appointment to office, administration of welfare departments, tax-collection and some disbursement, even lawmaking, were in the hands of the Lukiko or council, a body of chiefs and notables appointed by the Kabaka, or elected by a complicated system of indirect voting, culminating in electoral colleges in the various districts. Chiefs and other dignitaries were assigned large areas of agricultural land as their private estates, so

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that now about half—and the more valuable half—of the land in Buganda province is privately owned, in blocs which range from a few acres to many square miles. A good deal of this is planted in cotton and coffee, worked by share-cropping tenants or hired labor, and some of the holdings in and near Kampala are subdivided into relatively high-rental residential or business plots.

The rest of the protectorate was governed by quite different regulations. Its chiefs were British appointees, and in some areas, where there was no background of centralized authority on even a small scale, the chiefs were Ganda,[5] brought in to teach the "backward" areas how to govern themselves. Even where, as in Bunyoro, for example, or Ankole, hereditary kings were recognized by specific agreements, they did not have the self-governing powers assigned to the Baganda. And nowhere else were there parallel land allotments, so that there are no comparable large estates, nor access to individual wealth, for the peoples of the rest of Uganda.

The movement toward independence in Uganda involved a drama which is easily referred to the rubric of "tribalism." The issue was that of Ganda separatism. Establishing a Protectorate Legislative Council with increasing native representation and responsible participation in government was conceived by the Colonial Office as an important step toward the goal of independence and self-government. When a common election for delegates to this body was held, Buganda refused to participate in the election, although special provision was made to guarantee it substantial representation. Actually, there were several issues. One was the threat of being swamped in a protectorate-wide body; another was the disapproval of a direct-election system, which would have given the vote even to "foreigners" resident in Buganda (that is, members of other tribes of the protectorate and Ruanda, who in a few districts actually constitute a majority of the population); and a third was popular opposition to a body which was clearly being set up on a "multiracial" basis, with representation for Europeans and Indians.

The election boycott was successful. Only some thirty-

[5] Ganda here refers, as is customary current usage, to the people of Buganda, who speak Luganda, and call themselves Baganda.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

five thousand out of a Buganda population of over a million registered for it. When arrangements for the election went ahead in spite of the Buganda protest and boycott, the Lukiko—the Buganda assembly—declared itself out of the protectorate. It passed a resolution rescinding its 1900 agreement with Britian and declaring its full independence. Despite Britain's refusal to recognize this new status, it proceeded, on January 11, 1961, to implement its resolution by assigning ministerial portfolios to cover the new functions the independent government would have to assume.

When the British persisted, and the candidates elected by the three per cent who voted were seated in the legislature, the Ganda leaders changed tactics and founded their own political party, Kabaka Yekka ("the Kabaka only"), which captured the seats at the next election, and secured special home-rule privileges for Buganda and the election of the Kabaka as the first president of Uganda. Kabaka Yekka has been maintained as a strictly Baganda party, despite suggestions that it expand to include traditionalist and royalist elements in the other kingdoms of Uganda.[6]

Certainly, this is Ganda "tribalism" in the sense that it is Ganda separatism and a reflection of Ganda attitudes of difference and superiority over the other peoples of the protectorate. These attitudes are easy to discern. Land is seldom sold to members of other tribal groups, although they are welcomed as tenants, especially as seasonal commercial-production tenants. Many "foreigners" play a considerable role as stewards and even political right-hand men to their landlords, but virtually none have yet been appointed as chiefs. The Ganda are, on the average, wealthier. They are Christian, and more of them are literate and even highly educated. They disdain to work with their hands, and whenever possible hire paid laborers, who flock in from all sides to work on Ganda-owned plantations and in construction trades, while landless Ganda aim at civil-service jobs and commute from the suburbs on bicycles.

The quality of Ganda superiority feelings is neatly epitomized in a fragment of a high-school students' debate, reported by Audrey Richards:

[6] See Cherry Gertzel, "How Kabaka Yekka Began," *Africa Report*, October 1964, 9–13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

14-year-old girl: "If we are all equal we ought to give our porters food on plates with us, and not on banana leaves at the back door."
Answer, from another student: "But we are not equal. The Europeans and Ganda are clean and the others are dirty." [7]

It would seem to me quite obvious that the character and content of these attitudes are at least as much a product of the privileged economic and political position of the Ganda today as a heritage of previous tribal alignments. For one thing, Ganda superiority was not so firmly entrenched before the Uganda agreement with Britain. It is true that the kingdom was an expanding conquest state, exacting tribute from increasing numbers of its neighbors. It had an extremely powerful and rather efficient system of centralized control, with an elaborate appointive bureaucracy under a hereditary dynastic ruler. But it was not the only powerful state in the region. The Kingdom of Bunyoro especially was in a comparable position of successful conquest and ascendancy. One of the factors impelling the Ganda to make peace with the British and place themselves under their protection was the desire to gain British arms and support against their dangerous rival in the west. There is still a considerable area in Buganda which is *Bunyoro irridenta,* Lunyoro-speaking, but ruled by Ganda chiefs. The districts in question were ceded to Buganda not by treaty with the Nyoro, but by agreement with the British, in recognition of Ganda cooperation against the intransigent Nyoro, whose king died in exile, never reconciled to British rule. And the problem of these "lost counties" is still a live issue.[8]

To some extent these issues still rankle. But it seems that "tribal" (or perhaps in this instance we would be better advised to say "national" or "imperial") antagonisms must sometimes be set aside for larger issues, such as the safeguarding of the principle of monarchy. In any case, it is precisely with their old rivals—the great kingdoms of Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole—that the Ganda ruling class made

[7] A. I. Richards, *Economic Development and Tribal Change* (Cambridge, 1954), 161.

[8] In 1964 the Baganda political party, Kabaka Yekka, withdrew from its coalition with the government when Prime Minister Obote approved the holding of a referendum on their status.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some common cause. The several hereditary monarchs met together a number of times, and urged that no change be made in the formal government of the protectorate before the status of Buganda, and the position of its monarch, was fully clarified and protected. The value of hereditary monarchy both as symbol and for bargaining power in the contemporary situation is so great that in Busoga the chiefs, once heads of about fifteen separate small states and now united by the British under an appointed Paramount, have asked that the latter be elevated in status and be named hereditary monarch. And when Uganda achieved its independence in 1962, the constitution provided for hereditary status for the various kings and federal status for their several districts, though with greater formal independent powers granted to Buganda than to the others.

"Tribalism" certainly seems an inadequate and misleading term for this whole situation. We must remember that the lines of separation between these various kingdoms were in a state of flux long before the British arrived on the scene. There were realignments by war and conquest, and by treaty among the rulers, which meant that subject populations were transferred to different masters. In addition, subject peoples themselves might move, or adopt a new ruler. As Audrey Richards puts it:

> Lineage groups have split off from parent stocks and have become attached by fictions of common descent to similar lineages in another tribe. In some cases they have acquired position as ruling dynasties over indigenous people. In others the migrants have been absorbed into the political systems of neighboring tribes by the mere act of recognizing the latter's chiefs and giving them tribute. They have done so either as refugees from one tyrannical chief trying to win protection from another, or as humble allies of a more powerful political group. Cases of families and individuals being incorporated into stranger tribes are also known.[9]

What is more, in Buganda the political organization was not set up along clan and kin lines, with permanent relationships to hereditary chiefs and subchiefs. Instead there was considerable vertical as well as horizontal mobility. Only the position of the Kabaka was hereditary, and even that

[9] Richards, 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was not clearcut, because there was no simple designation of the specific heir. The ancient kingdom was almost an "open society." Chiefs were appointed and demoted by the Kabaka; preferment was by personal favor, not lineage. And as for the ordinary Muganda, too poor to play this game of power politics, even he was in a position to exercise some role in it. A new chief might be appointed over him at any time, to whom he would owe customary dues and assistance in war. But he was free to move on his own initiative, to find a master whom he preferred if he did not like his immediate overlord. Land-use rights came from this kind of voluntary feudal subjection, not from membership in a clan with vested rights to particular land areas, although there were indications of earlier conditions of such tenure, as in the designated non-alienable clan burial grounds.

Certainly this is a far cry from the usual model of traditional chieftainship and hereditary loyalties. The consequence of the Uganda agreement, and particularly of its land tenure provisions, was to shift the balance toward what Low, in his analysis of twentieth-century Buganda political history, has so aptly called "neo-traditionalism." There has been increasing power for the chiefs, with rather less for the Kabaka, and for the ordinary peasant. Many of the best-educated and most Westernized elite are the sons of wealthy landowning chiefs, with an inclination to enter the power-hierarchy rather than to fight it.[10]

Furthermore, and again to counter the model of homogeneity and comfortable unity under "tribal" conditions, there is reason to think that the Ganda are far from a united people today. It is true that there was strong general support for the Kabaka a few years ago, when he was exiled in a political dispute with Britain. But this was an indignity which could obviously rally the support of anti-British nationalists, such as the Uganda National Congress, as well as of the most ardent traditionalists. It is also true that the 1960 election boycott was successful, but there have been accusations that this was the effect of threats and intimidation, not unanimity of sentiment. And there were voices, in Buganda itself, which accused the Lukiko of refusing to go along with constitutional changes because

[10] D. A. Low and R. C. Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule* (Oxford, 1960), 138ff., 259.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its members were afraid of being voted out of office in genuinely democratic elections. These accusations may be partial and biased, but they are at least straws in the wind.

There are a few clearer indications of some popular resentment against the entrenched power of the landlords and chiefs—grumblings, for example, which Richards reports, that landlords line their pockets at the expense of Ganda peasants, by preferring to rent their lands to the Alur and other "foreign" tenants.[11] And there has been the long history of resentment over the violation of clan burial-ground rights, expressed through the "Bataka Union" of lineage heads. When the chiefs' estates were assigned, many of them received, as part of their private lands, grounds which traditionally belonged to the different clans and lineages in perpetuity, as burial centers for all the scattered members of the clan. The "Bataka" lost their legal case for the return of these lands as long ago as 1926, but they have remained a pressure group, and apparently have had considerable popular support as a channel for the expression of various grievances. Some of these boiled over in riots in 1945 and 1949. In 1949, the Bataka submitted a petition to the Kabaka, calling among other things for greater democracy in government, including direct election of Lukiko representatives. I have no data on their political strength today. But it is surely important to note that while there are some fifty thousand Ganda landowners by now, this is just a tiny fraction of the entire Ganda population, and other bases of political differences are clearly present.

There is one other "new" cultural distinction which plays an important role in Uganda politics: religious affiliation, particularly as between Catholic and Protestant groups. This goes far enough back in Buganda history so that perhaps it ought to fall into the category of the "neo-traditional." There were serious religious conflicts between the adherents of different Christian missions, as well as with followers of Islam, in the early pre-pacification days. Once order was established, the issue was resolved by apportionment of different areas and political offices to Protestants and Catholics respectively, and Low's study indicates that for the

11 Richards, 223.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whole first half of this century there was very little change in the distribution.[12] There are virtually no pagan chiefs, and very few large-scale landholders, who are not officially Christian. The only exception is in the area of Kkooki, where an entire small kingdom was incorporated into Buganda by its own voluntary submission, just in time to profit by the favorable terms of the Uganda agreement.

IV

What of the other peoples of the protectorate, with their differing languages and cultures and varying adherence to older ways of life? What does "tribalism" mean to them, and to what degree have their horizons and loyalties been changing? Because of the differences in their older life ways, and in their reactions to modern currents of change, it would be very difficult to make any valid statements that would fit all of them. I should, as a matter of fact, even be hard pressed to find a definition for the tribe as such which would fit all the peoples of Uganda. However, for some at least we can say that the experiences of the recent past have acted as a catalyst for the emergence of new and wider ethnic identifications. For the Alur, for example, we can find the same kind of situational interpretation of identification and allegiance, and the same process of "super-tribalization," of recognition of "tribal" belongingness far beyond the limits of any earlier community. Actually, the Alur represent at least five different stocks, varying in language and culture. They were all subject to Alur chiefs, but the latter governed as individuals, not as members of an organized governing unit. Today, when any of these many people come to Buganda to work, they are all classified as Alur, both by the Ganda and themselves. They are fitted into a Ganda stereotype for the Alur, as rather violent people, with a penchant for fighting and strong drink, but excellent workers. And they tend to live apart in little enclaves, which may be made up of actual kinsmen, or simply of people from the same clan, chieftainship, or region.[13] The phenomenon of clustering together for security, which this represents, is a common one in the

12 Low and Pratt, 97.

13 Southall, "Alur Migrants," in Richards, 141–60.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

urbanization process. It has been described not only for Africa, but for other parts of the world as well, and characterizes the immigrant to America as well as it does the "tribal" migrant to a large city. In Uganda, welfare and social clubs have developed along such "super-tribal" lines, embracing, for example, all people from Ruanda and Urundi, or many different speakers of Luo dialects.

The Ganda keep all these people at a social distance, and deny them landownership or political preferment. This is itself a new rather than an old phenomenon, for the Ganda in the past incorporated aliens. Indeed, some of the leading Ganda families were originally of alien lineage. Today, "foreigners" are kept out of the power elite as much as possible. But as far as the immigrants themselves are concerned, more and more of them are staying longer and longer, just as is the case in other centers of cash income in Africa. And it is clear that whatever their past or present antagonisms to the Ganda may be, some at least among them are quite ready to be assimilated, if the Ganda would allow it. As the protocol of an interview with a Ruanda immigrant puts it, "Yes, I want to become a Ganda. I join in everything they do. When I have enough money I mean to be baptised like the Ganda." [14]

The model of tribalism must also be modified by the segmentary-lineage type of structure which was to be found among quite a few of the peoples of Uganda. For such people as the Chiga, whatever sense of ethnic unity they possess can only be an emergent one, a response to experiences of the recent past. For the Chiga as I knew them in the nineteen-thirties had no "tribal" unity whatsoever. They were simply those people who lived in the hill country of the southwest.[15] They spoke a dialect of Lunyankole sometimes with a considerable admixture of Lunyaruanda. There was no common Chiga jural or moral community. Different Chiga clans, and even sub-clans, were constantly fighting one another; there were cattle raids, feud killings, even open battles. And there was no way of avoiding such bloodshed by ritual or blood-money payments, except between closely related lineages. The only ties uniting

[14] Richards, 167.

[15] May Edel, *The Chiga of Western Uganda* (Oxford, 1957).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people of different lineages were bonds of affinal kinship and pact-brotherhood, and these were individual bonds only, not political networks.

The only sense of common Chiga identity came from a common rejection of alien overlordship. They were the people whom the Hima and the Tutsi had not conquered, or who had escaped from their suzerainty. They recognized no chiefs, paid no tribute, and told with proud boasts of individuals who had accepted patronage gifts of cattle, only to run off with them instead of becoming vassals. But the battles they had fought with invading Ruanda or Ankole armies were fought by separate clans, not by the Chiga as a people. The different clans had no common ultimate identity, no claim to common origin; some spoke of coming from the north, others from Ruanda, and all knew of individuals and lineages who had moved away, migrated, for instance, northward to the grasslands below the escarpment, and so had ceased to be "Bachiga."

Independence and individualism have remained important parts of the Chiga world-view and value system. When resettlement projects were undertaken in recent years, to relieve serious population pressure on their densely-settled lands, the Chiga resisted attempts to move them into Ankole. This was not because of traditional ties to their homeland, for such moves had often taken place in the past, but because those who were to move feared they would lose their independence and become subject to the hereditary ruler of Ankole.

The Chiga image of government as distasteful has not been lessened by their experience with British overrule. They are among those peoples of the protectorate whose introduction to the techniques of "self" government was through Ganda chiefs. Baxter tells us that one of the lessons they learned was that chiefs should be domineering and arbitrary.[16] Being a pragmatic people, the Chiga knuckled under to superior power, but they are no doubt ready to value their independence should they win it once more.

Perhaps there is a danger here for the future. On the other hand, the Chiga have been moving forward to partici-

[16] P. T. W. Baxter, "The Kiga," in A. I. Richards, *East African Chiefs* (New York, 1960), 278–310.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pation in the money economy, to Christianity and education. They have been selling their goats and their labor in Buganda, and improving their agricultural methods by careful terracing and reforestation. Some of them have lately been the proud recipients of freehold titles to their agricultural plots. Perhaps their qualities of rugged individualism, uncomplicated by strong tribal bonds, will fit them well for democracy. I have no actual current data on which to predict whether individualism, nationalism, or a new tribalism will emerge in this area. It appears that in earlier district elections, the Chiga did vote in large numbers, indicating an interest in wider affairs; but they are reported to have voted solidly by religious blocs, "lining up" literally behind the Protestant and Catholic candidates respectively. Major Uganda national parties today represent a fusion of parties from the northeast and the southwest, again suggestive of wider allegiances. Many delicate problems may still be in the balance, of course. Only recently, people somewhat similar to the Chiga in their cultural and political status (the Konjo and the Amba of the northern part of the Western Province) have been demanding separate recognition. They claim to be discriminated against by the Toro, and would like to form a distinct administrative unit from them.[17] But this is all within the framework of the Uganda national state, not a proposed secession.

All this suggests that the Chiga are beginning to see themselves as part of Uganda. It does not tell us whether the Chiga have in fact developed any stronger identification of themselves as a tribal unit than they once had. Certainly their moral community has broadened in at least some senses, for the old warfare and fighting have gone, under the enforced Pax Britannica. With this change, there had begun the acceptance of other people's rights to their lives and to their cattle, as long ago as in the nineteen-thirties. I do not know how much further this has gone today.

In any case, I think we can say not only for the Chiga, but for most of Uganda, that whatever strength "tribal" allegiances and inter-tribal antagonisms may have can hardly be a heritage from the "tribal" past, since for the masses of the people neither loyalties nor differences were deeply rooted

[17] There have been outbreaks of violence in February 1963 and June 1964.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in a "tribal" tradition. Perhaps it is different in regions in which there was a more integral relation of the chief to his people, based on common hereditary territorial and ritual commitments. But I think the prevalence of the latter kind of unity has probably been somewhat exaggerated in our common image of Africa. In Uganda, as we have seen, the lines of what *is* one's tribe, of what security it provides and what obligations it implies, and the character of its relations with other tribes, have always been subject to fluctuation and reinterpretation. It seems to me that patterns of cohesion, division, and identification will continue to be responsive to the realities of legal, economic, and political experiences and pressures. The emergence of a stronger consciousness of ethnic unity in any "tribal" region does not have to be incompatible with the parallel growth of allegiance to a wider unity, providing there is some context in which each is meaningful, and that the interests involved are not sharply in conflict.[18]

V

A parallel lesson could be drawn from the implications of another meaning which is sometimes given to "tribalism." I have been considering tribalism in the sense of ethnic loyalty and identification. It is also sometimes taken to refer to commitment to traditional patterns of culture. There are, it is true, considerable differences in the extent to which different African peoples have chosen the path of culture change. Some, especially the pastoral peoples of East Africa —including the Karamajong and others of northern Uganda —have fought to maintain their traditional way of life. Most others have welcomed at least some change, have accepted the value of lamps and bicycles, and even of universities, hospitals, and scientific research. We all know the story of the ways in which changes in family form, land utilization, the position of women, and so on follow in succession once the die is cast. It is too late now for most of Africa to vote for "tribal" ways of life. It is true that we are witnessing today a strong rebirth of some aspects of indigenous culture. Pouring libations to the ancestors and wearing cloths instead

[18] A rather similar view is stated for the Congo in D. Biebuyck and Mary Douglas, *Congo Tribes and Parties* (London, 1961), 44ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of European clothes, as in Ghana today, are symptoms of this movement. But these are sophisticated symbols, not simple reversions to "tribalism." Nor are they marks of tribal separatism. Their essence is the defiance not of modern ways as such but of the image of the colonial power, and all of its culture, as superior. More meaningful are the new cultural forms, the family corporations, women's welfare "meetings," even such things as the new concrete sculpture, which are adaptations of the old to meet the problems and demands of today.

I do not believe that differences in culture as such are likely to be barriers to communication and unity of action, or to mutual tolerance and respect in Africa. The African has no tradition for crusading missionary zeal in imposing his own standards of morality and esthetics on other people. Hair styles, riddles and songs, even initiation rites like the filing of teeth, have passed readily from one people to another in the past, sometimes even as fads and fashions to be experimented with. If such differences ever become the rallying cries for conflict, it will surely be only because they will be symbols for existing conflict on another level. Of course, institutional differences, as in marriage and inheritance laws, may sometimes pose problems in relations between intermarrying groups; but these are no more (and no less) difficult of resolution than the comparable problems posed by the rapidly changing patterns of social organization within a given "tribe."

In short, I think that we can say, for tribal cultures as for tribal loyalties, that features of the past are likely to be dynamic factors in the present only as they are relevant to real issues in the present and reflect common or conflicting interests and values. It sometimes seems to me that the issues of "tribalism" which pose the greatest problems for Africans today are those that arise not from situations intrinsic to Africa but from the "tribal" conflicts of our own Western world.

May Edel

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY, 1880–1920

IN RECENT years the analysis of American political history in the decades from 1880 to 1920 has undergone considerable innovation. Historians have, for example, used statistics more than in the past, investigated new subject-matter areas, and promoted to some degree the cross-breeding of history and the social sciences. Far more than that, however, they have become increasingly concerned with examining the patterns and processes of political change, and thereby have asked new basic questions and developed new frameworks of analysis. Following Professor Thomas C. Cochran's critique of the "presidential synthesis" in 1948,[1] historians have increasingly shifted their focus from the episodic and the formal to the underlying uniform patterns of political life. They have become, in other words, more thoroughgoing social analysts. Here I wish to examine some specific aspects of this trend and to elaborate briefly on some of its implications.

I

The social analysis of history, it should be emphasized at the outset, does not involve a concern for a particular "social" subject-matter which can be distinguished from political, economic, or constitutional history. On the contrary, it refers to a particular way of looking at all aspects of the past, a focus on the structure and processes of human relationships. Society, the assumption runs, is a network of human contacts in which there are uniform and persistent patterns. The most important aspects of these persistent relationships are their structure and the processes by which that structure changes. For the social analyst the crucial questions concern human institutions and the types of organization of economic, social, political, and intellectual life that develop and change over time. These, it is emphasized,

[1] Thomas C. Cochran, "The Presidential Synthesis in American History," *American Historical Review*, LIII (1948), 748–59.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are to be described and analyzed not in terms of the formal statements which institutions produce such as laws, constitutions, newspaper editorials, annual reports, speeches, or official press releases, but in terms of the types of human interrelationships which are inherent in those institutions. My concern here, then, is not with social facts as a separate type of data, but with social analysis as a particular set of questions which can be asked of every type of data that involves human relationships.

More specifically I am concerned with the social analysis of politics, of those human activities which involve the distribution of power throughout society. Political life consists of many economic, social, cultural, and ideological facets, which must be incorporated into historical analysis not simply as new elements which influence formal political institutions, but as factors which lie outside those institutions and form an even broader system of political life. Leadership in the educational, religious, and economic world, for example, is as much a political fact as leadership in party politics or public administration, for it is a crucial feature of decision-making and the distribution of power. The social analysis of political life, therefore, requires that the definition of politics be greatly broadened; it requires that the historian move from the formal aspects of political institutions to the structure and processes of every type of public human relationship.

In political history the emphasis on social analysis has affected most greatly conceptions of the structure of politics, that is, of the distinct groupings of people in political life, their ideas and practices, and the relationships among these groupings. For many years historians have divided political groups in the decades around the turn of the century between the business community on the one hand, and its mass supported opponents, chiefly farmers, workers, and small businessmen, on the other. Political differences centered on the problem of control of the business community and the role of parties, legislation, and court decisions in that struggle. Whole periods of political history have been classified on the basis of whether the business community or its opponents dominated the era and people and events in terms of whether they were bound up with one or the other side

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of that struggle. For want of better terminology, I will refer to this viewpoint as the liberal framework, a term which will be used here in a purely descriptive sense, referring only to the view of history outlined above and below, and without further connotations.

The liberal analysis assumed a highly moralistic and rationalistic political structure. Political life involved divisions not between well-defined economic and social groups, but between a mass, undifferentiated, equalitarian "people" or "public," held together by common cosmic forces of morality and reason and limited cultural and economic groups which sought special power and influence. That conflict, moreover, was unnatural and transitory, the prelude to eventual harmony rather than a permanent manifestation of a fundamental structure of industrial society. Progress came not through the victory of one group over another, but from the elimination of group conflict through the activation of the cohesive forces of morality and reason as education increased and as right-thinking and right-feeling people arose to positions of power.

It seems clear now that this analysis consisted primarily of an elaboration of contemporary ideology rather than of generalization from evidence concerning political practice, that historians mistook the self-conceptions of an age for an accurate description of its political system. But an equally important source for it lay in the predominance of the assumptions of social science in history. Social science is essentially reformist. Political science and economics, for example, visualize ideal systems which should be created through private or public action. The resulting conception of political forces consists of those making for ideal systems on the one hand, and partial "selfish" influences working against them on the other. Thus to understand the politics of tariff-making, the historian must rely on studies by political economists, for whom the forces consist of those wishing to create an ideal system of free trade and those who would prevent this by "selfish" action. For municipal reform political scientists provide studies which describe conflicts between independent rational voters and more limited group power, represented by the "machine," which interferes with that process. By relying on such studies for his analyses, the historian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has absorbed a normatively defined political structure, highly moralistic and rationalistic in tone, rather than one growing out of evidence concerning patterns of human relationships.

This framework historians are discovering to be increasingly confining, because newer evidence concerning underlying social patterns and processes is inconsistent with it. An increasing amount of social, rather than ideological, analysis has produced evidence of a far more complex and varied political structure. The most explicit and widely acknowledged example is the current view that social reform did not spring from but was often opposed by the urban masses.[2] But the implications of other research are equally significant. For example: the source of commission and city manager movements lay primarily in the upper business and professional classes; [3] railroad regulation arose from competition among rival commercial centers more than from a struggle between farmers and railroads; [4] conservation involved a political conflict between the consolidating tendencies of science and technology and the varied needs of resource users rather than a popular revolt against corporations; [5] industrial towns of the eighteen-seventies were often controlled by workingmen, and not always by the new industrial elite; [6] ethnic and cultural issues, such as prohibition, language, and Sunday observance, determined voting attitudes more often than did questions of corporation control; [7] labor joined business to oppose lower tariffs and railroad regula-

2 George Mowry, *The California Progressives* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), 86–104; Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York, 1955), 131–269.

3 Harold A. Stone *et al., City Manager Government in Nine Cities* (Chicago, 1940); Frederick C. Mosher *et al., City Manager Government in Seven Cities* (Chicago, 1940); Harold A. Stone *et al., City Manager Government in the United States* (Chicago, 1940); James Weinstein, "Organized Business and the City Commission and Manager Movements," *Journal of Southern History,* XXVIII (1962), 166–82.

4 Lee Benson, *Merchants, Farmers and Railroads* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955).

5 Samuel P. Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959).

6 Herbert Gutman, "An Iron Workers' Strike in the Ohio Valley, 1873–74," *Ohio Historical Quarterly,* LXVIII (1959), 353–70; "Trouble on the Railroads, 1873–1874: Prelude to the 1877 Crisis," *Labor History,* II (1961), 215–36.

7 Samuel P. Hays, "History as Human Behavior," *Iowa Journal of History,* LVIII (1960), 193–206.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion not from fear of business but from convictions of self-interest.[8]

The implication of evidence such as this, let me emphasize, is not to modify value judgments about political movements, but rather to change fundamental and value-free conceptions of political relationships. That one should praise rather than condemn the "robber barons" involves little progress in historical understanding, but only a moral reclassification of events within a traditional analytical framework. The designation of leaders such as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as more "conservative" than "progressive" equally accepts rather than questions traditional assumptions concerning political structure. The argument here presented is that this set of assumptions, the liberal framework, has become of dubious usefulness, formal and confining for historical analysis, rather than conducive to the imaginative exploration of social patterns and processes. Exercising considerable power over the definition of historical problems, that framework has instinctively turned historians from many significant aspects of political life. More recent social analysts, however, find these views increasingly to be a "steel chain of ideas," the assumptions of which they must break through in order to delve into a wider range of political phenomena. Here I wish to review several examples of this trend.

II

During the last decade and a half the analysis of leadership has undergone a marked transition from an almost exclusive concentration on individual biography to a greater interest in collective biography. Cases in point are studies of the backgrounds of business leaders by William Miller [9] or Gregory and Neu; [10] of railroad leaders by Cochran; [11] of the

[8] Walter Poulshock, "Pennsylvania and the Politics of the Tariff, 1880–1888," paper delivered before the Pennsylvania Historical Association, October 20, 1961.

[9] William Miller, "American Historians and the Business Elite," *Journal of Economic History*, IX (1949), 184–208.

[10] Frances W. Gregory and Irene D. Neu, "The American Industrial Elite in the 1870's; Their Social Origins," in William Miller (ed.), *Men in Business* (New York, 1954), 193–211.

[11] Thomas C. Cochran, *Railroad Leaders, 1845–1890* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Philadelphia elite by E. Digby Baltzell; [12] of reform groups by Chandler and Mowry.[13] In the same general vein is the treatment of the patrician liberals of the post-Civil War era, which in its latest version Ari Hoogenboom has dealt with in the specific context of civil service reform.[14] Of unquestioned value, these studies provide a broader base from which to generalize about leadership, its recruitment, its status, its ideology, its impact.

The most influential of these studies, those by Chandler and Mowry, describe the old middle class, Puritan, native American, educated background of Progressive party leaders, and develop the argument that this background shaped the peculiar nature of Progressive reform. This analysis has played a crucial role in several recent works on the Progressive era and in the elaboration of newer cultural interpretations of modern America.[15] But these collective biographies are deficient in method and the reasoning based upon them is faulty in logic; they illustrate both the dangers and the advantages of this technique of analysis.

In the first place, the Chandler-Mowry studies were not comparative. They tell us who Bull Moose leaders were, but fail to investigate if and how they were different from other, for example, Old Guard leaders. Evidence is now available that in at least one important state, Iowa, both Progressive party leaders and Cummins Insurgents were just like their rivals in background.[16] If this is the case generally one can no longer explain the peculiar behavior of reformers in terms of a background not peculiar to them. There can be no doubt of the crucial importance of the crisis facing older America in an urban-industrial society. But it produced varied reactions, some of which, for example prohibi-

[12] E. Digby Baltzell, *Philadelphia Gentlemen* (Glencoe, 1958).

[13] Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," in Elting Morrison *et al.* (eds.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951–54), VIII, Appendix III, 1462–64; George Mowry, *California Progressives.*

[14] Ari Hoogenboom, "An Analysis of Civil Service Reformers," *The Historian,* XXIII (1960), 54–78.

[15] Richard Hofstadter, *Age of Reform;* Henry May, *The End of American Innocence* (New York, 1960); George Mowry, *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900–1912* (New York, 1958).

[16] Eli Daniel Potts, "A Comparative Study of the Leadership of Republican Factions in Iowa, 1904–1914," M. A. Thesis, State University of Iowa, 1954.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion and the defense of small-businessmen merchants threatened by the revolution in distribution, found expression in Old Guard politics. The question to be answered is, What special segment of older America did reform attract?

There is a second problem as well. Can one describe an entire movement by the characteristics of its top-level leaders? What of its voting base, the associated private movements, or local leadership? One analysis of local leadership found that the backgrounds of the two Republican factions were just the reverse of those suggested by Chandler and Mowry.[17] Reformers were far more immigrant, less educated, more non-Protestant, and working-class than was the Old Guard. Such evidence suggests that a broad political movement involves different levels of activity from the top down to the grass roots, and that leadership evidence from one level does not necessarily describe the entire movement.

Collective biographies, rightly approached, have much to offer. They can, for example, pinpoint the historical sequence of leadership groups and the process by which one elite fuses into or clashes with a succeeding one. Robert Sharkey has delineated a fairly clear line between older, mercantile, low-tariff, sound money leaders and the newer industrialists, expansionist in finance and high tariff advocates.[18] Ari Hoogenboom has found the same two groups on opposite sides of the fence in civil service reform.[19] These reflect a growing body of evidence which sets off an earlier elite bound up with commercial America from a rising industrial elite which looked at public affairs in a new way.

Several decades later the "rule-of-thumb," speculative industrial entrepreneur gave way to the systematizer and efficiency expert.[20] The new leadership appeared in many forms: the Taylor Society, conservation, the Municipal

17 David Carey, "Republican Factionalism in Burlington, Iowa, 1906–1908," M. A. Thesis, State University of Iowa, 1960.

18 Robert Sharkey, *Money, Class and Party* (Baltimore, 1957).

19 Hoogenboom, "Civil Service Reformers."

20 Loren Baritz, *The Servants of Power* (Middletown, 1960); Hays, *Conservation;* Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State* (New York, 1948), 3–61, trace different aspects of the efficiency movement.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Research Bureau, and the city manager movement; the efficiency movement in the public schools; vocational education; welfare capitalism and the scientific personnel movement; or the less formal innovations seen through the pages of a journal such as Arch Wilkinson Shaw's *System*. Such movements reflected the rise of men who thought in terms of systematic analysis and manipulation, who viewed earlier entrepreneurs with scorn, and who sought, with persistent success, to redirect the values and goals of American society. This new elite was highly attractive to patricians and intellectuals. While many in both groups had rejected the materialism and brashness of the new industrial elite, they found in the tendencies toward rationality and systematization an acceptable outlet for their talents, and thereby became reconciled to the very business community which earlier they had abhorred.

Collective biographies can also provide insight concerning the perplexing problem of the relationship between leadership and following. Why and how does an elite secure support for its political goals? This problem arises for the post-Civil War era in the fact that the industrial elite commanded broad political support. Why should this be when the "people and the "interests" supposedly occupied opposite sides of the political fence? Various corrupt practices, we have answered, prevented voters from expressing their own convictions. Thus, the urban workingman supported McKinley in 1896 because of threats and coercion. Newer evidence, however, suggests an alternative explanation, that political leaders allied with the industrial community provided a strong positive attraction for many voters. Oscar Handlin has emphasized such a role for the urban political machine in the life of the immigrant. Two recent papers at historical association meetings have stressed that McKinley and the tariff were positive symbols for urban workers who blamed the depression of 1893 on the Democrats.[21] Voting data, moreover, suggest that Anglo-Saxon Republican voters of Calvinist and Wesleyan descent looked upon their party not as an organization of corrupt political buccaneers, but

[21] Samuel T. McSeveney, "The Politics of Depression: Popular Voting Rehavior, 1893–1896," paper delivered before the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, April 20, 1961; Poulshock, "Politics of the Tariff."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as an instrument of "great moral ideas," as one of them put it, which rid the nation of slavery and stood for the defense and extension of evangelical Protestant morality. Perhaps the political leadership of the industrial elite depended as much upon its identification with particular culture patterns as upon its economic achievements.

By the same token, how did reform leaders secure political support? The implication of recent research is that reformers were not responding to an upwelling of popular demands, but, rather, that they faced an indifferent or even hostile public, and therefore were preoccupied with the problem of securing a following. Perhaps this explains why reformers seized upon prohibition, one of the few mass movements of the early twentieth century which sprang irresistibly from the grass roots and swept political leaders before it. Working within the context of reform as an outgrowth of mass protest, historians have assumed that no special problem was involved in relating reform leadership and grass-roots attitudes. With the knowledge, however, that reform sprang from upper socio-economic groups and met frequent mass opposition or indifference, this problem is brought into sharp focus.

III

Historians have frequently stressed that understanding American politics depends upon an analysis of developments at the middle and grass-roots levels. More recently, social analysts have argued that our political life uniquely involves the vitality of the middle levels of politics, which provides a degree of stability, a sense of participation, and a measure of fluidity absent in political systems where the elite and the mass face each other directly.[22] In the evolution of this middle level lay some of the most significant changes in American politics in the Age of Reform.

One such development concerns the rise of organized economic groups. With recovery from depression in the late eighteen-nineties, economic organizations grew rapidly and began to constitute a system of politics with a life of its own, independent of the party system. Since liberal historians,

[22] William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, 1959), for example.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

however, have condemned these organizations as an interference with more legitimate political processes or with desirable policies, there has been little attempt to understand their natural evolution or their role in political life. Some recent studies have utilized a more satisfactory approach, for example, those of the background of railroad regulation by George Miller, Lee Benson, and James Doster.[23]

Studies such as these emphasize the role of trade and business groups in "reform" movements, and suggest that they were even more characteristic sources of political change in the Progressive era than were farm and labor organizations. After 1897 trade associations grew rapidly, especially in distribution, where a veritable revolution, similar in impact to the earlier transportation revolution, displaced many merchants. Even more important were the opportunities for economic expansion which came with the upswing of 1897 and gave rise to community economic growth spearheaded by business groups organized in local chambers of commerce. One has the impression of a significant increase in associated commercial and industrial endeavor nurtured by the increased opportunities for economic expansion.[24]

Much political activity of the early twentieth century sprang from the demands of these trade groups. The Hepburn and Mann-Elkins Acts came about primarily through the efforts of organized trade associations and chambers of commerce. Pure food laws were shaped to a great extent by small merchants who complained that packaged foods, mass distributed by such firms as the National Biscuit Company, deceived the customer. Chambers of commerce invariably sparked reforms in municipal government and played a large role in the Country Life Movement. The drive to strengthen the Sherman Anti-Trust Act came largely from trade associations whom its enforcement affected most adversely and who sought to perfect the Act by emasculating

[23] George Miller, "Origins of the Iowa Granger Law," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* XL (1954), 657–80; "The Granger Laws: A Study of the Origins of State Railways Control in the Upper Mississippi Valley," Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1951; Benson, *Merchants, Farmers and Railroads;* James F. Doster, *Railroads in Alabama Politics, 1875–1914* (Montgomery, 1957).

[24] Robert Wiebe, *Businessmen and Reform* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it to legalize their own price-fixing devices. Finally, commercial groups who sought markets in Canada and Latin America spearheaded the movements for lower tariffs and reciprocity. This political revitalization of the nation's middle level economic groups was an especially important force in Midwestern Insurgency and its southern counterparts.

A second significant expansion of activity at the middle levels of politics was the shift in decision-making from local communities to states and municipalities. The systematization of public affairs in industrial society involved the increasing absorption of centers of political initiative and decision-making from local to higher levels, the atrophy of township and ward units as centers of political life, and the growth of state and municipal activity. Politics, in other words, underwent a process of centralization, a process of which many aspects of "reform" were an integral part.

One focal point of this development lay in municipal government reform, of which the crucial element was not so much the democratization of politics as the shift from ward to city-wide elections for city councils. This reduced both the influence of ward organization and the participation of the average citizen in both ward and city affairs. On the other hand, the city-wide election of councilmen gave greater influence to those centralizing and consolidating tendencies within the community and especially to business and professional leaders. The centralization of decision-making, which greater efficiency in municipal affairs required, and which was also demanded for a city-wide focus for such matters as street and other public works construction, often depended upon the centralization of the system of representation.

A more specialized example of the same process lay in the transfer of control over urban schools from the ward to a city-wide school board. The urban elementary school lay primarily under the jurisdiction of a locally-elected school board, as it did in rural areas, composed of a representative cross-section of the community's occupational groups. Educational reformers were shocked at the thought of permitting bartenders, oculists, and barbers supposedly ignorant of the details of education to guide the growth of an increasingly professional school system. In their minds the only solution

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was to consolidate control in a central board which would be responsive to professional educators rather than to laymen.[25] Business groups, concerned with cost and tax problems, heartily approved. The shift in jurisdiction, therefore, permitted a different group of people organized on a city-wide level, business and professional groups, to exercise more control.

Of the same order as these trends in urban politics were shifts from township and county authority to the state. School consolidation and good roads are cases in point. Organized formerly on the township level, encompassing relatively small geographical areas and under the control of township officials, these activities became absorbed into larger state-wide units, covering the entire state and under the control of state officials. Both were crucial elements of the Country Life Movement, in which Theodore Roosevelt took such a great interest and which attracted many to him in the Bull Moose campaign.

The good roads movement, for example, involved a conception of an inter-city system as a single network of transportation. Formerly each community had planned its own roads to connect individual farmsteads to local schools, churches, and market towns. When a larger system was formulated which attempted to link cities over a wide area, a new approach arose. Now roads cut through farms, instead of going around them, serving the requirements of the larger system. The transportation needs of the entire state gave rise to a state-wide, rather than a local perspective, and therefore a more centralized authority. It was just such a shift in focus which rural inhabitants feared. Conflict arose over the power of the state highway commission to establish and enforce standards of construction and maintenance. As its power grew, the power of local officials diminished. The location of decision-making had shifted to the middle levels of political organization.

IV

A number of historians have stressed from time to time that we must examine politics from the vantage point of the

[25] Lila Ver Planck North, "Pittsburgh Schools," in Paul Underwood Kellogg (ed.), *The Pittsburgh District Civic Frontage*, VI, *The Pittsburgh Survey*, 217–305, especially 247–48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

grass roots. For this purpose, our greatest dividends will come most quickly through analysis of voting data and the association of that data with social, economic, and cultural factors. The pioneering work done by V. O. Key, Samuel Lubell, and Lee Benson in this field opens up enormous possibilities.[26] Two large types of questions can be explored. First, what are the major changes in political sentiment and how can they be explained? Second, how do groups on the opposite side of the political fence differ?

Voting data can define changes in political behavior so that less emphasis is placed on the outcome of particular contests and more on the patterns of political attitudes and the shifts in those patterns. The politics of the eighteen-nineties is a case in point. For many years we have focused on the election of 1896; we have asked, Why did Bryan lose? But two major observations are now compelling a reformulation of the problem. One is that the most important long-run change in political sentiment between the Civil War and the First World War was the shift from the even balance between the parties from 1874 to 1894 to sixteen years of one-party Republican domination. The second is that the election of 1894 witnessed what appears to be the sharpest shift in voting sentiment during the entire period from 1874 until the First World War. These two facts prompt one to argue that the question as to why Bryan lost is less important than those of why the long-run shift in voting sentiment and why the sudden rise in Republican fortunes. The significance of this "revolution" in voting patterns has been pointed out by W. Dean Burnham, Samuel Lubell, and Lee Benson.[27] Burnham, for example, wrote, "In 1892 the Republican two-party percentage of the membership of the House of Representatives rose to 37.0%, while in the violent G.O.P. overturn of 1894, the proportion of Republican

[26] V. O. Key, "Secular Realignment and the Party System," *Journal of Politics*, XXI (1959), 198–210; *Idem*, "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, XVII (1955), 3–18; Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1952); Lee Benson, "Research Problems in American Political Historiography," in Mirra Komarovsky (ed.), *Common Frontiers in the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, 1957), 113–83.

[27] Lee Benson, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy* (Princeton, 1961), 128–31; W. Dean Burnham, *Presidential Ballots, 1836–1892* (Baltimore, 1955), 154–56; Duncan McRae and James Meldrum, "Critical Elections in Illinois," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (1960), 669–83.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

members rose abruptly to 70.7%." [28] A number of doctoral dissertations in progress involve an analysis of this dramatic shift, and a paper at the Missisippi Valley Historical Association meeting recently examined the apparent close relationship between the depression of 1893 and the sudden rise in Republican strength.[29] It therefore appears that the analysis of voting behavior is radically altering our approach to the politics of the eighteen-nineties.

A second long-run change in political sentiment is the rise in Democratic strength in the first fifteen years of the twentieth century. Using the party composition of congressional delegations as a measure of change, Democratic support began to rise in 1906, persisted through 1908 as the party, despite Taft's victory, increased its legislative strength, reached a congressional majority in 1910 and a peak probably in 1914. The end of this Democratic majority came with the First World War, but the cause for its development is not so clear. The most important single fact seems to be its concentration in a group of states from Illinois on the west to New York and New Jersey on the east. Between 1904 and 1910, for example, the Democrats gained ninety-two seats in the House, of which sixty-two came from those six states: Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. Ohio and Indiana, the centers of the movement, increased their Democratic strength respectively from one to sixteen out of twenty-one, and from two to twelve out of thirteen. The location of the focal point of the shift rules out its relationship with Insurgency and the timing, that it began before 1909, rules out its peculiar connection with Taft's policies in 1909 and 1910. It may be that, as in Ohio, Democratic increases were associated with prohibition.[30] The problem remains yet unexamined and unsolved, but the use of voting data to define it as a significant focus of interest inevitably draws attention to shifts in voting patterns at the grass roots.

Voting data can also establish more precisely the distinctions between political contestants, parties, factions with-

[28] Burnham, 155.

[29] McSeveney, "Politics of Depression."

[30] Landon Warner, "Ohio's Crusade for Reform, 1897–1917," Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1949, 250ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in parties, or the opposite sides of a non-partisan issue. Precinct returns for the gubernatorial race in Iowa between 1887 and 1918, for example, demonstrate that differences between and within the two major parties were overwhelmingly ethnic and cultural.[31] Republican precincts were distinctively Methodist, Presbyterian, Quaker, and United Brethren among native American groups, and German Presbyterian, German Methodist, Reformed, and Scandinavian Lutheran among immigrants. The native American element in Democratic precincts is not so clearly defined, but the immigrant component was distinctively German, Bohemian and Irish Catholic, and German Lutheran. Economic issues, such as corporation control, seem to have been almost irrelevant in the face of a range of social and cultural differences involving nationality and religion, which centered primarily on prohibition and Sunday observance.

Evidence such as this suggests that the period 1874–92, far from being one of stalemate and barrenness in politics, as tradition would have it, involved significant cultural conflict. Consider, for example, the sharp rise in Democratic congressional strength in 1890, which is one of the most perplexing bits of voting behavior of the entire period. The rise had little to do with agrarian unrest because it took place, for the most part, east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio. In at least three states cultural factors were dominant: in Iowa the adverse reaction to prohibition, and in Wisconsin and Illinois an even stronger reaction to the language restrictions of the Bennett and Edwards Acts. These factors, moreover, carried over into the twentieth century. Distinctions in Iowa between Insurgent and Old Guard voters were cultural, and the sharpest political shifts in the state's history, in 1916 and 1918, involved issues of prohibition and language.

Grass-roots voting behavior can also illuminate more fully the forces involved in reforms in municipal government. Liberal historians have long suggested that municipal reform came on a popular wave of discontent with a business-politician combination involving an exchange of favors to businessmen and graft to political leaders. Recent research has modified this view to the extent of emphasizing that

[31] Hays, "History as Human Behavior."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lower socio-economic groups, both immigrant voters and organized labor, opposed such innovations as the commission and city manager forms of government. The reform impulse, the argument now goes, came from the middle class. But the nature of the leadership, organized groups involved, and voting support in such issues suggest that the source of reform drives lay in the upper classes. The best evidence for this is in the case studies of the origin of city manager government carried out by the Committee on Public Administration under Leonard White at the University of Chicago in the nineteen-thirties.[32] Voting data from commission government elections in Iowa, which was a major center of this movement, indicate that silk stocking districts provided the heaviest support for reform, just as working-class wards furnished its greatest opposition. Through changes in governmental structure, the leading business and professional groups sought to secure greater control of urban public affairs. Reform involved not an attack on the urban business community, but a drive by businessmen, usually spearheaded by a chamber of commerce, to influence urban affairs more effectively.[33]

V

The increasing emphasis on social analysis has affected not only the treatment of specific historical problems but broader conceptions of change in industrial society as well. It has focused attention particularly on the systematizing and organizing processes inherent in industrialism as the dynamic force in social change in modern life. The following is a brief elaboration of some implications of such an overall focus.

Science and technology shaped the politics of modern American society. This is not to say simply that the subject matter of public policy concerned industry, labor, and urbanization, but that science and technology imposed a social discipline which "invaded a constantly increasing portion of the community's activities . . . , disintegrated the

[32] Stone *et al., City Manager Government;* Mosher *et al., City Manager Government;* Fred G. Kerschner, "From Country Town to Industrial City," *Indiana Magazine of History,* LV (1949), 330.

[33] James Weinstein, "Organized Business."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

institutional heritage," and influenced fundamentally the patterns of social relationships.[34] That structure, moreover, involved the systematization of human relationships into a fairly distinct hierarchy of thought and behavior, involving top, middle, and grass-roots levels. Each level of this hierarchy comprised a different degree of the geographical scope of life, the cosmopolitanization of culture, and the unification of political processes.

Political movements in modern industrial society can be distinguished in terms of the role which they played in this evolving structure. Many were involved in constructing systems of human activity in industry, labor, agriculture, government, or education and with perfecting the techniques of control which these systems require. A gradual rather than a sudden development, this process constituted an evolution from smaller to larger and larger systems, accompanied by a persistent upward flow of the location of decision-making. One envisages a network of human relationships emerging from the demands of industry and technology, reaching out to encompass an ever-wider number of people and range of activities. Nationwide corporations drew many local firms into a single entity; social scientists perfected systems of personnel control in industry, government, and education; metropolitan centers drew small towns and rural communities into their economic, social, and cultural orbit.

At the base of the hierarchy of political action were forces standing apart from innovating tendencies, yet drawn into them. Metropolitan and cosmopolitan influences constantly threatened local life. Ethnic ties became weaker; rural life was reorganized around larger centers of school and church community; local elites declined in significance in the face of national elites with wider prestige; the standards of a wider professional life invaded the educational institutions responsive to local forces;[35] the small town became a satellite of the larger city; suburban areas were drawn into the larger metropolitan community; county officials accus-

[34] Clark Kerr *et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 33–46.

[35] Alvin Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* II (1957), 281–306; (1958), 444–80.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tomed to the selection of local welfare officials on a friends-and-neighbors basis were required by federal social security agencies to use professional standards.[36] The quality, activities, and political role of local life were drastically modified by the larger affairs which now engulfed it.

This framework helps to distinguish levels of political activity and to establish relationships among them, thereby placing in proper focus the inadequacy of top-level political history. In particular, it raises a whole series of problems of social analysis at the points where cosmopolitan and local forces met.[37] Who, for example, were the personal links between local society and the larger world, and did those who provided these connections change over the years? What were the stages by which individuals and communities were drawn into the larger society? What types of communities resisted, and perhaps successfully, these influences? Illumination of problems such as these would prevent one from generalizing directly from one level of political life to the entire society, and, in turn, would deepen our understanding of the workings of the structure of politics as a whole.

Two phenomena illustrate these problems more concretely. One is the development of the county agent system in agriculture. This did not arise simply from the political or economic growth of agriculture, or from what has traditionally been labeled "Progressive reform." As Grant McConnell has shown, the impetus for the county agent movement came from railroads, mail-order houses, farm equipment manufacturers, and mortgage bankers, all of whom feared the loss of rural business, and from land grant college agricultural experts who worked closely with business groups.[38] The county agent, in other words, served as a representative, in a local community, of outside forces, a contact man between local farmers and the wider scientific

[36] "The Battle of Blue Earth County," in Harold Stein (ed.), *Public Administration and Policy Development* (New York, 1952), 89–105.

[37] Robert K. Merton, "Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials," in Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, 1957), 387–420; Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (New York, 1960).

[38] Grant McConnell, *The Decline of Agrarian Democracy* (Berkeley, 1953), 19–35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and economic influences of industrial society. His role is to be understood in terms of the way in which the larger industrial, cosmopolitan, and systematizing influences of modern society reached out to transform rural and small town life.

A second example is the impact of the First World War on the United States. The war speeded up greatly tendencies in political structure, and especially the systematization and nationwide organization of economic life. The war witnessed an upward shift of decision-making so that many groups exercised less influence than formerly. Railshippers, for example, now confronted a railroad administration strikingly unreceptive to their demands, whereas in previous years they had found a spokesman in the Interstate Commere Commission. The pressures of wartime patriotism silenced temporarily those who felt this type of frustration, but after the war they rebelled against these innovations of system.[39] Therein lies one important key specifically to the decision against continued federal control of the railroads, and generally to the massive rebellion against Wilson and the Democratic party first evidenced in 1918 and reaching staggering proportions in 1920.

The character of the middle levels of political life frequently stemmed from the evolving relationships between the top levels of politics and the grass roots. On the one hand, those engaged in local activities organized in larger geographical units to exercise some control over vast private and public forces which they could not, as individuals, influence. Hence the rise of the trade association in business, labor and agriculture, or the regional or national ethnic or religious group. On the other hand, as administrators executed policy on higher levels, they found that they had lost contact with the grass roots, and so encouraged the formation of the same intermediate organizations both for administrative convenience and political support. Thus, for example, the promotion of trade associations by the War Industries Board during the First World War, or of neighborhood clubs by the city-wide welfare agency which

[39] Kathel A. Kerr, "Shipper Groups and the Transportation Act of 1920," M. A. Thesis, State University of Iowa, 1960, for an account of this process in one important area of wartime policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had taken the place of personal charity provided by the ward leader.

One intriguing aspect of political evolution at the middle level concerns the changing nature of state-wide decision-making as a product of the tension between locally-oriented tendencies in rural and small-town life on the one hand, and consolidating tendencies of larger urban centers on the other. Faced with dominant and unfriendly small-town and rural state legislators, large cities turned increasingly to the federal government not only for financial aid, but also for assistance in establishing political and administrative systems with a state-wide focus which encompassed urban-metropolitan life. Effective state highway commissions, for example, responsive to urban views on highway development, were accepted by many state legislatures only as a necessary condition for receiving federal aid. Urban areas thereby used federal power to shape the character of state government. Rural areas, on the other hand, by constantly resisting urban-sponsored state programs, drastically limited positive state government and shaped it largely as an economic broker between federal agencies and the state's citizens. Historians have neglected the changing role of state government in modern industrial society, treating it in limited fashion as a miniature example of reform or a bulwark of private enterprise. More correctly it is a product of the interplay between local life and urban systematizing and cosmopolitan forces.

VI

The foregoing examples illustrate the new ways of looking at the years 1880–1920 which historians are increasingly emphasizing. They are not meant to be exhaustive as theories of explanation, but to serve as instances of the growing stress on the analysis of social patterns and processes. The liberal framework, more concerned with the formal and the episodic, has become increasingly restrictive rather than conducive to further social analysis. It has prevented historians from giving full attention to the political role of working people, the influence of ethno-cultural factors in politics, the changing characteristics of elites, the role of the business community in reform, the treatment of urban life

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as a system of social organization, the source of anti-reform impulses, the conflict between local and cosmopolitan cultures, the growth of bureaucracy and administration, the growth of education as a process of cultural transmission and social mobility, the development of ideology and its relationship to practice, and the examination of inter-regional economic relationships. Most important, it has obscured significant shifts in the location and techniques of decision-making in a more highly systematized society.

Instead of generating more careful examination of questions such as these, the liberal conception of history brought about an almost complete abandonment of the analysis of social and political structure. Advances in the emphasis on social, economic, and intellectual data have not produced overall syntheses of this material with political history. Instead, authors of modern American history texts compartmentalize topically distinct material with no attempt to establish relationships of structure or process. Even in chapters on more conventional political history, emphasis on material which relates events to underlying structure has sharply declined. Thus, information concerning the political source of the movement to regulate railroads is usually limited to statements that the "public" or the "people" demanded a change. Finally, the increasing emphasis on the cultural and political homogeneity of American society has involved an almost complete neglect of the examination of the structure of political groups in favor of themes concerning common cultural characteristics. By their failure to stimulate deeper investigation into the nature of fundamental political relationships, traditional viewpoints have demonstrated their decline in usefulness.

If new departures in research such as I have outlined above continue, we are, I think, well on the way to some basic reorientations in approach not only in studies of specific problems, but in overall conceptions of political life as well in the decades from 1880 to 1920. In the future, historians will be concerned less with the formal and the episodic and more with social analysis; they will borrow heavily from the social sciences for ideas concerning political patterns and processes; they will proceed through comparative study; and they will emphasize the political relation-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ships which evolve in industrial society. It seems safe to predict, moreover, that future analysis will center on the relative roles of people at all levels of political life in decision-making, within the context of a more highly organized and systematized social order. The groundwork for such an orientation has been established during the last decade and a half; its further progress during the next fifteen years, I am convinced, will be even more remarkable.

SAMUEL P. HAYS

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATO AND CONGRESS

DURING the Senate Committee hearings on National Policy Machinery in 1960, Senator Mundt, no great internationalist, commented, "There are a lot of things that are unique about our system that we have to explain as we work along with our friends overseas." To this Robert Lovett, the witness, replied, "That is true. I think most of the countries overseas have come to accept the United States Senate as an act of God." [1] He need not have confined his remarks to the upper house of the legislature. NATO's other members are well aware of the distinctive powers possessed by the Congress of the United States, and part of their lack of confidence in American leadership flows from failure to understand the sources of "irresponsibility" in the United States governmental process.

Membership in any international organization, including NATO, means that the U. S. government expects to further certain objectives through this medium. But which parts of the government will be involved in the pursuit of such goals and which might modify the way the goals are sought or even hinder the pursuit? If the declarations of American leaders about the government's intentions are any guide to United States action, one might expect that participation would have some impact on how foreign policy is made. What role has Congress played in NATO affairs?

After the United States led in forming the alliance, four important policy questions raised by American membership in NATO involved Congress: military aid, stationing of United States troops abroad, sharing the expenses of the free world's upkeep, and providing for the nuclear defense of the alliance. In dealing with these questions specific congressional powers were differentially important.

CONGRESSIONAL POWERS

Exercise of the Senate's treaty-confirming power, once the

[1] U. S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Hearings, Organizing for National Security,* Part I, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

North Atlantic Alliance was accepted, has not been a prominent way of expressing congressional concern with NATO. Treaty action was also taken on the accession of Greece, Turkey, and Germany and the Status of Forces arrangements. But this simply legitimated "policies initiated by the executive to deal with problems . . . identified by the executive." [2]

Similarly, Congress' constitutional power to declare war necessitated a careful wording of the guarantee contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the inclusion in Article 11 of the provision, "This treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." [3] Once NATO was established these special treaty- and war-declaring powers were of much less importance than more general congressional powers.

Most of the functions of Congress which might be affected by United States membership in NATO, including those arising from its power to raise armies, are performed in conjunction with the executive. It is mainly the NATO business which involves money in which Congress can play a relatively independent role. One very important exception is the field of atomic energy, in which the rather autonomous Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has played a major role. When military aid to the NATO allies was vital to the success of the alliance, the need for congressional approval provided some opportunities for the legislative branch to participate in NATO policy. However, the only important case in which Congress did not in general merely follow, if grudgingly at times, the executive lead, was the first authorization of "mutual aid." The House of Representatives, responding to the objections of its Foreign Affairs Committee, balked at the size of the first mutual defense assistance proposals. Authorization was withheld until a compromise was reached with the Senate, led by Senator Vandenberg, that United States military aid must be conditioned upon the recipients' drawing up a plan for integrated defense to be approved by

[2] James A. Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making* (Homewood, Ill., 1962), v.

[3] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Part II (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), 249. The need was political rather than legal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the President.[4] As the importance of military aid to NATO allies diminished, the leverage which Congress might have employed began to disappear. The increasing unpopularity of foreign aid in Congress has provided an additional stimulant to efforts, especially by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to put at least the NATO infrastructure expenses of the United States into the defense budget rather than to continue them under "foreign aid." This would be consistent with the regularly-reiterated argument that "aid" to the allies and especially to the alliance itself was part and parcel of America's own defense. Even appropriations committees have come to regard as relatively mandatory the financial burdens which the United States has accepted as its share in the upkeep of NATO's defenses.[5]

In their supervisory role congressmen have nevertheless been mainly interested in how well the other members are playing their part and how fully they are paying their share. This is the kind of information that they elicit regularly. Much of it cannot be made public, however, since it involves delicate political matters in other governments. Appropriate congressional committees have from the beginning been given privileged, very secret, information derived from NATO's Annual Review and other NATO sources, and they have used this privilege responsibly. They could demand it as necessary to put a favorable case before the whole House or Senate, where committee members claimed their colleagues depended upon committee understanding of the detailed issues.

Occasionally a congressional committee has prepared a report concerning NATO or, more frequently, concerning questions related to NATO. These have usually been friendly to the (committee's) concept of the alliance and frequently critical of other members' performance in the alliance. It would be difficult to say what influence, direct or indirect, such reports have had on United States government policy—to say nothing of alliance policy—and members fre-

[4] Holbert N. Carroll, *The House of Representatives in Foreign Affairs* (Pittsburgh, 1958), 128–29, 300–03. See also Arthur H. Vandenberg Jr. (ed.), *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston, 1952), 503–08.

[5] U. S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Mutual Security Appropriations for 1961 and Related Agencies,* 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 2348, 2441.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quently complained that their reports were ignored. Congressmen are generally well aware of their weakness in being able to initiate a policy, although some of them do not cease trying. A perennial question (asked less frequently in recent years) is why Spain cannot be included in the alliance.

That Congress nevertheless continues to be important is recognized by the regular appearances of each succeeding Supreme Allied Commander before congressional committees to report on the state of the alliance. SACEUR's account, as well as the appearance of State and Defense officials who are responsible for aspects of United States policy in NATO, gives individual congressmen the opportunity to ask provocative questions.

To speak of Congress in general rather than of specific committees or leaders is to miss the main focuses of influence. Each committee—indeed, within the House Appropriations Committee, each subcommittee—is likely to have a different perspective, and jealousy between the House and Senate is well known. There is somewhat greater coordination between related committees in the Senate than in the House of Representatives.

The prestige of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and of its renowned Chairman Fulbright (and Senator Green before him), has provided strong, if benevolently critical, support for NATO and its members. (An earlier chairman, Tom Connally, was of a different breed.) Less support could be expected from the House Foreign Affairs Committee, especially early in NATO's existence. At first the administration had been less careful to cultivate its good will; furthermore, instead of being one of the most powerful committees in its chamber this committee has had to fight hard for recognition.[6] The Armed Services Committees of the two houses both occupied a high position. Although not inclined to question the usefulness of NATO these two committees were likely to take a parochial view, making whatever contribution they might to the strength of NATO by pressing for improvements in the United States defense forces. On procurement matters members were likely to be particularly concerned that the sources be American. (Considering the fuss over the TFX contract in 1963, what might have

[6] Carroll, 134–35, 137, 273, 275.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

happened if one competitor had been foreign?) Since they have been more interested anyway in the "nuts and bolts" and "real estate" questions than overall defense matters this attitude is hardly surprising.[7]

Coming to the powerful House Committee on Appropriations, we find a very different picture, one of scarcely concealed ignorance and indifference regarding international organizations. This committee, the despair of the State Department, conducts much of its business in great secrecy, even as between one subcommittee and another.[8] The subcommittee responsible for foreign operations has been for some years chaired by the notorious foe of foreign aid, Representative Passman, who had strong support from the powerful late chairman, Cannon. It tends to serve as a "conduit" for grievances and exposures.[9] Passman's suspicion that under cover of a military alliance the administration has been expanding all kinds of welfare activities for non-Americans was shared by other colleagues.[10] Even General Norstad as SACEUR did not escape his challenge:

> General, you are competing with a lot of other different programs. . . . There is not a member of this committee who would ever meat ax this program. . . . When Congress has worked its will I hope you will have sufficient money to carry out your commitments. I cannot imagine Congress approving a figure anywhere near what has been requested, but you can rest assured that this committee will lean over backward to take no more than just the fat out of the program. . . . You must keep in mind that the economy can stand just so much.[11]

7 See Warner R. Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York, 1962), 65–66; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York, 1961), 134, 138.

8 See Carroll, 140–62.

9 Ernest Griffiths, "Congress and United States Foreign Policy," in Stephen D. Kertesz (ed.), *American Diplomacy in a New Era* (South Bend, Ind., 1961), 375.

10 U. S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Appropriations, *Mutual Security Appropriations*, 543, 551–52, 557, 560.

11 *Ibid.*, 515, 532–33. Often in the past, however, committee members' bark has been worse than their bite. Nevertheless, another subcommittee drastically cut the funds requested for mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles in 1963 despite pleas and support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Administration leaders generally look to the Senate to restore appropriations cuts made in the House.[12] But the Senate Appropriations Committee has had in its membership such uninternationally-oriented individuals as Senators Ellender, Bridges, McCarran, and Ferguson. Senator Dworshak in April 1961 told General White, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, that in saying SAC was America's main protection he did not mean to "disparage NATO, [but] there is a Maginot Line mentality among too many Americans regarding NATO." Senator Chavez then said, "May I add, General, I think all of us are rather sympathetic to the idea of NATO and the so-called free world but our greatest confidence is in our own military. You will find the American people also feel that way." [13] Congressmen working on budget requests know that most taxpayers fail to see the *quid pro quo* between paying taxes and national security.

From the point of view of NATO operations probably the most important congressional body is the extremely powerful Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. But this is not so because of NATO's impact on it; it is because of the committee's power to decide questions vital to NATO. At least three presidents have tip-toed around this committee. It has a dominant position in Congress, and has also taken over unprecedented executive-type powers, rather quickly gaining the upper hand over the Atomic Energy Commission.[14] The members are highly conscientious, non-partisan, and strongly loyal to their committee, but they are short on international experience. They have a narrow conception of national security, and during much of its life the committee has been more interested in building up and protecting American

NATO Command, the Pacific, United States, and Alaskan Commands. Charles H. Donnelly, *United States Defense Policies in 1963*, House Document 335, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 23.

12 Thus Secretary Dulles personally appeared to ask restoration, *inter alia*, of funds cut by the House Committee on Appropriations which were intended to strengthen and redesign NATO in political and economic areas. U. S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Appropriations for State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary for 1957*, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 406–07.

13 U. S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Defense Appropriations for 1962*, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 306–07.

14 For the powers, functions, and behavior of this committee see Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, *Government of the Atom* (New York, 1963).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nuclear development than in gearing such development to foreign efforts. In international matters their primary concern has been to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unlike the appropriations committees and many others in the House, this joint committee is strongly staffed. The committee has effectively opposed sharing its jurisdiction over some international nuclear questions with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In 1963, it secured the right to review all of the Atomic Energy Commission's budget requests, including military items not formerly part of its jurisdiction.[15]

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has carefully controlled all nuclear cooperative arrangements with other countries while simultaneously protecting its own power position, and has regularly leaned toward trying to keep nuclear secrets rather than sharing them. (In this respect its action has accorded with opinions expressed in the Armed Services Committees, whose members are also apprehensive regarding the loss of American control over nuclear questions.) On a number of occasions the committee has effectively (if not always formally) prevented a more liberal nuclear policy toward NATO allies, particularly the French.[16] As soon as the MLF proposals of the administration became public the committee sprang to action. Within a few days the submarine offer was changed to surface ships and there is strong evidence pointing to the committee's role in this change.[17] A secret report of the committee based on an inspection of American nuclear installations in Europe in 1960 was one of the important factors in bringing about the removal of the Thors and Jupiters in 1963.[18] A reading of the committee's hearings confirms that its members knew how to bring out important considerations ignored if not deliberately hidden

15 New York *Times*, July 21, 1963.

16 See Robert E. Osgood, *The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago, 1962), 226, 230–31; New York *Times*, Oct. 18, 1962; Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1959* (New York, 1960), 65–66, and *idem, 1960* (New York, 1961), 126.

17 Washington *Post*, Feb. 20, 1963. Vice-Chairman Hollifield warned again in April 1963 that the only conceivable plan would be inter-allied, national units, with the United States retaining a veto on the use of nuclear weapons (*ibid.*, April 17, 1963).

18 U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Military Posture*, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 278–81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from view by administration witnesses. The committee has clarified neglected points and its views were as worthy of attention as administration views in a field in which so little can be objectively determined. The big qestion in the nineteen-sixties is whether the committee will bow to outside pressure for relaxing United States controls over American nuclear weapons as it has eventually given part way to earlier, far less radical changes.

It is not only in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that members of Congress have shown an increasing interest in NATO affairs. For example, after some delays, Congress authorized and financed a United States commission of private individuals to attend a conference of Atlantic states in Paris in January 1962. This commission reported in June 1962, with strong recommendations for greater unity and integration.[19] Probably more important in their influence on individual congressmen's attitudes toward NATO and the other allies are the annual NATO Parliamentarians Conferences to which the United States began to send delegations after the conferences had already been started. United States delegations try to arouse interest among the allied delegations in questions of American concern, such as a unified trade policy vis-à-vis the communists and cooperation in aiding development in Latin America—two 1963 issues. Whether or not the American delegates develop trans-national interests with their counterparts in other NATO countries, they do become better acquainted with each other inside the U. S. delegation. The reports coming out of these conferences tend to be wide-ranging, somewhat arbitrary in the items selected for emphasis, and more concerned with economic questions than NATO is officially. The Senate publishes the report in its own series. Since there can be no congressional delegates to the North Atlantic Council as there have long been on the team which represents the United States each year at the United Nations General Assembly, this unofficial conference has played a part, if only a minor one, in the acculturation of Congress to NATO. Like the meetings of the North Atlantic Council, the Parliamentarians Conference has provided the opportunity for other discussions with particular foreign governments.

[19] U. S. Citizens' Commission on NATO, *Report*, June 18, 1962, House Document 433, 87th Congress, 2nd Session.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES

Do congressional procedures hobble potential efforts to use membership in NATO more effectively? Two notorious hindrances to (domestic) action, the filibuster in the Senate and the Rules Committee in the House, have not entered into the picture here. The use of riders, or even regular legislation, to restrict the freedom of action of the administration, has occasionally prevented more cooperative behavior with particular allies in the trade field. The Buy American Act and requirements that government-financed exports in particular programs be transported in ships at least fifty per cent American are examples. Apart from the customary stinginess with which Congress has treated the State Department's personnel problems, there has been no evidence of the kind of interference in appointments which has occasionally occurred in areas other than those relating to NATO. Even more markedly than in other policy fields, non-partisanship characterizes congressmen's treatment of NATO.[20] There are no formidable interest groups aligned for or against the alliance and congressional committees could have exercised more independent judgment on NATO-related questions than if they were under pressure from powerful constituents. At least there are none at the present modest state of international cooperation.[21]

A principal obstacle to more effective participation in a more integrated NATO is the almost chaotic fashion in which Congress—especially the House—carries on business, resulting in such fragmented or contradictory policies that the best organized administration could not counterbalance the effect. The incoherence flowing from two equally powerful chambers dealing separately with issues is only partially reduced by the habit of joint conference committees to reconcile differences so that the eventual outcome is closer to

[20] The first evidence of any specific party interest in NATO—and it was benevolent—was the formation of a House Republican "Task Force" for NATO, initiated by Representative Quie of Minnesota, which made recommendations on November 20, 1963, and again in May, 1964 (*Atlantic Community News*, Nov. 1963, 1 and Dec. 1963, 4; New York *Times*, May 15, 1964). Senator Goldwater's use of the nuclear control issue in the presidential campaign of 1964 was not a congressional question.

[21] An unproved suspicion exists that some very large providers of defense items are so influential as effectively to prevent more alliance-wide cooperation in arms supply, but in any case such lobbying is not against the alliance itself.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

administration policy. Yet even the incoherence of Congress has its compensations. Thus, the fact that every program must be authorized by Congress (often yearly) and therefore defended before two committees in two separate chambers and then at the appropriations stage be justified before two other very differently oriented committees means that at least the appropriations committees cannot completely carry the field. Although this procedure keeps the departments on a short string, annual authorization of such programs as foreign aid does give the State Department and Defense Department more voice, because they are more respectfully heard in the legislative committees. Each committee and each house is highly jealous of its prerogatives and therefore markedly competitive with a rival. Programs or projects which are not particularly popular with representatives or senators are unlikely to have strong advocates among the weaker of the competing committees, such as the House Foreign Affairs Committee. But within the House Appropriations Committee questions related to NATO are divided up among secretive subcommittees and the answers are not subsequently coordinated. Coordination is a word unpopular in Congress and especially in this committee.[22] Added to this confusion, many questions of interest to the NATO allies, including monetary policy, tax laws, and disposition of farm surpluses, are the "property" of diverse committees having "constituents" different from those of the State Department or Defense Department. Even the staffs of the committees—where they are qualified to deal with NATO aspects of the matter under review—have stayed aloof from each other and in any case have been far too few for gathering and sifting the information congressmen need to make rational judgments. In May of 1950 Secretary of State Acheson tried an experiment not repeated later. He addressed both houses of Congress on his return from the meetings of the North Atlantic Council in London. Instead of concentrating on his report, the members asked questions quite irrelevant to the task in hand and ranged over the whole of foreign policy.[23] In their committees, however, one

[22] Carroll, 195, 207–08. Ernest Griffiths has argued that there are certain advantages at times in "strategic or tactical obfuscations." Griffiths, 385.

[23] Dean Acheson, *A Citizen Looks at Congress* (New York, 1956), 80.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gets the sense that members of Congress see only the trees, not the forest. For example, the concept of a *regional* organization does not seem easy to grasp; most of the questions deal with specific countries. This corresponds to the common tendency to confuse *allies* with the *alliance* or the organization.

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS

The zeal with which different segments of the United States government protect their own decision-making powers is particularly noticeable when the competing segments are two coequal branches, Congress and the executive. For foreign observers—and potential victims—the separation of powers is an inherent defect of the United States Constitution. So far as NATO is concerned, however, this competitive process has not markedly hindered the executive in making effective use of NATO during its first fifteen years. Validating and modifying executive initiatives has been accepted by most congressmen as their function in this field.[24] Some criticism could be heard but there has been no outright veto of administration action in a NATO matter, for no clear alternative was apparent.

When the Senate accepted the North Atlantic Treaty, the Foreign Relations Committee report favoring it stated that the treaty would "in no way affect the basic division of authority between the President and Congress as defined in the Constitution." Within two years the executive's interpretation of this division became a matter of extensive congressional inquiry after President Truman had assigned ground troops to Europe as part of the United States contribution to an integrated NATO command. The clash of opinion over this action exposed several different but overlapping conflicts: old-time isolationist versus new generation internationalist arguments, strategic air power versus ground forces, Pacific versus European priorities. Some senators who did not clearly take sides on any of these issues were nevertheless concerned that the President had overstepped his powers. Elaborate hearings were held by a joint session of

[24] Roger Hilsman, "Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign Policy Consensus," *American Political Science Review*, LII (1958), 725–44; Robinson, 13–14; Hubert H. Humphrey, "The Senate in Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (1959), 525–36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on the Wherry Resolution. This resolution, introduced by a senator who was not a member of either committee, was so worded as to give senators the opportunity to express their concern that the President's actions in NATO be accounted for to Congress. The demand for formal consultation before the President sent troops to the NATO command in Europe was dropped, but the executive branch did not forget the congressmen's desire to have reports on major actions relative to NATO.[25] (Administration leaders claimed they had done so all along.)

After the senators had expressed the frustrations which flowed from the declining ability of the legislative branch to control events in the new era of cold war, Congress settled back to a general acceptance of the United States commitment. Not even the rearmament of Germany and its entrance into NATO aroused congressional hostility. Quite the contrary, for this move ran in the direction of congressmen's preference that the Europeans do more in their own defense.

Congress could have hindered the implementation of the treaty by withholding funds, but for many years it cooperated in providing for military assistance to complement the commitment, although members seldom demonstrated a clear understanding of the extent of that commitment. (The "defense of Europe" could be jointly concerted or it could be more or less dictated by American strategists, with the concurrence of the European members whose assent had been partly induced by American military aid.) Even the House Appropriations Committee was resigned, if resentful, but it resisted usually unsuccessfully the idea of providing funds to persuade other states to put up funds of their own for projects of interest to NATO. In any case the administration had a number of means for getting around such recalcitrance. It could use contingency funds, deficiency appropriations, and transfers, none of which devices found favor with the appropriations committees. Only in its third

[25] U. S. Senate, Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, *Hearings, Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area*, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 38–41, 53–56, 70–72, 584. See also Walter Millis, Harvey Mansfield, and Harold Stein, *Arms and the State* (New York, 1958), 344–49; Huntington, 320–25; Vandenberg, 570–71.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

year of operation did the NATO Science Program come up specifically before these committees.[26]

State Department officials (and those in other departments) perennially complain that congressional committees tend to fasten them into an administrative straitjacket. This practice is normally associated with requests for money or with trade matters and has ordinarily not arisen in maters *directly* related to NATO. It does, however, have an indirect effect, for the executive has less diplomatic maneuverability, where a freer hand would have permitted flexible bargaining. Congress, for fear of losing control, has regularly refused to authorize aid over longer periods than a year, even though longer-term arrangements could improve the efficiency of the programs and make the negotiation of them with other countries much easier for the administration. (Import quotas, shipping requirements, and agricultural disposal measures are also hindrances to more flexible bargaining.) In one area the effect is direct; the series of acts relating to atomic energy control have tended to set boundaries to American diplomacy with NATO countries. Congressional leverage, outside money questions, arises mainly where the executive needs legal authority to embark on new programs. Thus, even if the administration were to persist in the MLF proposal and reach agreement on it with some NATO allies, the American contribution to the fleet would still have to be approved by Congress. The fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have two masters, Congress as well as the President, could conceivably enable the former to put pressure on the executive in NATO matters but this has not happened so far.

Numerous devices are available to blur the jurisdictional lines between Congress and the executive in areas of concern to NATO. The most important is the contingent veto, requiring the executive to lay certain orders for a specific period before some appropriate congressional committee. If during this period a specified form of legislative disapproval is voted the orders will not take effect. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has such powers, and the opposition need only be in the form of a concurrent resolution,

[26] U. S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Appropriations, *Mutual Security Appropriations*, 534–38.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

requiring no further presidential action.[27] So far no conflict relating to NATO has erupted from use of this procedure. Another device is the requirement that the President specifically declare it to be in the national interest to make an exception to a general restriction laid down by Congress. This the President has had to do to continue military assistance to a number of NATO allies who had, in defiance of Congress, traded with Communist countries in the earlier nineteen-fifties.[28] Sometimes the administration did not strongly oppose congressional constraints providing the tendency was to support the State Department's diplomacy. With another administration in power, however, another attitude might develop. Secretary of State Dean Rusk begged Congress to see that once a card had been played by congressional restrictions on aid, it was gone and United States diplomacy was thus deprived of a potential trick.[29] On the other hand, the "self-commitment" resulting from a legislative ban on nuclear sharing suited the government's diplomacy when the leaders were bent on preventing proliferation, even among allies.[30] When contradictory or confusing instructions are given by Congress (which is quite possible in view of the way it legislates), the administration is not likely to be over-troubled. Such ambiguities permit a choice of direction.

Although Congress labors under severe handicaps, especially in its dearth of relevant detailed information, it continues to try to spur the executive into policies not part of the accepted government program (though favored by some officials in the executive branch). During the late nineteen-

27 Green and Rosenthal, 145.

28 U. S. Department of State, *Bulletin,* XXXV, 988.

29 U. S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, *Hearings, Administration of National Security,* Part VI, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 387.

30 Osgood has pointed out that the 1954 law giving the Joint Atomic Energy Committee unusual powers regarding nuclear cooperation agreements "enabled Congress to administer the legal criteria for sharing with a discrimination among allies that the executive branch would have found embarrassing (p. 402). See also Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 26–27, for the general advantages of "self-commitment." Congressional restrictions on military aid gave the administration in 1964 a way to restrain Greek and Turkish action over Cyprus (See James Reston, New York *Times,* Aug. 19, 1964).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fifties many congressmen tried to get the Eisenhower administration to raise the efficiency of the armed forces by expansion and modernization. The Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, under Senator Symington's chairmanship, conducted a formal inquiry on "Major Defense Matters." In similar and related efforts some congressmen pointed up ambiguities in nuclear defense policy for NATO and the neglect of conventional warfare capability.[31] At least when Secretary Wilson headed the Defense Department such activities were of no avail, for he ignored both congressional chiding and congressional acts while maintaining parts of the defense forces at a low level. The hitherto odd sight of Congress appropriating defense funds unasked for by the administration—and also unspent—became relatively common, especially for favored items such as particular types of aircraft. Some of the appropriations would have been meaningful to NATO, such as those intended in 1959 and 1960 to modernize the Army and improve airlift capabilities, as well as to hasten missile development. These pressures by congressmen on Defense officials helped lay the foundation for ready acceptance of the McNamara reforms. These in turn altered the United States position in NATO, but relatively seldom did a congressman during the slack years ask of a defense witness what effect defense cuts or inadequate preparations might have on the allies.

Depending upon the department, committee, and issue, the executive and legislative branches have many times worked together in fields relative to NATO. Close collaboration between the executive and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began at the birth of the treaty, with initiatives taken by both President Truman (aware of his predecessors' difficulties) and the author of bipartisan foreign policy, Senator Vandenberg. The "Vandenberg Resolution" paved the way for the treaty; the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favoring its ratification specifically mentioned the cooperation in

31 Examples appear in U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1959*, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 21, 80; U. S. House, Subcommittee of Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957*, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 116–18, 495–96.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

emphasizing its own important advisory role.[32] The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Green, offered to propose a resolution in 1959 using the wording of the North Atlantic Council on the Berlin crisis, but Secretary Dulles declined the offer as injecting an element of inflexibility in U. S. diplomacy.[33] For a few years the executive took less care with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, an omission for which it paid a price.[34] The consent of these committees was necessary for longer-range matters, but when crises occurred the executive took quick action without such consultation, whether it was in Korea or Berlin.[35] In the October 1962 Cuba crisis the Congress was on a par with the allies in being informed—elaborately—but after the decisions had been taken. (The exception was the presence of Senator Fulbright in the inner circle of advisers.) And both allied and congressional circles understood the necessity for this procedure. The Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees have conducted hearings in recent years which were at least as much to afford the administration (principally the State Department) a chance to present its case as they were to criticize executive positions or provide ventilation for opposition. When Senator George was about to retire from electoral office, he accepted an assignment from President Eisenhower to conduct an inquiry into non-military aspects of NATO, which he did with enthusiasm. (This study coincided with the "Three Wise Men" investigation into peaceful uses of NATO.[36])

Intractable problems can arise out of the clash between congressional desire for publicity and the administration's desire for executive privilege; such conflicts may sometimes affect United States relations in NATO. Several different audiences are involved, and the information often includes

[32] Truman, II, 242–44, 250–51; Senate Ex. Report No. 8, 81st Congress, 1st Session; Vandenberg, 403–08.

[33] U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, United States Foreign Policy,* 86th Congress, 1st Session, 11–12.

[34] Carroll, 328.

[35] Robinson, 4, 50, 54, 63.

[36] State Department, *Bulletin,* XXXIV, 879–90; *ibid.,* 1066–67.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreign governments' budgets and plans, about which publicity would ruin confidence within the alliance.

At the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Dulles used to give a panoramic report of foreign relations at the beginning of each session, very little of which appeared in published form. Information on a general level was not always the answer to congressional desires. The enthusiastic response the House Armed Services Committee gave to Secretary McNamara's innovation in giving an extremely detailed picture of the country's "Military Posture" (compared to earlier cut-and-dried reports) suggests that a genuine need was being fulfilled. He was also ready to give explicit answers to the congressmen's questions. These annual reviews have paid especial attention to NATO and the congressmen's questions about the alliance appeared to suggest much greater enlightenment than heretofore. Late in the day President Kennedy began a similar type of panoramic briefing with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.[37]

In contrast to the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees and Armed Services Committees is the House Appropriations Committee, which under the long chairmanship of Representative Cannon seemed not to desire any potentially weakening contact with the executive branch.[38]

There remain many ways of improving procedures: better liaison with willing congressmen (especially by State Department officials); more continuous contact with interested and appropriate committee members; resistance by congressmen to the temptation to pit one part of the administration against another, especially in the Defense Department; better preparation of the State Department position for congressional committees; a more coordinated presentation of national security questions altogether, especially to eliminate contradictions between testimony given by one part of the administration to one committee with that by another to a different committee; and—the most utopian desire of all—better coordination in congressional procedures, particularly

37 *Greenwich* (Connecticut) *Time*, Jan. 18, 1963.

38 See Carroll, 329. A change may be possible under his successor, Representative Mahan, who had made defense his specialty (New York *Times*, May 13, 1964).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

budget decisions. The unavoidable fact remains that NATO is part of the whole military policy of the United States, a subject which no congressional committee has yet been able to debate very intelligibly; none has in fact even made much attempt. Most congressmen tend to see defense matters as a subject for "experts." Apparently they do not so view diplomatic questions, feeling no inhibitions in opposing the State Department.[39]

Perspectives in the executive branch regarding "what Congress will take" have hindered better congressional-executive understanding about matters pertaining to NATO. To the outsider, State Department and White House officials have been unnecessarily timid over the years in educating Congress to the obligations as well as benefits from more wholehearted cooperation in such an international organization as NATO. The short-term benefits in avoiding direct confrontation may have to be secured at a long-run price. By contrast, there has been steady indoctrination by the executive in the need for foreign aid. Secretary McNamara has not been afraid of trouble in presenting very frankly the defense facts of life. His boldness has scored some astonishing successes, despite the apprehensions he has aroused among some members of the Armed Services Committee for their favorite services.

Neither Secretary McNamara nor the military officials who have gone before congressional committees have clearly spelled out the meaning of international cooperation and the difference between this and persuading the other allies to accept American decisions. This is a job for the political expert, which is supposed to be pre-eminently the specialty of the State Department. The successful political bargainer cannot reveal his techniques, and foreign-policy-makers have to persuade two different constituencies, Congress and foreign governments, while avoiding contradictory arguments. Thus non-participating allies who disapproved of the embargo on Cuba in 1963–64 could hope that United States pressures on NATO members to follow the American lead were being exerted to gain consent from Congress on some

39 See Schilling, Chaps. III, IV; Senator James W. Fulbright's speech at the University of North Carolina (New York *Times*, April 6, 1964); and Carroll, 163, 184, 190. Perhaps the difference can be accounted for partly because the Department of State deals with goals as well as instrumentalities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other issues. But are the same committees involved or the same segments of Congress? Otherwise the maneuver would be fruitless.

Critics of executive timidity in NATO affairs may note a possible parallel with international cooperation in the field of trade. After some fruitless attempts to obtain senatorial approval of the proposed International Trade Organization, President Eisenhower resigned himself to the more modest GATT, which has in the meantime performed fairly effectively in a somewhat more restricted sphere than the proposed organization. Again anticipating (and thus almost inviting) congressional disapproval of a more liberal trade policy, the Eisenhower administration also fashioned its proposals for the revamped OEEC to mute its potential significance in trade negotiations. Once created, however, the OECD began to look at trade questions as well as other aspects of foreign economic policy, even though it was not a vehicle for formal tariff negotiation. But the economic groupings are organized and operate quite differently from NATO. Furthermore, their activities touch more directly specific influential interests within many congressmen's constituencies.

The caution of the executive branch in the face of possible congressional opposition might be one way to demonstrate the government's accountability to a representative organ. The United States alone among the alliance members has a legislative body powerful enough to enforce such accountability effectively with respect to NATO. To a minor extent Congress performs this function for all the alliance, as when it hears and comments on the reports of SACEUR. That accountability has not been a more prominent feature of congressional-executive relations in NATO affairs is due partly to uncoordinated congressional procedures and to lack of executive initiative in educating the legislators. As an independent branch of government, Congress could help to develop a broader consensus on NATO's functions while also forcing the Executive to refine its NATO-related actions which require defense before congressional committees.

We constantly hear of the "nuclear crisis" in NATO, but little about a potential "nuclear crisis" in the United States government. A key committee for the success of the execu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive's proposals for some kind of nuclear sharing in NATO is the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Ironically this committee, whose jointness was a rational adjustment to a new problem difficult for Congress to handle in a customary way, has the legal and political power completely to frustrate the executive on NATO-related questions, greater than any other congressional body in recent years.[40] On the other hand, the committee has the rare opportunity to play a creative role in fashioning a sensible, down-to-earth response to legitimate allied demands for more participation in NATO's nuclear defense. In 1963 and 1964 we have been observing a novel political process. The administration has been seeking the consent of its NATO allies to the MLF *before* beard-ing the Joint Committee in its den, apparently with the hope of having allied support to strengthen its hand. That confrontation may alter the story of Congress' role in NATO affairs.

For the first fifteen years of NATO's existence we find little evidence that Congress has either significantly hindered or conspicuously promoted the use of NATO for legitimate United States—and allied—objectives.

ANNETTE BAKER FOX

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

40 Roger Smith, "Restraints on American Foreign Policy," *Daedalus*, XCI (1962), 706.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS: LEON D. EPSTEIN, *BRITISH POLITICS IN THE SUEZ CRISIS*—A DISCUSSION

THE EDITORS of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY have been fortunate in obtaining reviews of a notable recent study of British politics at a moment of high crisis—Leon D. Epstein, *British Politics in the Suez Crisis* (Urbana, Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1964; xi, 220 pp., $5.00)—from eminent members of both the Labour and Conservative parties. The reviews by The Rt. Hon. Lord Henderson, P. C., and The Rt. Hon. Sir Derek Walker-Smith, Q. C., M. P., follow.

DA592
E6

I

Many books have already been published dealing with the Suez crisis, and there will be more to come. That is not to be wondered at in view of the fact that the Suez episode was not only a deeply disturbing international event, but was also the cause of a sharper internal political clash than the British nation had experienced for very many years.

Professor Epstein's book is a distinguished contribution to the "Suez" library. The Suez issue is not his main concern. His purpose was to show how the British political system worked in the exceptional circumstances of the crisis. That he has succeeded so admirably in his task is due to his close understanding of the British political system, which differs in important respects from that in the United States, as well as to his thorough inquiries and impartial analysis of the material which he gathered.

As background to his study he devotes an opening chapter to a discussion of Britain's "Imperialist Legacy." It is true, as he shows, that imperial tradition has still a place in national sentiment, but it is of diminishing significance as an active influence in Britain's post-Second World War political life, and it was not a principal factor in determining the Conservative government's attitude and action when confronted by the Suez crisis.

The British Empire now belongs to history. The nation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

does not look back with nostalgia to its great imperial past. It lives in the modern world, and far from regretting "lost possessions," takes pride in the fact that Empire has been transformed into a Commonwealth of independent and equal partners, a cooperative achievement without precedent in history.

It is also true, however, as the author points out, that there is a vigorous minority who on occasion can be moved to passionate championship of British overseas interests and who are anxious that British independent power should be maintained, and used if necessary, to defend them.

What might be described as the historical setting for this study is provided by a factual record of the crisis as it developed. It does not add anything new to what is already generally known—it is only from those who were active participants that "disclosures" may be expected—but the author includes a "Suez Log: 1956–57" which sets out both the international and the British events of the crisis. The log is comprehensive, concise, and useful.

Professor Epstein traces with a sure hand the gradual change of opinion from a national reaction of indignation to Nasser's illegal act nationalizing the Suez Canal, through full support for the international efforts to secure by negotiation a fair agreement for maintaining international management and control of the Canal as a vital international waterway, to the stage of disunity when the division of opinion became clear-cut over the issue of military intervention. It became evident that national unity and the resort to force outside the United Nations were incompatible.

Americans who are not familiar with the workings of the British political system may have been surprised at the time by the intensity of opposition to government policy in a crisis situation. As the author makes clear there was a sharp cleavage in Parliament, in the press, and in the nation. It would indeed be difficult to cite a parallel case in modern times. Following the Second World War there had been a considerable measure of bipartisanship in the conduct of British foreign policy. Bipartisanship became a victim of the government's policy. Even before military intervention doubts and suspicions had begun to be expressed about the government's military preparations and its intention to resort to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

force in default of an agreement. When the decision to intervene outside the United Nations was announced, acute parliamentary conflict ensued, and, as the author shows, it was fought mainly along partisan lines.

The author notes two significant facts. The first is that "the military commitment was an executive decision made without the prior approval, formal or informal, of Parliament." The significance of this lies in the fact that the executive or Cabinet in Britain is composed of Members of Parliament; it derives its authority from Parliament; it is answerable to Parliament; and it can remain in power only so long as it can command a majority in the House of Commons.

The Prime Minister had no advance consultation with the leader of the Official Opposition in the House of Commons. This was an unusual departure from normal practice, especially at a time of external crisis which was bound to deepen as a result of the government's contemplated action. In a parliamentary sense the Prime Minister was resolved to "go it alone," counting on being able to rely on a sufficient number of his own party followers to see him through. Not since the turn of the century has a government entered upon military operations without the general approval of Parliament.

In the event he was proved right in his assessment. I agree with the author's conclusion that it was "the very partisan nature of the division of opinion which sustained the Government, and kept Conservative M.P.'s who disliked Eden's action from trying to defeat their leadership." The Conservative pro- or anti-Suez dissidents on no occasion took any action in the House of Commons that was likely to endanger the continued existence of their government. In a two-party system the fear of letting in "the other side" is a powerful spur to loyalty. It is certain to operate in the present House of Commons where the Labour government has only a minimal overall majority. This factor, in my view, has become a significant feature of the British parliamentary system, and is bound to act as a curb on the activities of pressure groups among the followers and even within the Cabinet of a government whose fortunes rest on a slender majority in the House of Commons.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But if the Prime Minister correctly assessed his ability to defy his internal opposition, he seriously misjudged the speed and strength of external world-wide condemnation of Anglo-French intervention. This proved fatal to the success of the project. This unhappy experience is a sign-post for the future. It should serve as a warning to any democratic government that in the world of today it is folly to enter upon independent military action with its own nation disunited and with the United Nations ranged against it.

Partisan division in the Commons was reflected in the constituencies where party organizations and activists marshaled themselves firmly behind their respective parliamentary leadership. Professor Epstein includes in his study an interesting examination of constituency reaction to declared rebels. The problem of deviation was one concerning the Conservative party more than the Labour party, which had only one member whose opposition to his party's official line brought him into collision with his constituency party organization. Except for flagrant breaches of loyalty both parties in the House of Commons usually display reasonable tolerance when any of their members are unable to support official policy on a particular issue because of conscience or deeply held conviction. It is right that it should be so.

In such circumstances a Labour M.P. is entitled to abstain but not to vote against the official line, though he may speak according to his conviction. Labour's one rebel followed this course. No action had been taken against him or even contemplated by the parliamentary Labour party. But he was subsequently called upon by his divisional Labour party to resign. The divisional Labour party, however, had no constitutional power to enforce their call for their member's resignation. He could have ignored it, but he chose to resign.

Conservative constituency associations may enjoy a wider local autonomy. Even so, it is difficult, as the author found, to explain the variations of treatment meted out to Conservative deviationist M.P.'s. Some of the rebels may have been cautioned, but at any rate they survived and retained their seats at the next election. Some were repudiated by their constituency associations and either resigned or were not readopted for the next election.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It may be the case, as the author suggests, that the decisions in some instances were influenced by personal or other factors that had nothing to do with the Suez episode. There may have been several extraneous factors, and the commonest of these appears to him to have been opposition to capital punishment. If this were true it would be very disquieting, for if ever there was an issue touching conviction and conscience, capital punishment is surely it. But what also is unusual is that so many Conservative M.P.'s should have been called to account by their party associations for holding or expressing views inconsistent with official policy on Suez. That may now become a less reserved feature of the British party system when members are elected to Parliament as party candidates committed to a party program and platform, and knowledge that it may happen will no doubt tend to discourage embarrassing disloyalty after election.

It is impossible in a short review to do justice to Professor Epstein's study. He states that he is an American writing for Americans. His readers will find that he has served them well. It is a book well worth reading.

HENDERSON

HOUSE OF LORDS

II

The story of Suez has attracted commentators in a variety of forms—as drama, as mystery, as a cautionary moral tale, as a last colorful essay in imperialism, and as a somber study in Western relations. Of this type of work, it can fairly be said that there comes a time when enough is enough, when contemporary comment should yield to, and await, the more informed and objective view of history, based on wider and more comprehensive material than is now available. This is not to say that even the judgment of history on controversial events can be merely factual in a coldly scientific sense, since the evaluation of fact must take its color somewhat from the personality of the historian and the political, philosophical, and ideological climate of his age. Nevertheless, the bias of the historian will normally be less than that of the contemporary commentator, just as his sources of information will be more complete and more soundly tested. So far, therefore, as reconstruction and assessment of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

events of Suez are concerned, we should now await the assessment of history.

This is not, however, to say that Suez has not imposed more immediate duties for statesmen. They have to consider its consequences and lessons in the context of relations with the Middle East and Arab world, in the context of the role and effectiveness of the United Nations, and in the context of Anglo-American cooperation—an aspect, of course, of particular interest to readers of the QUARTERLY and to the present reviewer.

Whatever may have been doubtful or disputed about Suez, one sad fact was abundantly clear: even the most complacently and easily satisfied were bound to concede that a common language and ideology and a decade and a half of close cooperation had not wholly assimilated the thinking of the two peoples. The main point of departure was, as Lord Avon (Sir Anthony Eden) has so clearly shown in his *Memoirs,* the view taken of so-called "colonialism." It was this which, in his view, obscured Washington's clarity of vision on this issue: "the old spoor of colonialism," he wrote, "confused the trail."

The rights and wrongs as between Sir Anthony and Mr. Dulles and between Sir Anthony and President Eisenhower must now be left to history. But what cannot be left to the leisurely processes of history is the urgent and continuing task of a fuller and more informed understanding by each of the Atlantic partners of the views of the other. There will always, I venture to suggest, be a majority opinion in Britain that the "Imperialist Legacy" is not a matter for shame and regret and that "colonialism" properly understood is by no means a dirty word. Many nations have traded with primitive and underdeveloped countries for their own enrichment and no blame has been sought to be attached. Why should it be a matter for censure that together with the prerequisite of trade the duty of administration and training in political democracy was accepted by Britain? In fact, British colonialism combined economic and social progress with the operation of a constitutional conveyor belt leading to independent self-government, preferably and generally, but not compulsorily, within the Commonwealth. Of course, the effect of such a policy is inevitably the diminu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of national power and resources, and the British as realists must appreciate this. But, if there is room for any weights on the scales in addition to military might and material resources, the experience gained and relationships formed by the pursuit of these policies over the years are elements to be taken into account in assessing Britain's place in, and contribution to, the modern world. Is there in fact any room? It can, of course, be argued that in a modern age nuclear power is the only yardstick. Such an argument would no doubt be incontrovertible if there was only one nuclear power. But, with more than one, comes the inhibition on the use of such power and consequential restriction of its power. In a sense, the greater the development of nuclear power, paradoxically enough, the smaller its actual influence, and consequently the greater room for other considerations. On such a view, Britain has still a special contribution to make, not to be precisely assessed in terms of nuclear power or material resources; and the understanding and evaluation of that contribution is a task for the consideration of statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic.

But with these great matters of Anglo-American cooperation and Britain's place in the modern world, Professor Epstein's book is only indirectly and obliquely—though always interestingly—concerned. His main theme is a practical study of the workings of the British parliamentary system as exemplified by the stresses and strains to which it was subjected in the Suez period, when events moved fast and passions rode high; and such a study of the oldest existing form of democratic government, and model for so many more, should be of interest over a wide field. The study raises two related matters, which together go to the heart of parliamentary institutions—the relation of a Member of Parliament with his constituents, and the functioning of Parliament in the context of executive government and its influence upon it.

The first of those two matters is treated at greater length because Professor Epstein has produced case-studies of the relation of the various dissident members with their constituents arising out of their attitude to Suez. Having set out the facts, he is too conscientious and objective an analyst to claim that the cases necessarily reveal a precise pat-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tern of general application. This is because of the inevitable personal factor which enters in. An M.P. is not merely an embodiment of certain ideas or points of view, nor are the officers and committee members of his constituency association. All are, in Shakespeare's words, "flesh and blood and apprehensive," and this factor introduces an imponderable into the attempted assessment. In Professor Epstein's words, "it is necessary therefore to introduce here a large element of doubt with respect to the matter of explaining the differences in treatment of individual M.P.'s. This is unfortunate since the differences in treatment were substantial enough. . . ."

Nevertheless it is possible to view the totality of the cases in the round and draw certain conclusions therefrom. The great preponderance of cases were on the Conservative side and therefore I confine myself to them, though the facts, as set out by Professor Epstein, show a reinforcement for the view that party discipline over Labour M.P.'s is stricter and less flexible than its Conservative counterpart. Measured by abstentions in the vital division in the House of Commons there were eight Conservative "antis" and fifteen Conservative "ultras" (to use convenient shorthand descriptions). If one adds to this certain critics who nonetheless conformed in the division lobbies, we are perhaps considering upwards of thirty Conservative M.P.'s. Of these, six could be said to have ultimately forfeited their seats because of their attitude to Suez, in that they were not the adopted Conservative candidates for the next General Election. But, as Professor Epstein's account shows, this would be an over-simplification of the facts. So far as the two "ultras" are concerned, his account shows that their attitude to Suez was not the *causa causans*. Of the four "antis" only one really put the matter to the test; the rest, in varying degrees, went, if not willingly, at any rate quietly, and the case of the resigning junior minister who lost his seat was paralleled by the case of the resigning junior minister who kept his.

I think that perhaps the general position of a Conservative M.P. vis-à-vis his constituents can be summarized broadly in the following propositions:

(1) A person will not be selected as a candidate, nor consequently elected to Parliament, unless his views are broadly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in conformity with party thinking and doctrine. Nevertheless, over a period there is the possibility of divergence over minor and even major matters, and especially in respect of issues which have newly arisen since the date of election.

(2) When such divergence occurs, both member and constituency association (that is, those whom Professor Epstein terms the "party activists") will go to great lengths to avoid a split; but the anxiety of the party activists to do so will vary in accordance with the personal popularity and standing of the member, which is therefore a material factor in this context.

(3) The chances of a deviating member getting a vote of confidence from his association will always be strong, though varying in accordance with the personal factors referred to above. Even without such a vote a sitting member will be in a strong position to effect a reconciliation during the remainder of that Parliament, especially if he has retained or resumes the Party Whip, and assuming that no other candidate has been chosen.

(4) If, however, no reconciliation is effected, and the deviating candidate is not readopted and has to fight against his party machine as an Independent at the General Election, his chances nowadays are small.

The fact that his chances are small is, of course, due to the increasing importance of the party machines, both centrally and in the constituencies, and to the increasing influence of nationwide election propaganda on television and so forth. Like it or not, the power of the party machine must be accepted as a fact when it comes to the final crunch of readoption and the General Election. And, of course, it is not wholly unreasonable or undemocratic that it should be so. Any M.P. worth his salt will reply to any attempt by his constituents to dictate to him in the classic words of Burke in his letter to the sheriff of Bristol. But from the point of view of the party activists, they are bearing the heat and burden of the day—organization, canvassing, etc.—in order to return a parliamentary representative who will support, at any rate broadly, the views in which they believe. Professor Epstein quotes Lord Attlee as saying:

> "They are elected because the politically active citizens select them as expressing broadly their views, and because these

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> same citizens have worked to persuade a majority of the electors to support them." So, Attlee continued, if an M.P. fails to support the government or fails to act with the opposition in its efforts to turn the government out, he acts contrary to the expectations of those who have put their trust in him.

Perhaps the two conflicting considerations—the representative as opposed to the delegated character of the member, on the one hand, and the legitimate interests of the party activists on the other—are not too unfairly or inadequately reconciled by the position as outlined in my four propositions. But, of course, the increasing dependence of Parliament on a central party cohesion has its dangers. To put it at its extreme, any position in which the member became a mere party robot—fortunately, a long way off—would obviously make men of intelligence and integrity disinclined to assume the burden of parliamentary service and their place would be taken by more compliant men, with a consequential depreciation of the parliamentary currency.

This aspect in turn affects the other theme with which Professor Epstein is mainly concerned, the relations between Parliament and the executive. The classic concept of British government is the control of the executive by the legislature through the accepted responsibility of Ministers to Parliament. But what happens to this principle if members become increasingly party delegates as opposed to individual representatives (in the language of Burke's dichotomy), and if the executive can rely for the duration of a Parliament on the automatic endorsement of its actions by a party majority in the Commons? This, I think, is a possibility which has engaged the attention of Professor Epstein. He says of Suez:

> First, it is plain that the Suez commitment was an executive decision made without the prior approval, formal or informal, of Parliament. . . . Second, Eden's commitment, after being made so purely as an executive matter and in defiance of partisan opposition, did receive the crucial minimum of parlimentary support.

In regard to the executive responsibilty for the decision, Professor Epstein says this:

> Eden shared his decision-making only with a few key con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> genial ministers, and, since these ministers were distinctly of his own choosing, he was really the decision-maker. If so, it is well to appreciate that the practice would have been consistent with the tendency, in contemporary British affairs, for the Prime Minister to be a genuine chief executive and not just the first among equals. British executive authority may have become prime ministerial, almost presidential in this respect, rather than collegial in the classical sense of cabinet government.

Certainly, in the years since Suez, the tendency, I would say, has been in the direction of a presidential concept of executive government, a concept almost inevitably welcome to the prime minister of the day and to the heads of civil service hierarchy in Whitehall. It is a tendency which is reinforced by the personalization of politics in the public mind due to politics being increasingly considered, at any rate by the mass of the electorate, in terms of the television appearances of party leaders.

All this has its constitutional dangers. They should not be exaggerated. The tendency to presidential government has perhaps not gone very far in Britain. The executive's reliance on virtually automatic parliamentary support on party lines is tempered by the unseen and informal control exercised by party committess, where criticism and restraint of ministers can be indulged in without fear of provoking their public defeat. Nevertheless, in so far as such a tendency is developing, it is a deviation from accepted British constitutional practice, and should be restrained to the extent that it does damage to basic constitutional principles. After all, the architects of the Constitution of the United States planned for a presidential executive system and presumably planned their safeguards accordingly. It is possible that there would be insufficient safeguards in the British system for a presidential form of government introduced late in the day, and, as it were, by a sidewind.

Finally, these tendencies raise the question of the contemporary effectiveness of Parliament and the value of the contribution of the individual member. Broadly, the wider the scope and the more complex the nature of government problems the stronger the case for concentrated executive authority; and the more concentrated the authority of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

executive, the greater the danger of the erosion of the parliamentary function. I think it is true that the power to interrogate ministers (though Professor Epstein is skeptical of the value of "the much-cherished question period" at the time of Suez) and to scrutinize and debate legislation line by line still provide a reasonably effective measure of control. But there is less participation by Parliament in the initiation of policy and the formulation of decisions; it is in the tendency to present these in a prefabricated form that parliamentarians see the greatest threat to their power and usefulness. There is, therefore, considerable thinking at the present time as to the possibility of reviewing and revising the procedures of Parliament to ensure that it remains a full working partner of the executive in the conditions of the second half of the twentieth century.

Against this background, Professor Epstein's study is one of great interest and value. The main subject matter of his book may seem in a sense a far cry from the drama and high passion of Suez; but it is part of the very stuff and substance of the ways and workings of democratic government.

DEREK WALKER-SMITH

HOUSE OF COMMONS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REVIEWS

The History of Parliament: The House of Commons, 1754–1790. By Sir Lewis Namier and John Brooke. New York, Oxford University Press for the History of Parliament Trust, 1964. Vol. I: xx, 545 pp.; Vol. II: viii, 692 pp.; Vol. III: 685 pp. $70.60.

In 1928, the late Sir Lewis Namier, then a relatively unknown, unemployed scholar, published an article calling for a parliamentary history of Britain based upon the biographies of members of the House of Commons. The idea caught fire and an official committee, appointed in 1929, reported favorably in 1932. A private trust was set up to carry on the project with the enthusiastic leadership and support of Colonel Josiah (later Lord) Wedgwood. Two experimental medieval volumes were published in the nineteen-thirties before the project was suspended because of the war. It was revived in 1951 with government financial support and entrusted to a committee of professional historians (Namier himself, Sir Frank Stenton, Sir Goronwy Edwards, Sir John Neale, and T. F. T. Plucknett). Periods of forty to fifty years were assigned to separate teams each headed by a leading scholar of the age. Sir Lewis assumed responsibility for the years 1754–90 which he had made peculiarly his own. For each period, two or so volumes of biographies were envisaged preceded by a volume containing constituency histories and interpretive material. When Sir Lewis died in 1960, almost all the biographies and constituency histories were completed but little had been done on the introduction. The whole has now been seen to completion and the introduction written by John Brooke, once Namier's student and for many years his closest collaborator. Sir Lewis was indeed fortunate in leaving this monumental task to a fellow-worker of impeccable scholarship and taste who was so in sympathy with the conception and techniques of the project.

The second and third of the volumes now published contain the biographies, many by Namier and Brooke, others by a distinguished group of collaborators including Lady Haden-Guest (who did Scotland), Lucy Sutherland, and Romney Sedgwick.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is nothing new about the idea of a biographical dictionary. Ever since 1859, the United States government, to give just one example, has been publishing the cumulative *Biographical Directory of . . . Congress.* But where the articles in the latter are formal and skimpy, the Namier-Brooke biographies are full, analytical, and probing. Eschewing labels, the author of each entry has tried to establish: (1) the family and personal connections of the member; (2) his political and interest affiliations; and (3) his actual behavior in the House of Commons, his speaking activity, his voting record, and so forth. This has demanded an enormous research effort on the part of the contributors, utilizing an unprecedented volume of manuscript material. Only one who has ever attempted to trace the relatively obscure can appreciate the complexity of the work involved. Lady Haden-Guest, for example, had to disentangle no fewer than seventeen Campbells who sat in Commons in this period (including four Johns), ten Murrays, etc. While all the biographies are conspicuously scholarly, those by Sir Lewis are frequently marked by a personal quality rare in a reference work. Thus does he sum up Samuel Martin, sometime secretary to the Treasury:

> Perhaps his emotional poverty accounts for his ultimate failure. A joyless man, solitary and self-centered, he could not stand anyone permanently near him; he remained unmarried. There was little warmth, sympathy, or loyalty in him: and politics is a gregarious game. While not fit to serve, he was not great or bold enough to be a master. An obsessional worker, he was pathologically methodical. Gradually his life silted up; he grew weary even of work. . . .

About three-fifths of the first volume is devoted to brief histories of the individual constituencies, each signed by an individual contributor. These are models of their kind. The patterns of family and other interest influencing each constituency are carefully delineated; the element of change, so often ignored, is underlined and its impressive extent revealed. Where electoral contests occurred, the returns are given and their significance explained. Where, as in the majority of cases, there was no contest, the circumstances leading to the selection of the unopposed candidates are as carefully examined.

The first two hundred pages of the initial volume are devoted to a general introduction by John Brooke. He ably sums up recent scholarship, not the least his own, and presents us with an interpretation of the politics of the later eighteenth century which most would call "Namierite"—though there are a few Brookean touches in it. There are inevitably a few trifling slips.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A secretary of state did not sit in the House of Commons "almost invariably" (p. 118); one sat there less than five out of the thirty years between 1761 and 1791. Professor Foord, too, has recently shown that the practice of the Opposition sitting together on one side of the House dates not from the seventeen-seventies (p. 199) but from at least the seventeen-forties. Such trifles aside, the introductory matter is excellent; its weaknesses lie only in what is omitted. In his original 1928 article, Sir Lewis called for not just a cooperative but a collective biography: "The biography of the ordinary man cannot be profitably attempted unless one writes the history of a crowd. . . . Proper returns cannot be obtained from the work except by following up many threads, by establishing the average and selecting the typical." In other words, Sir Lewis saw the enormous work of writing thousands of individual biographies as but a step toward quantification and precise analysis. Mr. Brooke is at his best when he does quantify, as in his analyses of the votes against Lord North and in the shifts in the election of 1780 and 1784. We can only wish that in these preposterously expensive volumes, his publishers had allowed him ten or twenty pages more for statistical tables. As it is, subsequent workers in the field will have to analyze most divisions from scratch, though Mr. Brooke could have done an excellent job for them from material in his notes.

In these volumes, a major tool has been created for the systematic study of British politics. One can only hope that the volumes for other periods will follow swiftly. Not in criticism but in admiration for what has and can be achieved, this reviewer also hopes that subsequent parts will, in so far as possible, contain rather more quantification.

JACOB M. PRICE

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Our Parliament. By STRATHEARN GORDON. London, Cassell for the Hansard Society, 6th rev. ed., 1964.—xii, 262 pp. $4.80.

The Reform of Parliament. By BERNARD CRICK. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964.—xiv, 274 pp. 36s.

These two books have little in common except their subject. *Our Parliament,* written by the librarian of the House of Commons, has useful information about British parliamentary history and procedure, but it reflects a conventional satisfaction with British governmental institutions that was typical of the postwar years when the earlier editions of the book appeared. Its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

author assumes not only that "Parliament has efficiently controlled the affairs of the nation" (p. 189), but more specifically that parliamentary debating procures "the required action on the part of the Executive" (p. 39).

In sharp and refreshing contrast is *The Reform of Parliament.* Bernard Crick, a British scholar writing with dash and wit, starts with the view that ministers control national affairs between general elections, and that what Parliament can do is to influence the electorate which periodically decides the fate of a governing party. For Parliament effectively to perform this role, Crick believes that it should spend less time on "ritualistic forms of debates and divisions on legislation which is going to be passed anyway," and more time on "scrutiny of administration" (p. 193). Among his specific reform proposals are the increasing use of a less undemocratic House of Lords as a revising chamber, the provision of better work facilities for M.P.'s than the understaffed clubrooms now available, and the establishment of standing committees on the basis of specialized subject-matter. It is the last proposal which is most controversial. The others may not be adopted, given the demonstrated institutional resistance to any change, but there is little argument against their merits. Specialized parliamentary committees, however, are usually understood as drastically innovative in their implications for British government. They raise the specter of independent legislative authority, in the manner of American congressional committees and of French parliamentary committees (of the Third and Fourth Republics). There is no doubt that Crick intends his new committees to have some resemblance to these non-British examples. He would have more parliamentary business handled in the committees, and he would have them composed of M.P.'s experienced and interested, politically as well as personally, in the relevant legislative subject-matter. Moreover, he would have Parliament staffed with a counter-bureaucracy to the executive's.

Still Crick insists that specialized committees could be developed in the British Parliament without threatening the executive control which he regards as established through cohesive parliamentary parties. It is *because* this control is so firmly established that Crick believes that specialized parliamentary committees could not represent legislative independence in the American or French manner. He also argues that the parliamentary parties have specialized committees which influence without upsetting the leadership. But the parallel may mislead. Having these party committees is a recognition and a logical corollary of the fact that party lines are so rigid that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

private intraparty counsel is the effective means of influencing decisions. Official bi-party parliamentary committees, on the other hand, would be ineffective unless numerous important policies were decided outside an internal party process. In this light, while Crick's proposal would seem unlikely to change the system, it would also seem unlikely to be significant as long as the system required party rigidity.

Questions on this point cannot detract from an admiration for the learned intelligence, analytical marshaling of data, and highly readable style which distinguish Crick's work. The book is studded with remarks both witty and telling. My favorite is the response to R. A. Butler's views of the dangers to the British constitution of a committee system *"à l'américaine"*: as if, says Crick, "to put it in French would remove any lingering doubt among his followers that America is foreign" (p. 168).

LEON D. EPSTEIN

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Gentlemanly Power: British Leadership and the Public School Tradition. By RUPERT WILKINSON. London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1964.—xv, 243 pp. $6.00.

Wilkinson has written on an immensely important and fascinating subject: What was the nature of the education received in the public schools by the English gentlemanly class who have so successfully (in some senses) and persistently governed England for the past century?

The early part of the book, where the author is dealing with a subject that he knows at first hand—the English public school—is best. Here he presents a useful and largely unexceptionable summary of the principal values inculcated by the public school. He deals briefly but fairly with such crucial questions as the control of public school pupils by "ethical restraint"; the development of loyalty and the concomitant threats to self-development; the importance of manners and accent (although this latter is too summarily dismissed); the amateur ideal; the breeding of mental flexibility and the crushing of imagination; and the contribution of the public schools in producing public servants, imperialists, and conservatives. If his treatment is competent, it is largely derivative and unoriginal; there is little here that was not treated with greater profundity and insight by Edward Mack, in his two-volume study of the public schools (strangely, Wilkinson seems to have used only the second volume). Wilkin-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

son's analysis is often interesting but his inferences tend to be banal.

There is, moreover, a steady deterioration in quality in the last half of the book. This section ("Comparisons and Implications") consists of a long chapter on Confucian China, and two awful concluding chapters, in which the author takes us on a breathless chase through discussions of free will, modern advertising techniques, Chinese brainwashing, the schools of Meiji Japan, Soviet indoctrination, and Jesuit training. Wilkinson seems to have no particular competence to discuss these matters, his treatment is painfully superficial and often (for example, the comparison of Soviet and Jesuit education) ill-informed, and the relevance of these last chapters to his central theme is difficult to perceive.

The first half of the book would have made a good essay or article, but the tangential addition of the last half has expanded it into a poor book. In fact, the early part of the book developed out of an undergraduate thesis the author wrote at Harvard, while the latter part was largely written after leaving the corrective influence of that institution.

Wilkinson writes in a pleasant, if sometimes journalistic, style. His content is rather ill-organized, however, and this leads to a certain amount of repetition. The same point is often brought up in different contexts, and on at least one occasion even the same quotation is repeated—with a different attribution each time (pp. 63, 144).

There are several errors that should have been picked up by the editors: "Quintillian" (p. 220), "mitigate against" for "militate against" (pp. 106, 119), and others that are probably typographical. Nor do I myself care for the author's repeated use of "education" as an adjective.

This book clearly points up the continued need for a profound and searching study of the public school gentleman and his role in English life. Mack laid the groundwork with his study of the schools up to the nineteen-thirties. Wilkinson might have extended this in breadth and depth by a thorough examination of the gentleman's political, social, economic, and cultural roles, and by a more profound examination of the values developed in the public schools. Unfortunately he has allowed his study to become diluted and trivialized by the gratuitous introduction of irrevelant material, thus taking away space that could have been devoted to the achievement of greater profundity and insight.

PAUL NASH

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Coercion and Conciliation in Ireland, 1880–1892: A Study in Conservative Unionism. By L. P. Curtis Jr. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963.—xiii, 460 pp. $9.00.

About the turn of the century, apocryphal report has it that a group of retired British colonels were discussing the relative merits of colonial troops over their brandy in their club in Pall Mall. When all had finally agreed that the golden palm could only, in the last analysis, be awarded to either Sikh or Gurkha, and they were trying to make up their minds which, the discussion was pre-emptorily brought to an end by a respected senior colleague, who had only just arrived. "Bosh, tish, poof, gentlemen," he pronounced gravely, "the best troops in the world are Irish, and especially when led by white officers."

In *Coercion and Conciliation in Ireland,* L. P. Curtis Jr. provides a full historical text for the apocryphal lesson. His account actually begins in June 1885, when the Conservatives assumed office as a caretaker and minority government with Lord Salisbury as their Prime Minister. In two successive general elections, November 1885 and July 1886, that government moved from weakness to strength to power. That power, in turn, was not broken until some six years later in the general election of 1892. The lessons presented by Dr. Curtis in this close study of that ministry are a warning and a moral to all men who love liberty and have a respect for representative institutions. What governments are tempted to do, it seems, to solve awkward problems as they move from weakness to strength, will never allow the ghost of Lord Acton to rest in peace.

When the Conservatives were forced to deal from weakness in 1885, their Irish appointments reflected some concern for common decency and humanity. After 1886, however, the appointments made from strength expressed only a growing concern for a justification of authority that was thinly disguised as law. The architect of this "Conservative Unionist policy" for Ireland was Arthur Balfour, who was appointed Irish Chief Secretary in 1887 and would continue in that post some four years. Nothing is more revealing, perhaps, about the character of a man than the men he choses to serve under him, except possibly the reasons why he makes such choices. In filling the crucial post of Under Secretary for Ireland, for example, Balfour's choice was a professional soldier, Sir James West Ridgeway, who had distinguished himself some years previously as commander of the Indian contingent of the Afghan Frontier Commission when a boundary dispute was being negotiated. "I pointed out to Mr. Balfour," wrote Sir Joseph in a memo to himself, "that though

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Irish blood ran through my veins, I knew little of Ireland, that I had few friends and no correspondents there, and did not even know what the postage was. Mr. Balfour smiled cynically and replied, 'Then that is a great qualification for the post, for you will not be besieged by your friends in search of employment' " (pp. 186–87).

To understand Balfour is not only to understand his uncle Lord Salisbury and their colleagues in the Cabinet, but it is to understand the whole Conservative mentality with regard to Ireland in the nineteenth century. Balfour, as Dr. Curtis points out, was essentially aristocratic by temperament, and his fault was a myopia that was as much moral and intellectual as it was emotional. His emotional myopia was apparent in his cynicism, and in his general and supercilious contempt for people. This, however, was not necessarily a weakness in a politician, especially when he was *in* power. The moral and intellectual aspects of Balfour's myopia, however, were of a more serious nature. Intellectually he was unable to appreciate the complexity of the Irish question. To him, it was simply an economic question, and if something could be done about the appalling poverty of Irishmen, their devotion to their nationality and their superstitious religion would somehow evaporate. Indeed, Balfour could not seem to understand that ordinary men, not made in the image and likeness of an aristocrat, might also have a need not to live on bread alone.

Balfour's moral myopia was even more disastrous for the British rule he was attempting to preserve in Ireland than his intellectual short-sightedness. He suffered from that very common delusion of men in power that the end justifies the means, and the means are only limited by the extent of one's power. This led him to conceive and structure a policy of right within a framework of might, which in the end convinced the Irish people that at least half the British nation was prepared to subvert the British Constitution in Ireland. Since the British Constitution by its nature allows that force is at best only a short-term expedient, when the Irish people lost confidence in the other half of the British nation in 1918, the only remedy left to a people who had acquired a respect for representative institutions and loved liberty was revolution. In brief, Dr. Curtis has provided us with much food for thought in our own world in our own time.

EMMET LARKIN

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Appeasers. By MARTIN GILBERT and RICHARD GOTT. Cambridge, The Riverside Press and Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963.—xviii, 444 pp. $6.50.

If one grant that the primary function of foreign policy is the care of the national interest, in the appraisal of any foreign policy two fundamental questions arise: What is the view taken of the national interest; How adequate the implementation, the use of means in relation to ends?

On both scores the directors of British policy during the years preceding the outbreak of war in 1939 may be severely indicted. It is to them, and to like-minded men elsewhere, that we owe the commonly pejorative connotations that have become attached to the word "appeasement," one of neutral content otherwise. For they failed in the basic test of any action; not only did they not achieve their intended purpose, but, worse, they assisted the opposite result.

So strange an outcome gives special point to an analysis of how and why it came about. Addressing themselves to this question is the justification of the authors of this additional contribution to an already extensive literature that has concerned itself with the sorry record of the renewed failure of peace. Their concern is exclusively with the British milieu.

The birth of appeasement is rightly situated in the earlier war and the subsequent peace. Where much of British opinion was concerned, the influence of psychological and moral considerations cannot be overstressed. The view that Germany had been mistreated gained an acceptance that was as wide as it was uncritical. Whatever bases there might be for such an interpretation it was another matter to let it becloud the understanding of Britain's own interest. Germans might be a noble breed, far preferable to their trans-Rhenish neighbors; such considerations should be wholly irrelevant to the realities of the relationships of power, especially among the directors of it. Worst of all, the moralistic approach was self-defeating, for it led to a blind condoning of Nazi excesses and to a corresponding lack of interest in the fate of distant and inferior Slavs; principle cannot be cut in half.

Ethics aside, the view might seem more hard-headed that stressed economic necessity or advantage. The idea of partnership between the British Empire and a German-dominated Europe led to inordinate lengths of economic appeasement; it lends support to the interpretation that Hitler found himself presented in some cases with even greater opportunities than his own plans envisaged, but that he then could hardly turn down. Even the possibility of some colonial restitution was toyed with.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Confusion was no less at the operational level. The Foreign Office where the pro-French orientation was strong, was ignored or bypassed, and Vansittart for one was eliminated. Chamberlain was too sure of how to deal with far-away countries about which he knew little. And to this might be added an inordinate bias where communism was concerned. His responsibility is correspondingly heavy for the eventual disaster.

Considering the operation of British foreign policy over a longer period, what "the appeasers" represent is an unusual passage that loss of nerve best describes. As British power diminished, the directors of it seem to have been incapable of making an adequate adjustment to its modified circumstances. The authors, though themselves not altogether free of a certain moralistic inclination, have made a useful contribution to the setting down of that record.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

BARNARD COLLEGE

German Administration Since Bismarck: Central Authority Versus Local Autonomy. By HERBERT JACOB. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1963.—xviii, 224 pp. $7.00.

This book is, in part, a history and description of some general features of German administration under four regimes since the founding of the Second Reich. It includes, for example, descriptions of the changing workings of German federalism; of the abolition of federalism under the Nazis and its rebirth under the occupying powers; of the legal training and legalistic outlook of German civil servants; and of political and judicial controls over administrators under different regimes. As history and description, Professor Jacob's book is a useful source for anyone who wants to learn some of the basic facts about such matters.

This book is also an attempt at conceptual analysis. The author presents the last one hundred years of German administration as an instance of "the quest for responsiveness," defining extent of "responsiveness" as "the extent to which field agents execute directives within the time and in the way the central regime desires." That is, the book is not only about recent and contemporary German administration. It is also about certain generic features of "the administrative process." As conceptual analysis, it exemplifies some of the problems which lurk in that sort of scholarship.

Throughout the book there are references to many factors that are said to promote "responsiveness" in field administration: ideological loyalty to a regime; absence of class distinctions be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tween central officials and field officials; the presence of administrative courts and of agencies of local government that review or oversee the work of administrators; central control of appointments, transfers, and promotions; central control of budgets; the Junker spirit; high prestige of office; and a great many more.

Such factors, plus the concept of "responsiveness," are the ingredients of Professor Jacob's analysis. The attempt to make something out of these ingredients entailed many problems. They can be summed up by three questions. First, how do you think about multiple determinants of a single result (that is, of "responsiveness")? Second, how do you relate general concepts and concrete historical materials to one another? Third, at what point do you stop subsuming diverse phenomena under a single, all-inclusive concept and decide instead to deal with that overarching concept's less inclusive components?

As for the first question, the author does not take us much beyond a listing of causes of, and obstacles to, "responsiveness." Many different things promote or hinder responsiveness. For all we are told, they operate together in a purely additive fashion. If conditions A, B, and C all promote responsiveness, then you have more of it when all three conditions are present than when there are only two; and more of it when two are present than when there is only one. But suppose that these conditions are themselves related to one another: for example, that staffing central offices, field agencies, and organs of local government with people of similar class affiliations makes for ideological consensus and for frequent informal contacts which, in turn, reinforce the consensus and allow for informal group controls completely apart from formal hierarchies. And suppose that some of these conditions modify the ways in which others are related to "responsiveness": for example, that the degree of formal hierarchical control is a major determinant of responsiveness when there is little class solidarity, consensus, and informal contact, but is of little or no importance as a determinant when class solidarity, ideological consensus, and informal contacts are highly developed. And suppose that some of these conditions are related to one another in ways that have contradictory consequences for "responsiveness": for example, that central control of budgets makes officials in the field more "responsive" to their superiors in the central administration, but also lowers their prestige and power over their own subordinates and in the communities in which they work. In short, many factors, all making for more or less "responsiveness," do not by themselves add up to a system of complex interactions and contradictory forces that mirrors reality.

Second, Professor Jacob deals with some of the determinants

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of "responsiveness" in general, conceptual terms and with others in historical, descriptive terms. He writes of "coordination," "legitimacy," "communication," and "hierarchical control." He also writes of Bismarck's desire to minimize the power of the *Reichstag* as a factor checking the development of *Reich* field administration, and of the absence of a veto power in the Weimar Republic's *Reichsrat* as lessening "the likelihood that national laws would be acceptable to the *Laender*" and making it more likely that *Land* governments would amend national laws by administrative interpretations. The conceptually formulated factors and the descriptively formulated ones do not, for the most part, overlap. Most of the descriptive factors are not instances of the conceptual ones.

One result is that the author has to shift levels of conceptualization in the middle of sentences whenever he relates a descriptive factor to "responsiveness." Professor Jacob writes, for example, that "in the context of the federal structure in which the new [Second] Reich operated, the fears and jealousies of non-Prussian governments constantly threatened to obstruct responsive field administration of national mandates." For some ingredients in the analysis are treated conceptually while others are not.

Another result is that rich historical details are often summed up by impoverished conceptual conclusions. For example: "The principal barriers to responsiveness that the Prussian government encountered during the Weimar period were the disloyalty of field officials, the centrifugal forces of popularly elected councils participating in field administration, and communication obstacles which impeded coordination of Land and Reich programs at the local level." For when only some of the factors involved are treated conceptually, conceptual summaries are bound to leave out a lot.

Third, the ingredients of Professor Jacob's analysis seem to have consequences for quite different phenomena, all subsumed under "responsiveness." Some ingredients, such as superior control of promotions or the prospect of rebuke or reversal by an administrative court, seem to relate primarily to an official's motivation to comply with superior directives. Others, such as the absence of conflicting directives from above or an official's position of prestige in his dealings with the citizenry, seem to relate primarily to an official's ability to carry out his directives, entirely apart from his motivation to do so. Others, such as the presence or absence of coordination between different local agencies, have to do with the less proximate consequences of officials'

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

actions; motivated and capable officials may bring about results different from those intended because they unknowingly worked at cross purposes. And, of course, some of the ingredients in Jacob's analysis relate to more than one of these things. For example, the kind of education and professional training an official has had might relate both to his motivation and ability to comply with orders.

Whatever the determinants of the various components of "responsiveness," the use of the single, overarching concept seems to imply that these components are highly correlated with one another or are, in some sense, interchangeable. But that would have to be shown. It is not quite a matter of definition, in which each man is free to define as he will. It seems better to treat separately phenomena that feel different to the first touch, and wait until their underlying unity is shown before treating them as aspects of a single, more inclusive concept. In short, while this reviewer feels that Professor Jacob has been insufficiently conceptual in spots, he is also convinced that with the notion of "responsiveness" the author is conceptualizing too broadly and too inclusively.

It is, of course, quite difficult to combine history and conceptual analysis. No one man could do the job that Professor Jacob set out to do. But we do have many historical monographs on German administration. And, leading a separate intellectual existence, there is a continuing theoretical tradition—including some of the writings, among others, of Weber, of Mannheim, and of Merton—that was in large measure inspired initially by the German historical experience. Professor Jacob, following the work of Hans Rosenberg, for example, might have taken the next step toward bringing these two types of scholarship together. But he missed the chance, or took a different option, and we are all the poorer for it.

VERNON K. DIBBLE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Big Business in the Third Reich. By ARTHUR SCHWEITZER. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1964.—xii, 739 pp. $7.50.

The great flood of literature about the Third Reich in recent years has concentrated on the diplomatic, military, and biographical side. There have been few efforts to probe in detail the economic developments in the years of Hitler's rule; and when such efforts have been made, they have concentrated on specific

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problems rather than attempting to view the economy of National Socialist Germany as a whole. This great gap in our understanding of the Nazi system is now being filled by the studies of Arthur Schweitzer who, after writing a number of articles on specific topics, has published the first of what will hopefully be a series of volumes of truly comprehensive scope. Covering primarily the years 1933–36, this book is based not only on the available published literature, but on a painstaking scrutiny of vast quantities of archival material. Only those who have had any experience with these mountains of paper can fully appreciate the enormous effort required to locate the relevant information scattered in the secret files and then organize and synthesize that information into a coherent view of the National Socialist economy. In this process, the author has shed much light on the whole National Socialist system, and not merely on its economic policies.

The author takes up separately each major facet of the economy in its relation to the political, social, and military structure. He traces the development and fate of the coalition between the National Socialists, big business, and the military leadership. There is a fascinating account of the abandonment of Nazi economic doctrines in regard to the proposed artisan economy and the intended reorientation of capitalism in the direction of middle-class socialism. In this differentiation between the goals of National Socialism to be pursued regardless of difficulties, and the economic doctrines abandoned in the first years of the regime, the purge of Ernst Röhm and his followers in 1934 is placed in a new and broader perspective. Schweitzer explains convincingly how and why full fascism was not translated from the political to the economic and military fields, and that even the early successes of the National Socialist agricultural program were eventually subordinated to the requirements of the war economy in peacetime. The role of Hjalmar Schacht in the rearmament program, as well as the peculiar nature of the rearmament boom, are presented in a manner that supersedes all previous attempts to deal with these problems by the biographical approach. The reader is also given a clear view of the impact of National Socialist economic policies on the working man whose wage level was held down as prices and consumer taxes rose, and who thus paid a large share of the cost of rearmament along with expropriated foreign bondholders.

Those who have been fascinated by Schacht's fabled manipulations of foreign trade will be especially interested by the description of those practices in Chapter 9. All students of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

evolution of the Hitler regime will be impressed by Schweitzer's demonstration of a real shift from a rearmament to a war economy in 1936 and by his analysis of the collapse of Schacht's power position in the same year. The extensive theoretical discussion of the nature of the fascist economy, and the demonstration of how a directed capitalism was rejuvenated by government actions, will interest anyone endeavoring to understand the development of modern capitalism.

If the book has any fault, it is the occasional repetitiousness and opaqueness of its language. Some East German publications could have been usefully consulted. The author might also have pointed out that as the businessmen were not disturbed by extensive government intervention in the economy as long as they made high profits, so the workers were not so upset about the decline of real wages because they at least held jobs. Schweitzer's book will be the starting place for all future work on the National Socialist economy, and his sequel to this monumental study will be eagerly awaited.

GERHARD L. WEINBERG

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Guizot: Aspects of French History, 1787–1874. By DOUGLAS JOHNSON. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963.—ix, 469 pp. $10.00.

A long and varied life is narrated in detail and then carefully analyzed in this book which the author presents as something more than a biography. It is indeed more than that, for Johnson discusses at length the complex struggle in France to incorporate the revolution into her national life and he compares this at all times to developments in England. In fact, the many references to Englishmen and their ideas make a major contribution to the historian; Palmerston, for instance, is better understood after looking at him through an analysis of Guizot's conduct of foreign affairs, though the contrast between the French and English educational systems is less satisfactory.

In a sense, this scholarly study is a defense of Guizot, as the author nearly apologizes for his feeling that Guizot is no more likable as a historical figure than he was to his contemporaries. Johnson concludes that Guizot was not an original political theorist but defends him on the grounds that no one of his day was; perhaps this is also a commentary on the present day when any attempt at the "sovereignty of reason" seems so despairingly futile that its innovating qualities cannot be fully appreciated. The author defends Guizot for his failure to close the gap be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tween church and state in the field of education, for failing to unite Protestant and Catholic, for not realizing his aim of using history to restore unity, and for failing to restrain France's desire to play an exaggerated role in foreign affairs. In all his efforts, the author points out, Guizot has shared his failures with Frenchmen then and since. The reader might well conclude that it is not Guizot but France that has failed, might even commend Guizot for his persistent efforts to solve such problems.

It will be hard to add new facts to Johnson's study of Guizot. The author's familiarity with the collections of papers of so many of Guizot's contemporaries as well as with the secondary literature in this field is most impressive. His erudition and scholarship are outstanding; his use of detail makes the reading hard going at times. This is not a book for the beginning student but it will be appreciated by those who have some familiarity with the huge cast of characters on the French scene during Guizot's long lifetime.

Johnson is most convincing in his judgment of Guizot as "un-French" because of his Genevan training and his Protestantism. By virtue of his religious beliefs, reinforced by his early education, Guizot never quite understood his fellow countrymen nor was understood by them. The Protestant remained an outsider unable to grasp the significance of Catholic belief and the role of the Catholic Church in France; the Genevan never grasped the importance of military grandeur to the Frenchman both exhausted and inspired by Napoleon. From his detachment, Guizot approached politics, foreign affairs, education, and religion rationally, and that seems to be precisely why he gave the impression of failure. France, despite its stress on individualism and reason, seems to accept more readily statesmen whose governments are based on romantic collectivism.

LOUISE DALBY

SKIDMORE COLLEGE

Rural Revolution in France: The Peasantry in the Twentieth Century. By GORDON WRIGHT. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964.—xii, 271 pp. $6.00.

A British reviewer can say it: students of France already owe to American scholars most of our knowledge of French social groups. Now Gordon Wright's admirable and long-awaited study lights up that darkest corner for townsmen, the peasantry. His theme is not French farming or even agriculture, but the growth and political direction of rural organizations and elites. Slow to develop self-consciousness and produce their own leaders, peas-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ants in the Third Republic were loosely organized from above, either by aristocrats or by the small-town middle class with whom they "lived back to back rather than side by side." These politicians, who solicitously responded to their constituents' immediate grievances without ever tackling their real problems, finally earned a reputation for having "never cultivated anything except chicanery." Stimulated by the sacrifices of the peasant infantrymen in the First World War, and articulated by the depression, rural resentment soon gave rise to three abortive attempts to harness peasant energies—under the Popular Front, Vichy, and the Socialists at the Liberation—which left a legacy of leaders, organizations, and experiences to the Fourth Republic. The prosperous, conservative big farmers from the north and east managed to build on these foundations, crushing their Socialist rivals, winning acceptance from their former Radical enemies, appeasing right-wing "barnyard demagogues" like Dorgères, and leaving the Communists to exploit the grievances of the poorer regions in the center and southwest. But in the Fifth Republic new challengers have emerged among the younger Catholic peasants, who have at last faced the problem of France's "two agricultures"; no longer regarding the government as "a kind of vulture with teats," they welcome governmental regulation to humanize the inevitable decline of the farm population, and agitate for a reform in the law of land tenure rather than for higher price supports.

Not all observers would share the author's enthusiasm. Some of today's progressive leaders once flirted with extremists of the Right, and when their followers got out of control in the violent demonstrations of 1961 they behaved exactly like the angry peasants whom Dorgères led a generation ago. But I believe that Professor Wright's emphasis is correct, and that the emergence of this new, constructive peasant leadership is among the most hopeful developments in France today.

His book can be read with equal profit as an analysis of pressure-group rivalries and maneuvers in three Republics—two where Parliament was supreme, and one where it is "better to know two well-placed civil servants than twenty deputies." It sheds light on many problems: Vichy's place in French history, the unchanging obstructionism of the Senate, the new progressive role of the Roman Catholic Church, the modernizing aspect of Gaullism, the sterile hostility to reform which has cost the Communist party its potential following among young farmers. A fascinating appendix sketches the social and political structure of six widely separated villages, presenting Communists who regularly re-elect their aristocratic conservative mayor, or suddenly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

desert to Poujade, or cannot run a tractor cooperative because of their intense individualism—and Catholic priests who lead an alliance of workers and peasants against the combined reactionaries of town and countryside. The book has clear maps and statistics, a full bibliography, good photographs, but not a single algebraic formula or geometric model. It is written in readable English, witty, clear, and brief. In only two hundred pages of text it makes a really valuable contribution to our knowledge of contemporary France.

PHILIP M. WILLIAMS

NUFFIELD COLLEGE, OXFORD

The Economic History of Modern Italy. By SHEPARD B. CLOUGH. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1964.—xi, 458 pp. $10.00.

Professor Clough is well known for his textbook-like surveys of the economic history of modern France, of the United States, of Europe, of Western Civilization, and of the rise and fall of civilization in general. Modern Italy may now be added to the list. The volume shares the merits and defects of its predecessors. Based entirely on secondary sources, it is written in a straightforward narrative style, with slightly more than half of the text devoted to the last fifty years, almost one third to the last twenty-five years. Although entitled an economic history, it contains lengthy sections devoted to political, diplomatic, and even military events. This is no cause for criticism, but the events selected for narration do not always have a significant bearing on economic affairs, and the narrative rarely rises above the level of an introductory text. Some random examples:

> . . . after the Battle of Solferino, on June 24, France signed an armistice at Villafranca (July 8, 1859) without consulting its ally. The reasons for this sudden action were many and not entirely clear. In part, Napoleon did not revel in war as had his uncle, and after the victories of Magenta and Solferino he knew that his armies had to face the Quadrilateral . . . and that here the opposition would stiffen . . . (p. 35);

> . . . there was little sentiment in Italy to support the Central Powers in the summer of 1914 when the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand was shot and killed by a Serbian nationalist and Austria-Hungary made extraordinarily severe demands on Serbia without consulting Italy (pp. 173–74);

> In North Africa, the Germans joined the fighting in February, 1941, after Italian defeats at Tobruk (January 25) and Bengasi

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> (February 6), and General Rommel took command of all operations. The Germans entered this theater to help the Italians, but also as part of their attempt to strangle Britain. The fighting was bitter and comparatively drawn out; . . . finally the British irremediably routed their opponents . . . and allied power in North Africa was strengthened in November, 1942, when American forces landed in Morocco and Algeria (pp. 270–71).

As economic history the book lacks an analytical framework, and the use of economic concepts is superficial at best, frequently incorrect. Further examples:

> Those economies which have in their times reached great heights of "national income" per capita have always been those which had a relatively great division of labor, which put specially large amounts of human skill and technical knowledge into production, and which exchanged goods with others over great distances. This observation, based on the experience of economies from Ancient Egypt, Greece and China down to the present day, has meant that leading economies have always had a large proportion of their populations in industry (including mining) and in tertiary branches of economic activity, such as commerce, transportation, banking, and other services (p. 57).

Or this explanation of forced saving:

> This means that a borrower obtains and uses capital but does not pay back his debt in full. Thus the state may get funds by selling its bonds to individuals and banks and then settle its debt by collecting taxes or by inflation—by "forcing" people to divert some of their purchasing power to state enterprise . . . or funds may be obtained by private entrepreneurs from banks or private security holders, and the private entrepreneurs may, if they are unable to settle their debts, thus "force" their lenders to save (p. 60).

This book can serve a useful purpose as the only one on its subject in English, but its readers should be prepared to supply their own economic analysis.

RONDO CAMERON

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

The U.S.S.R. and the Future: An Analysis of the New Program of the CPSU. Edited by LEONARD SCHAPIRO. New York and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.—xix, 324 pp. $6.00.

The Soviet Union, 1922–1962: A Foreign Affairs Reader. Edited by PHILIP E. MOSELY. New York and London, Frederick A. Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1963.—xiv, 497 pp. $6.95.

Kremlinology is a flourishing art form that spins its gossamer

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

across the gap between journalism and scholarship, sometimes attaining the virtues of both though more often compounding their defects. The books under review offer two recent variations of this genre. Both are compendia of what once were separately conceived essays, held together in one case by a common subject matter, and in the other by the fact that all were first published in *Foreign Affairs*.

The U.S.S.R. and the Future consists of sixteen essays elucidating the "real" meanings of the official Program adopted at the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961. The text upon which the sixteen glossators lavish their learning is reproduced as an appendix (fifty-three pages of impossibly small type!), and so is the 1919 Program which it superceded (ten additional illegible pages).

Nearly all of the separate essays are persuasive and restrained. The comparative openness of Russian society since Stalin's death has hampered the free flow of the imagination which used to lend Kremlinology its principal charm. What remains? For one thing, a good deal of tedious doctrinal discussion, detecting and, at least by implication, deriding departures from Marxism-Leninism, or else locating logical inconsistencies between parts of the Program itself, and speculating as to party factions and groups that may have created such incongruities in the published document. For another, rather more pointed and interesting discussion of the discrepancies between program and reality, and guesses about the impossibilities confronting any Russian so foolish as to mistake the Program for a blueprint of the future. But the learned and ingenious essayists conspicuously and inexplicably refrain from analyzing the Program for what it was: a piece of propaganda!

What, one is tempted to ask, could be done if a team of equally learned Russians dissected the Republican and Democratic platforms of 1960 with the same dead seriousness? What devastating sallies they could launch against our illogicalities! What betrayals of the Founding Fathers, what failures to confront unpleasant realities they would find! And how silly they would sound. It seems to this reviewer that the learned experts who unburden themselves in this book are just as silly. Does it really take sixteen men to flog a dead horse? Particularly when the editor himself remarks with disarming simplicity: "In short, the Programme may not prove to be very important on the domestic scene at all . . ." (p. xvii).

Professor Mosely's collection of thirty articles about Russia, culled from back issues of *Foreign Affairs*, is far more variegated and interesting. Some famous Bolsheviks appear in person:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Christian Rakovsky, Karl Radek, Leon Trotsky, Nikolai Bukharin, Nikita Khrushchev. There are a few American counterparts, like Henry L. Stimson, but the bulk of the articles here reprinted came from the hands of journalists and scholars, addressing themselves to a cultivated general public.

Professor Mosely explains in his preface that he omitted articles "overtaken by history," and chose only those that still remain enlightening and interesting (p. xii). He has been notably successful, for the various articles record and analyze aspects of Russian realities across the past forty years with what seems—at least today—to be a remarkably high level of wisdom and penetration. To be sure, nothing like a balanced or complete picture of Russian history emerges. World War II, for example, fails to appear presumably because articles of that vintage have not stood the test of time so well as others written before and since. The book's value is that of an artist's retrospective display; it acquaints us with the *Foreign Affairs* style of Kremlinology at its best, successfully joining scholarship with journalism for the enlightenment of the public.

WILLIAM H. MCNEILL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Third World in Soviet Perspective: Studies by Soviet Writers on the Development Areas. Edited and with an introduction by THOMAS PERRY THORNTON. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.—355 pp. $7.50.

This important and interesting book, published for the Center of International Studies, consists of a representative selection of fourteen essays written by prominent Soviet scholars on a variety of subjects concerning social structure and class relationships in underdeveloped countries from the vantage point of Marxism-Leninism, with the attempt to establish consistency between ideological interpretation and political action.

The book is carefully edited with references to literature in various languages, a bibliography providing a guide to further readings, and informative footnotes regarding the history of Marxian concepts and interpretation of events. Biographical information about the contributing authors is also added.

The interpretation of social conditions, which has been little known in the West, shows the extent to which Marxism is a living tradition in the social sciences of the U.S.S.R. The articles were written in the sixties, with the exception of one published in 1950, dealing with Stalin's theory of the colonial revolution and the National Liberation Movement; it puts into relief recent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

changes in the party line and illustrates the progress made in methods of social research, although even now the analyses are frequently crudely mixed with polemics.

According to Communist theory, colonialism, as a specific form of imperialism, is the last stage of capitalism. Independence movements, therefore, suggest an interpretation as the final crisis of capitalism and a breakthrough toward communism. The articles which cover countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America present an attempt to interpret very diversified stratification systems—the result of different historical conditions—in terms of the Marxian concepts of "proletariat," "bourgeoisie," and "feudal aristocracy," and to figure out the role of the newly rising "national bourgeoisie" in the framework of growing national consciousness and political independence for which the original Marxian scheme did not provide a proper place. At the same time, the large agricultural sector and the peasant problem in these countries—a stepchild in Marxist theory and a highly controversial issue in later decades—is scrutinized and pressed in the Procrustean bed of the class-struggle. This is done with the intent of finding a firm Marxist-Leninist basis for political action by the U.S.S.R. toward the "Third World."

However, it becomes evident from these essays that the contradictions which Communism has to face in this situation are very complicated indeed, even for the most skillful dialectician. The first dilemma with which Communism has to struggle arises out of the question: How to apply the Marxian theory of class-struggle and the necessary downfall of capitalism in view of the fact that many underdeveloped countries, in their effort to industrialize, consider assistance by the West a constructive contribution to the improvement of their lot. Capitalism and Communism both support industrialization as the advisable method for social progress. Russia, like the United States, considers the contribution of her competitor as politically most dangerous to her own interest. But Communism interprets capitalist penetration, beyond its political implications, also as *socially* destructive to the underdeveloped countries, because it perpetuates "social dependence" in spite of political independence. Industrialization through assistance from the Soviet Union, however, is justified ideologically by establishing a new interpretation of the current period as "the transitional stage." It is an attempt to make the support of state capitalism and of a "national bourgeoisie" in the new countries reconcilable with Marxism-Leninism.

From this emerges the second dilemma: How to uphold the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marxist interpretation of history as a predetermined process in a situation in which the Soviet Union participates in shaping the history of precapitalist areas, thus foregoing the chance of promoting the final clash of diverging class interests. It becomes evident from these essays that Marxism-Leninism has no unambiguous answer to these contradictory propositions.

The essays are a contribution to the century-old theme of Marxian dialectics applied to problems of internatioinal relations. They are of specific value to the social scientist interested in the history of Communist ideology and also to those who shape policy in our confrontation with the communist bloc; they illustrate that we have to cope not only with sheer power politics, but with an ideology the appeal of which should not be underrated.

KAETHE MENGELBERG

NEW YORK CITY

Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics. By ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—vi, 180 pp. $4.50.

The Future of Communist Society. Edited by WALTER LAQUEUR and LEOPOLD LABEDZ. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—197 pp. $5.00.

The material in both of these books was previously published in another form. Was republication justified? The answer in both cases is an emphatic "Yes."

The five essays by Brzezinski, director of Columbia's Research Institute on Communist Affairs, appeared originally in such various places that few readers are likely to have seen them all. They examine several aspects of the interaction and blending of ideology and power in Soviet politics. In the first essay, dating from 1956, Brzezinski inquires whether totalitarianism can be rational. He shows how he reaches the conclusion that (1) it can, but that (2) in the Soviet Union the emergence of a high degree of rationality is far from imminent. His second chapter picks out similarities and dissimilarities in the Tsarist and Soviet patterns of autocracy. He finds several of the dissimilarities to be reversals of the pluralistic trends that were developing in Russia before 1917. Brzezinski's third essay, "The Nature of the Soviet System," was widely acclaimed when it appeared in the *Slavic Review* of October 1961; it has stood well the test of events since then, and can be seen to have relevance to the issues surrounding the recent fall of Mr. Khrushchev. The re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

maining two essays treat the role of ideology in Soviet foreign relations. Like the rest, they contain many worthwhile insights. All five essays exhibit Brzezinski's talent for clear and penetrating exposition, whether he be restating a widely held belief or advancing one of his many new interpretations.

The volume edited by Laqueur and Labedz originated as a special issue of *Survey* in 1961. Its point of departure is the third Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, published July 30, 1961—an important document following in the tradition of the Party Programs of 1903 and 1919. The eighteen contributors examine the Program itself as well as other evidence of current trends to discern the shape of Soviet society in the future. The editors have held duplication to a minimum. They jointly provide an illuminating introduction, and editor Labedz contributes an exemplary sketch of realistic and utopian elements in the Program and attendant debates. Various parts of the vision are then studied further in the excellent essays that follow. In the economic sphere, for example, Alfred Zauberman shows how "Communism" has in effect been redefined as a system of continuing scarcities, in which prices and centralized planning will be essential. Naum Jasny, uncovering inconsistencies in the Program's economic targets for 1970 and 1980, hypothesizes convincingly that these targets were conjured up not by professional Soviet planners but by Soviet politicians, and are not intended for operational use. In the related political sphere, George L. Kline elucidates the theoretical bases of the concept of "withering away," as well as the meaning of the removal of certain Soviet institutions from the original list of those slated to wither. Peter Wiles makes an entertainingly imaginative yet only partly frivolous attempt to concoct an individualist or capitalist utopia which can be compared with the communist one. Although his "Affluent Individualism" embodies some traits almost as fanciful as those that characterize "Full Communism," Wiles effectively puts across the message that for those who need utopias there are sound reasons to prefer "Affluent Individualism" to "Full Communism," and that it is, if anything, more likely to be attainable (which is not to say that he thinks either of them really is).

Some of the essays understandably focus more on Soviet actions than on Soviet words. Such, for example, are S. V. Utechin's account of educational reforms, Timothy Sosnovy's study of Soviet urban planning and housing, and Robert Osborn's explanation of the limited role of public voluntary institutions in solving urban problems. Osborn argues forcefully that the Soviet Union, while sharing the same maladies of urban life as other

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industrialized countries, tragically deprives its communities of the possibility of taking remedial action on their own initiative. A valuable subsection focuses on relations with China. The contributors here—Alexander Eckstein, H. F. Schurmann, and Donald S. Zagoria—maintain a high standard, though some of Schurmann's generalizations about Russia's political and social structure before 1917 seem dubious. The volume is rounded out by the essays of such specialists as Thilo Ramm on early utopian socialists, Irving Fetscher on utopianism in Marx and Engles, George Brinkley on Soviet foreign policy, John N. Hazard on law, Ernst May on city planning, Leonard Schapiro on the party-state relationship, and Alfred G. Meyer, whose concluding piece is a commendably tentative yet highly interesting estimate of what the Soviet Union may be like by 1980.

As this reviewer surveys the total coverage of the volume he finds it admirably comprehensive. Yet he would have liked to add essays giving further attention to three relevant problems. One would have ascertained the extent to which the Khrushchev Program's vision of the future differs from that presented in Stalin's later writings, especially his *Economic Problems of Socialism*. The second would have appraised the meaning of what has been said and not said, in belles-lettres as well as elsewhere, about the traits of personal character of the new man under Communism. And the third would have explored the tactical question of why the Soviet leadership felt it necessary at this time to devote so much attention to discussing and defining the transition to "Full Communism." This problem is touched on by several of the contributors, many of whom are eminently qualified to discuss it at length. Yet unfortunately, among all the wealth of other information they present, none of them tries fully to explain why the Soviet leaders in 1961 chose to bring the long-promised carrot so close that its defects would be harder than ever to hide.

RALPH T. FISHER JR.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918–48. By PAUL E. ZINNER. New York and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.—xi, 264 pp. $6.50.

The techniques employed by the Communists in seizing power in the countries of Eastern Europe have been investigated by many scholars with varying degrees of success. Professor Zinner has given us a first-rate analysis of this problem, using Czecho-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

slovakia as a case study. Seeing no justification for the Communist *coup* in February 1948, he avers that Czechoslovakia was then "genuinely friendly to the Soviet Union" and had "placed itself voluntarily under Russia's tutelage in international affairs." Inside Czechoslovakia, moreover, the Communist party was assured of "a respectable" if not "a dominating" position in the government. There was, according to the author, "no danger of social and economic retrogression" in Czechoslovakia. The Communist seizure, therefore, was "proof of Communist disingenuousness and put the Western powers on their guard as never before."

The first part of the book discusses the political character of Czechoslovakia, the origin and the Bolshevization of the Czechoslovak Communist party, and the party membership and activities between 1918 and 1938. The second part deals with Communist strategy at home and abroad from 1939 to 1945. The third and the most important part of the book is devoted to an analysis of the "democratic revolution" of 1945–48 and the subsequent *coup*.

Two ideas stand out in the book: the undemocratic and unprincipled methods employed by Communist tacticians in grabbing power, and the inability of democratic parties to cope with the challenge. To be sure, the Communists in Czechoslovakia were favored by internal conditions. They derived their main strength from the working class, which was large and in a favorable position after the war to demand social and economic rights and political representation. The party was aware of its own strength, cohesiveness, and discipline. "No one dared to oppose the wishes of the working class." The Communists knew how to use the working class in extending their control over trade unions. Their cause was also furthered by the collapse of the old social and political order. Finally, the Communist party in Czechoslovakia did not have the image of an alien movement.

Confused and inept, the democratic parties were no match for the Communist conspiratorial monolith. Moreover, the democratic leaders made one error after another. "They did not acquaint the nation with their plans," and they did not "enlighten the people about the seriousness of the situation." In fact, they left the direction of public opinion to the Communists. The democratic leaders, with no well developed plan of action, stunned the public by their sudden resignation.

Although the reviewer agrees with the author's conclusions, he thinks that the author has not given sufficient attention to the external forces which influenced the postwar political events in Czechoslovakia: the Munich psychosis; the Russophile sentiment

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inspiring a large sector of population; the triumph of Communism in Yugoslavia and Poland; the presence of foreign Communist troops on the borders; and the fear of a reborn Germany. Nonetheless, this is the best study in English on the Communist *coup* in Czechoslovakia, written by a man who knows his subject and is free of the national and confessional prejudices which often mar works on Eastern Europe.

WAYNE S. VUCINICH

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

The Law Practice of Alexander Hamilton: Documents and Commentary, Volume I. By JULIUS GOEBEL JR. New York and London, Columbia University Press under the auspices of the William Nelson Cromwell Foundation, 1964.—xxiv, 898 pp. $18.50.

Julius Goebel Jr. and five associate editors score several significant firsts and rate high marks for concept and execution in their presentation. It is the first major effort to exemplify out of documents the private practice of a distinguished lawyer, and makes a notable addition to the slender stock of studies which have sought to put the practice of lawyers in the context of their times. Historians have unwarrantably ignored the bar; in its objective this volume takes bold aim on important but neglected subject matter.

About a third of the book—its most valuable part—consists of commentary. The commentaries begin with a description of New York and federal judicial organization and procedure in Hamilton's time. They move on to tell the life history and context of salient types or affairs of his practice. These essays include three outstanding contributions of legal political and economic history, telling (1) of litigation under New York statutes directed against the property of Loyalists, (2) of maneuvers by lawsuit and negotiation in New York's boundary disputes with Massachusetts and Connecticut, and (3) of the interplay of free press values and the law of criminal libel in *People v. Croswell.* The commentary on the anti-Loyalist statutes gives an extended history of *Rutgers v. Waddington* which will henceforth be the constitutional historian's standard reference on that precursor of judicial review. About forty per cent of the book presents papers written by Hamilton or reporting arguments he made in court. Included here are some one hundred pages publishing for the first time a treatise on aspects of procedural and substantive law in New York, written by Hamilton in 1782 when he was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

studying for the bar. We have few law texts for this period. Hamilton's analysis is specially interesting because of the extent to which it reports contemporary unwritten practice and precedents. On both counts this volume usefully adds to legal history sources in offering this previously unpublished work. About a quarter of the present book presents papers growing out of Hamilton's representation of clients; another quarter goes to legal papers drawn by other men, relevant to matters in which Hamilton was advocate or counsellor. Such samples of lawyers' working papers—pleadings, briefs, notes on reading, reports of oral arguments—are valuable apart from such specific data as they furnish, for they convey a flavor of times and institutions which only original documents can provide. For the most part, however, the documents reflect general professional competence rather than the distinctive touches of Alexander Hamilton; lacking in these litigious papers is the stamp of individual mastery which Hamilton puts on his best public documents.

If there is less of Hamilton here than the book's title might suggest, this is no fault of the editors. The limitation inheres in the documents, and indicates only that the qualities of diagnosis and face handling, invention, judgment, and character which individualize the work of a first-rate practitioner elude the record.

WILLARD HURST
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN SCHOOL OF LAW

The Papers of James Madison, Volume 3: *3 March 1781—31 December 1781*. Edited by WILLIAM T. HUTCHINSON and WILLIAM M. E. RACHAL. Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1963.—xxv, 381 pp. $10.00.

This third volume of the Madison papers covers the last ten months of 1781, during which time the thirty-year-old Madison continued to be a member of the Virginia delegation in Congress. Of the 174 papers included, only twenty-two have appeared, in whole or in part, in earlier editions of Madison's writings. Like the two preceding volumes, this one is thoroughly annotated and contains the letters received by Madison as well as those written by him, and also the motions, resolutions, petitions, and reports involving him, the Virginia delegation, and the committees of which he was a member. Madison's letters, clear and pertinent, are pedestrian; those to him are almost always more colorful; those of Edmund Pendleton are particularly notable for their sagacity and virile English.

During 1781, until the Yorktown campaign, Virginia bore the brunt of the revolutionary fighting and the succoring of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Carolinas. The Madison correspondence is filled with bitter complaints about Virginia's military and civilian hardships, the neglect of her by Congress and the other states, the extravagant living of those to the north who speculated in trade and America's sick currency and engrossed goods desperately needed by patriot armies in the South. Political leaders watched anxiously every move in the power-politics game in Europe, feared France was diverting too much aid to Spain for attacks on Gibraltar and Minorca, saw clearly that the final outcome would turn on the control of American waters by naval power, and prayed for that French fleet which finally came and made possible the victory at Yorktown.

Madison concentrated on getting reinforcements and supplies for the patriot armies in the South, tightening non-intercourse with Britain, devising measures of retaliation for British atrocities, guarding against any provision in the peace treaty which would require readmission of Tories and remission of their properties, defining the commercial rights of neutrals and belligerents. Fearing that Eastern interests in trade and fisheries would be given priority in the peace-making, Madison was one of those who kept alive the importance of securing the Mississippi River as the Western boundary and the free navigation of that river through Spanish-held Louisiana, even though legislatures in those Southern states now fighting for their very survival were less insistent on these matters than they once had been.

Foreshadowing his future federalism, Madison favored strengthening the Articles of Confederation, as shown by his support of congressional authority to settle the Vermont controversy between New Hampshire and New York, of the motion to compel each state to redeem its quota of old continental money, of an interpretation or an amendment of the Articles to allow Congress a direct revenue to be paid to collectors designated by the Congress (a truly federal power), and by his proposed amendment (pp. 17–18) to make explicit Congress' "general and implied power" to employ economic and even military sanctions to compel laggard states to furnish their allocated quotas of money and troops. At this time, much of Madison's nationalism came out of the South's desperate need for Confederation help.

After Yorktown, divisive forces came even more to the fore and it was soon clear that the big question of the future would be whether peace and union could be made to coexist. Ironically enough, there is more in the Madison correspondence about the concern felt in Virginia over a congressional committee report rejecting Virginia's conditions appended to her cession of her Western lands than there is about the rejoicing over Yorktown.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Illustrative of the non-inevitability of history, the flexibility of politicians, and our over-stereotyping of historical figures is a letter of Madison to Jefferson (p. 308), suggesting that Virginia chart her future course on the presumption that "the present Union will but little survive the present war" and that the state "ought to be as fully impressed with the necessity of the Union during the war as of its probable dissolution after it."

WILLIAM G. CARLETON
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

Status and Kinship in the Higher Civil Service. By SIDNEY H. ARONSON. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1964.—xiii, 274 pp. $5.95.

The content of the present study is suggested by its subtitle: standards of selection in the administrations of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson. The author takes his departure from the commonly accepted notion that the spoils system was initiated by Andrew Jackson as a Western, populist protest against Eastern, aristocratic dominance. This notion is more or less reflected in the "appointment ideologies" of the three Presidents, discussed in the first chapter. Following this a series of chapters analyzes the actual "social-class composition" of the presidential appointees making up the decision-making elite of the three administrations. Family origin, occupational attainments, level of education achieved, and the role of kinship in the composition of these elites are examined in detail (Chaps. 4–7). A concluding chapter deals with the "origins of the tradition" attributing the initiation of the spoils system to Andrew Jackson, a tradition which in a restricted sense is refuted by the careful findings of this study. The study is rounded out by a general survey of the American social structure, 1750–1830 (Chap. 3), by a presentation of the procedures employed (Chap. 2), and by a series of appendices listing offices, appointments, educational attainments, and kinship relations of elite members by name.

This study is very carefully done and the author should be commended for the excellence of his work. It would be unfair to take issue with him over what he has chosen to omit, especially since he notes these omissions at several points. Yet this reviewer agrees with some of the questions Professor Aronson himself raises. He concentrates attention on the decision-makers among presidential appointments for the very good reason that the desired information would be difficult to obtain for less distinguished officials. This study shows clearly that Jackson

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also relied on prominent men for prominent appointments and did not distinguish himself significantly from his predecessors in this respect. But such appointments are difficult to classify as either "spoils" or "merit"; they are bound to be made in political terms and they depend on a knowledge of personnel that almost excludes the obscure by definition.

In this concluding chapter, however, Professor Aronson adds an interpretation which goes further. Though Jackson continued to appoint prominent men to the decision-making elite of his administration, that prominence was associated more often than not with the appointee's own occupational attainments rather than his family background. Compared with the earlier politics-by-gentlemen this is a critical change, which would have deserved elaboration because it may well have facilitated the growth of egalitarian ideology and practice after Jackson. The earlier interpretation of Jackson as the initiator of the spoils system was too simple, as this study shows. But was it really incorrect, if proper allowance is made for the declining significance of family origin and for the possibility (referred to on p. 179) that a major "democratization" of the civil service under Jackson may have occurred in the lower ranks? Perhaps Professor Aronson has carried the analysis as far as the imperfect personnel records of the past will allow and if so one wonders how future studies will be able to resolve the remaining questions.

REINHARD BENDIX

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

George W. Norris: The Making of a Progressive, 1861–1912. By RICHARD LOWITT. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1963.—xiv, 341 pp. $7.95.

Few twentieth-century political leaders are more deserving of a full-length scholarly biography than George W. Norris, the "fighting liberal" from Nebraska. His honesty and devotion to duty were legendary in his own lifetime, and his career, spanning the whole sweep of American history from populist days to the New Deal, makes a marvelous case study of the reform spirit in modern times. Professor Richard Lowitt of Connecticut College has undertaken to provide such a study and this volume, covering Norris' life down to his election to the Senate in 1912, is the first fruit of his labors.

The Norris that we see here is essentially a conservative. He resents the changes sweeping across the land, transforming the United States from a simple rural paradise to a complex urban society plagued by political corruption and industrial giantism,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"It is at the rural fireside that virtue, morality, and patriotism have reached their highest state," he said in 1904, and a few years later he added: "In the city . . . we have the slum and the breeding places of anarchy, ignorance, and crime. It is there we have the mob. . . . Upon the farms are located the conservative, patriotic, and thinking voters of our country."

Lowitt shows that Norris' independence never, in this period of his career, led him to take a stand unpopular in his own district. He worked assiduously for local pork-barrel legislation, opposed removing the duty on Philippine sugar because it threatened Nebraska beet-growers, supported local stockmen in their demand that the cost of meat inspection be borne by the federal government, and joined in the cry for stricter railroad regulation when local feeling turned against the Burlington railroad after it became part of the Morgan-Hill system. Norris' long and courageous fight against "Cannonism" in the House had the ardent backing of most Nebraskans. His basic article of faith was in individual responsibility and majority rule. Although always insisting that he was a loyal Republican, he remained generally aloof from the party machine, depending upon direct contact with the voters of his district both to fathom their sentiments and win their backing. His great strength was his conscientious fair-mindedness. Thus he could serve as an attorney for loan companies in Nebraska during a period of acute agricultural distress, when hundreds of farmers were threatened with foreclosure, without alienating either the farmers or his employers. Out of such experiences came his trust in the fairness and intelligence of the average man—the fundamental tenet of his progressivism.

Professor Lowitt possesses exactly the kind of scholarly integrity that Norris would have admired. His book is a model of judicious objectivity. "I have not tried to force any pattern on my subject," he says. "Rather I have tried to write concretely, to pay attention to significant details, to record observations, and to avoid excessive generalizing." As a result, we have here a meticulous but uncluttered description of Norris' early career. Lowitt's second volume, which will deal with far more important matters, will be eagerly awaited.

Only one aspect of the subject requires fuller treatment and interpretation than Lowitt has so far afforded it: Norris' personality. Repeatedly Lowitt refers to Norris' fits of acute depression and nervous exhaustion. He says that Norris was a model of probity who rarely exhibited sentiment or emotion, but describes occasional outbursts that appear almost pathological, such as the time Norris left the rostrum in the middle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of a speech and shook his fist furiously in the face of a heckler. When his eighty-two-year-old mother died in far-off Ohio, he was so depressed that he even talked of suicide, yet when his loving wife died the next year in childbirth, "he bore his loss remarkably well." It is to be hoped that in his next volume Lowitt will include an integrated description of Norris the human being to balance his portrayal of Norris the public servant and politician.

JOHN A. GARRATY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933. By WILLIAM PRESTON JR. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963.—352 pp. $6.75.

William Preston Jr. traces the history of twentieth-century federal policies toward immigrants and radicals. He finds that we have persisted in the intolerant course marked out by the Immigration Act of 1903, the first American law to exclude foreigners because of their beliefs and associations. The underlying continuity in subsequent policies, Preston contends, has been obscured by the sensational Palmer Raids of 1919–20. Rather than isolated outrages, the raids were an integral part of the twentieth-century pattern, differing little in basic intention from the Internal Security Act of 1951 and the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952. Indeed, not until after World War II were the now ubiquitous loyalty oaths and security checks applied on a large scale in peacetime to native-born citizens.

Our repressive federal policies have sacrificed the rights of aliens, naturalized citizens, and native-born radicals to the welfare of the state. But the real loser, Preston maintains, is the nation as a whole; for we need the invigorating dissent of radicals and the stimulation of nonconforming immigrants. This, then, is not only a comprehensive history of federal policies, but a plea for revision of those policies as well. It is highly effective in both tasks.

Other writers, especially John Higham and Robert K. Murray, have covered much of the same ground. (Five of Preston's nine chapters are devoted to the period 1917–20.) The author's major contribution lies in his extensive use of Labor and Justice Department records. Well chosen quotations from these manuscripts give the reader the best available picture of the men who established and carried out federal policies toward aliens and radicals.

Preston shows that a high proportion of immigration inspec-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tors, Justice Department agents, and federal judges saw recent immigrants as fundamentally inferior and potentially dangerous. Most of these officials accepted local businessmen's views about the threat to society posed by the IWW and other radical organizations. Immigration inspectors tended to believe that their primary task was the deportation of aliens; they were impatient with suggestions that they should be equally concerned with aliens' civil rights. Preston demonstrates that overburdened policy-makers in the Justice and Labor Departments—as well as in the White House—frequently did not know what their subordinates were doing.

The author's concentration upon federal practices and his dependence upon government records, however, prove to be handicaps as well as advantages. In limiting both his subject and his research Preston almost inevitably gives the false impression that the desires of federal officials were all that mattered in determining policies. Actually, even Attorney General Palmer was pushed and pulled in 1919 by congressmen, newspapers, his fellow cabinet members, and by many expressions of public opinion. Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson's negligence in overseeing immigration inspectors during the Red Scare was due, in part at least, to the fact that he, too, was responsive to the prevailing hysteria.

Furthermore, while federal policies did change markedly after the eighteen-nineties, a study of government records provides insufficient evidence for an explanation of the change. In recent years anthropologists, sociologists, social psychologists, and psychiatrists have contributed a great deal to our understanding of nativism. Preston ignores this literature in favor of an alleged relationship, unsubstantiated by evidence, between economic adversity and hostility toward alien radicals.

The book is an important addition to our knowledge—the fullest account of the federal actions it describes—and an impressive argument for new directions in government policies. It leaves us, however, with crucial gaps in our understanding of the subject.

STANLEY COBEN

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Minister of Relief: Harry Hopkins and the Depression. By SEARLE F. CHARLES. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1963. —xi, 286 pp. $6.00.

The subject of Searle Charles' book, a study of the federal re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lief program under the New Deal, has a timely interest. The federal government in its current attempts to ameliorate poverty and widespread unemployment will no doubt seek the precedents the New Deal has to offer. Though circumstances now are very different, the experience of the past can provide valuable guidelines for the present.

Mr. Charles focuses on three of the New Deal federal relief agencies—the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), the Civil Works Administration (CWA), and the Works Progress Administration (WPA). The author has set himself the task of analyzing "the formation, administration, and relation to politics" (p. vii) of each of these agencies and the impact Harry Hopkins, their chief administrator, had on all of them. The book is, therefore, an attempt at both administrative history and administrative biography.

Roosevelt's approach to relief, while governor of New York, was extremely cautious. He at first hoped that local agencies could handle the job. Only gradually did he expand the state's role in administering relief. By 1933, state resources also proved inadequate. Roosevelt and the nation were now willing to offer the states federal assistance in relieving the plight of the needy and the unemployed. The job of implementing this aid was given to Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's administrator of the FERA. Hopkins approached the job with enthusiasm, dispensing funds with a dispatch that startled the nation. Mr. Charles concludes that the chief accomplishments of the relief program in its first two years of operation were the increase in amounts given to those in need and the extension of coverage to many cases previously ignored. Early critics of federal intervention in the relief sphere predicted that national efforts would tend to diminish those on the state and local levels. Hopkins succeeded in proving these fears false. State contributions increased. Help from the federal government had an energizing rather than a narcotic effect.

In the winter of 1933–34, directly sponsored federal public works programs were inaugurated under the CWA. This type of work relief was greatly expanded in 1935 when the Works Progress Administration was launched. Hopkins served as head of the agency until he was appointed Secretary of Commerce in 1938.

Mr. Charles examines the administrative problems of WPA and the attempts on both the local and national levels to use it for political purposes. Hopkins held such attempts in check. While he did, at points, succumb to political pressures, he did so much less than other top Washington personnel. In the dis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cussion of WPA, the reader is disappointed with the scant mention received by such interesting sub-programs as the National Youth Administration and the Federal Theater Project.

The greatest shortcoming of the book is its failure really to elucidate the qualities in Hopkins which made him such a dynamic administrator. His attitudes toward the poor and toward economic questions are only superficially examined. His relations with his subordinates and superiors, so vital to understanding an effective administrator, are not adequately explored. The only manuscript collections used by Mr. Charles are those of Hopkins and Roosevelt. Several other relevant collections are available and might have added depth to the study.

RICHARD WEISS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Frank B. Kellogg—Henry L. Stimson, Volume XI of *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy.* By ROBERT H. FERRELL. New York, Cooper Square Publishers, 1963.—ix, 360 pp. $7.50.

Under the guidance of Samuel Flagg Bemis, thirty-seven authors collaborated to produce in ten volumes between 1927 and 1929 sketches of every secretary of state from Thomas Jefferson through Charles Evans Hughes and of the two men who served as secretary for foreign affairs from 1781 to 1789. As an example of expeditious editing, those volumes stand almost alone in the annals of cooperative histories. They quickly became a standard reference work. Some essays were original contributions, superior to anything then in print on their subject. Besides Bemis, the authors included such eminent students of foreign policy and international law as Randolph G. Adams, Philip Marshall Brown, A. L. P. Dennis, Joseph V. Fuller, Charles Cheney Hyde, H. Barrett Learned, Eugene I. McCormac, Dexter Perkins, Julius W. Pratt, James B. Scott, Lester B. Shippee, St. George L. Sioussat, Charles C. Tansill, and Mary Wilhelmine Williams. By 1941 the series was out of print, and the publisher—Alfred A. Knopf—is said to have allowed the plates to be melted for much-needed metal. In 1958 the Pageant Book Company reissued in offset process the ten volumes bound as five. Now, with Bemis as advisory editor and Robert H. Ferrell, one of his ablest students, at the helm, the series begins anew. This installment is the first of six which will end with Christian A. Herter.

The present editor is well equipped to deal with the two men to follow Hughes. He has written a model monograph on the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kellogg Pact, the best short account of foreign affairs during Hoover's presidency, and an excellent textbook of American diplomatic history. Although his pages occasionally condense what he has said before, they rest upon an investigation of new sources and employ fresh quotations. Of the six chapters devoted to Kellogg, only one deals with the anti-war pact. The first and last depict Kellogg's earlier and later career better than does L. Ethan Ellis' study of his secretaryship published in 1961. Ferrell also adds something in his chapters on Latin America, China, and Europe. The eight chapters allotted to Stimson cover his previous training, the State Department in 1929, the London Naval Conference, debts and reparations, the Manchurian crisis, the Stimson Doctrine and its aftermath, the World Disarmament Conference, and the record after 1933. The first draws upon Elting E. Morison's *Turmoil and Tradition* (1960) and is the best summary of Stimson's life to 1929. Throughout Ferrell seems slightly more sympathetic to Stimson than he did in his *American Diplomacy and the Great Depression* (1957) and markedly more so than Richard N. Current was in *Secretary Stimson* (1954).

Ferrell compresses his story into 289 pages of text. He appends thirty-four pages of backnotes, where he discusses divergent interpretations and specialized matters, and a twenty-seven-page bibliographical essay, where he lists over forty manuscript collections. His use of a wide array of unpublished papers distinguishes this volume from the original series and sets a high standard for the other contributors. To an enthusiastic endorsement of a job well done, this reviewer offers only two reservations. First, the author should have explained more fully the stand taken by both Kellogg and Stimson during the debate over the Treaty of Versailles. Second, the author has gone too far in revising the low estimate historians have held of Kellogg. Some change is called for, but surely Kellogg should not rank above Stimson, as is suggested on page 129.

RICHARD W. LEOPOLD

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Canada-United States Treaty Relations. Edited by DAVID R. DEENER. Durham, Duke University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, and London, Cambridge University Press, 1963.—xiv, 250 pp. $7.50.

The Commonwealth-Studies Center at Duke University has now sponsored, with this volume from the editorial pen of David Deener, chairman of the political science department at

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tulane University, nineteen volumes of studies relating to the Commonwealth. All have been published by the Duke University Press. Eight of these volumes have been writen by more than one scholar, and six of them have dealt with Canada. As with any series of cooperative works, the volumes are of mixed quality, but several have become basic to Commonwealth studies, and two, Craufurd D. W. Goodwin's *Canadian Economic Thought* and *The American Economic Impact on Canada* by Hugh G. J. Aitken and others, have been major contributions to Canadian history. Professor Deener's volume now falls into stride perhaps a step behind these leaders.

This volume grew out of a four-day conference on Canada-United States Treaty Relations held at Duke in the summer of 1961. Ten papers, bound together by the common desire to explore the nature of the Canadian-American relationship, attempt in the words of the editor both "depth and focus . . . a balance and a blend." Four of the essays pursue the broad view while six deal with highly specific problems. Inevitably the former are more interesting to read and the latter seem more thoroughly satisfactory in terms of approximating a complete statement. Jurists, economists, political scientists, and historians have contributed. Editor Deener has added a comprehensive and extremely valuable list of all treaties and agreements concluded between the United States and Canada or between the United States and Great Britain affecting Canada from 1782 to 1960, with references, and has concluded with a highly selective but well-chosen bibliographical note.

The essays are, of course, a mixed lot. Robert E. Wilson opens the book with a succinct and comprehensive statement on "Canada-United States Treaty Relations and International Law," while Maxwell Cohen closes the volume with a very brief attempt to foresee "Trends and Future Problems." He recognizes continentalism as a powerful force and asks, not surprisinly, for more good will on both sides. Two judges, Johne E. Read from Canada and Green H. Hackworth from the United States, briefly essay "Perspective in the International Plane" and "General Aspects of Canadian-United States Treaty Relations" respectively. Both essays are too general to be of more than passing interest, and Judge Hackworth's attempt to show the general "import for the conduct of relations between nations" which may be found in the Canadian-American relationship is too narrowly legal in its conception.

The more specific inquiries are more satisfactory. Professor Deener has chosen three subjects—boundary waters, defense, and economic relations—and paired an American and a Canadian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

paper on each. On the whole the Canadians win the pairings. Edward McWhinney of the University of Toronto perceptively writes of Canadian-American relations concerning trade with Cuba and sees psychological as well as economic implications in his subject, while Wesley L. Gould of Purdue writes less imaginatively, although fully and usefully, on cooperation over metals, oil, and natural gas. G. V. La Forest of the University of New Brunswick presents an excellent, well-written analysis of "Boundary Water Problems in the East," dealing with the St. Lawrence Seaway and the Passamaquoddy Tidal Power project briefly and clearly. Charles E. Martin of the University of Washington discusses and outlines, but does not analyze, "The Columbia Basin Treaty between Canada and the United States." Charles P. Stacey, dean of Canadian military historians, writes with sparkle and his accustomed bite in "Twenty-one Years of Canadian-American Military Co-operation, 1940–1961," the best essay in the book. Theodore Ropp of Duke also has written an excellent essay on "Politics, Strategy, and the Commitments of a Middle Power." The essays by Wilson, McWhinney, La Forest, Stacey, and Ropp give this collection both interest and genuine importance, and Deener's list of treaties adds utility. These essays, read together with Don C. Piper's article, "The Role of Intergovernmental Machinery in Canadian-American Relations" in the Autumn 1963 number of the *South Atlantic Quarterly* (a Duke author and a Duke publication), strengthen that university's claim to leadership in this important field of research.

ROBIN W. WINKS

YALE UNIVERSITY

One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast. By ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.—xiv, 374 pp. $7.50.

Nigerian Political Parties. By RICHARD L. SKLAR. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963.—xii, 578 pp. $12.50.

The appearance of these two volumes marks a new stage in the development of contemporary studies on Africa. Hitherto, with rare and notable exceptions, such as James S. Coleman's *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism,* the works on the continent have tended to be sweeping surveys which paint with such broad strokes that the detail of pre-independence nationalist political organization is usually lost. Attempts have been made to construct broad generalizations of political theory in the non-West-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ern world on a minimum of data and, in consequence, the resulting theories have not infrequently been rendered invalid by the ensuing train of events.

The two volumes considered here are admirable examples of detailed and accurate studies of the emergence and growth of the political movements which culminated in the parties that led the way to independence. Taken together, the two studies provide an interesting comparison between a former British and a former French colony in the methods and goals of political organization and in the influence of the metropolitan country on the growth of the nationalist movement.

Professor Zolberg traces the growth of the Parti Democratique de la Côte d'Ivoire from its inception until independence in 1960. Beginning as the earliest unit of the later widespread Rassemblement Democratique Africain, the party became a model upon which the other territorial sections of the RDA drew for their basic organization. The distinctive feature of the PDCI, however, was the leadership exercised from the outset by one of the most skillful of West African politicians, Félix Houphouet-Boigny. Houphouet was able to carry the party with him through his rejection of the support of the French Communist party and his return to the fold of the cabinets of the Fourth Republic. Zolberg's analysis of the twists of Ivory Coast nationalism under Houphouet, and the operation of the single party provide illuminating insights into the present political structure of almost every African country.

Perhaps the single exception to the single party format in West Africa is Nigeria, yet even here it might be argued that in post-independence Nigeria most of political activity has been centered about three major parties which dominated the regional governments with a somewhat shaky federal structure superimposed. Professor Sklar's study of Nigerian parties is remarkable for its wealth of detail and the fullness of its treatment of the party organization, leadership, and membership. No author writing on Nigeria can fail to be in his debt for the factual data he provides. At the same time it must be added that by the very detail of the text and the excessive impedimenta of content footnotes Sklar manages to obscure much of the real importance of his pioneering work. Even the specialized reader has considerable difficulty in finding, let alone seeing, the forest for the trees. But, with this reservation, the volume is the best study of the origins and interaction of Nigerian parties that exists. From it emerges a picture of the diversity of social classes which go to make up the parties, of the background and motivation of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leadership, and of the patterns of political recruitment demonstrated in each region. The role of traditional authority in the political activity at the regional level is clearly demonstrated, as is the multiple tribal interest which went into the make-up of each party. The force of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa's comment on the dissolution of parliament in October 1964, that the greatest danger to Nigeria four years after independence was still tribalism is clearly documented in Sklar's study.

Both volumes are major contributions to the study of African party systems. But to the present reviewer a major element is missing from both. In neither is there a clearly explicated theoretical framework into which the mass of pertinent data can be fitted. Both make vague bows in the direction of theory in introductions and conclusions, but the presentation of the data omits almost all reference to theoretical concepts about which the material might be organized to great advantage.

There has, quite correctly, been much objection to the volumes of pure theory on non-Western systems which tend to shy away from the application of the theory to concrete data. But at the same time the recording of a mass of factual material without reference to a theoretical framwork through which direction can be given to the data can be equally dangerous. There can be no doubt that studies of the kind represented here are the cornerstones upon which more meaningful comparative analyses must be built. Without the detailed investigations of the Zolberg and Sklar type many of the hypotheses of comparative theory cannot be tested. Both would, however, have been improved had the authors taken greater pains to present for proof a series of hypotheses even at the risk of having to omit some detail which might not have been of direct concern.

But this is a minor caveat; those who seek to go further in the comparison of non-Western governments will be forced to refer to these two volumes frequently for exemplary material. For the facts recorded and for the immense labors of research they represent those interested in Africa particularly and in non-Western political structures in general cannot but be indebted to Professors Zolberg and Sklar.

L. GRAY COWAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A History of East Africa. By KENNETH INGHAM. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.—xii, 456 pp. $7.50.

In attempting to write a satisfactory history of East Africa,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dr. Ingham has faced some major problems. He deals with four modern countries and with an extended time period which begins with the Greeks. Written evidence on East African history is often fragmentary or still unexamined in government archives, and research in such ancillary fields as archaeology and oral tradition has just begun. This attempt is not completely successful, but the book is the most useful East African history so far available.

For a number of years Dr. Ingham was professor of history at Makerere College, Uganda, and an official member of the Uganda Legislative Council. He gives us essentially an account of British activities in eastern Africa, as seen from a liberal imperial point of view. He is most at home with the diplomatic and the documentary record, and his narrative is most informative when it concerns the early activities of traders and missionaries following Speke's visit to Buganda in 1862, the occupation of territory by Britain and Germany, and the formulation of colonial policies. His last chapter considers the nationalist movements of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika; his account is scrupulous and fair to African leaders and parties. It is, however, cursory, and the flatness of his writing suggests that he feels little sympathy for or interest in the ideas of African nationalism.

Dr. Ingham's account of events is on the whole accurate and trustworthy. At times his documentation seems sparse, but it should be noted that this book, commissioned by the East African governments, is not primarily intended for a scholarly audience. The author confines himself largely to narrative and makes little attempt at analysis, though some surprising judgments do occur. Thus he states that the British developed satisfactory educational systems in Uganda and Tanganyika, but failed to do so in Kenya (p. 367). Since Tanganyika did not produce a university graduate until 1952 and achieved independence with a literacy rate rather under ten per cent, one wonders about his criteria for judgment.

The major problem of the book is one of balance. Less than one sixth of the book is devoted to the pre-European era, and many later events are viewed, not in the context of African society, but as they might be seen by a British secretariat in Entebbe. Zanzibar is largely ignored after its power on the mainland declined, and discussion of the German period in Tanganyika is based on inadequate sources. Owen's brief protectorate in Mombasa in 1823–24 is treated at equal length with the period of Portuguese power on the coast from 1498 to 1729. The establishment of British power in Uganda and Kenya is treated in exhaustive detail. At the present time it is probably

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

utopian, however, to expect a definitive East African history, and Dr. Ingham has presented a coherent narrative which, within the limitations noted, will be a helpful handbook.

MARGARET L. BATES

SMITH COLLEGE

The Middle East and the West. By BERNARD LEWIS. Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1964.—vii, 160 pp. $3.75.

The outpouring of monographs and specialized studies on the Middle East enhances the value of this book, a collection of six integrated lectures sweeping over the historical effects of the collision between Christendom and the Muslim world. Professor Lewis has polished the published essays carefully, and from them the reader can discover a humane, witty, and altogether enjoyable survey of the aberrations, confusions, and amalgams of modern history in the Middle East.

The first essay, "Sketches for an Historical Portrait," is one of the best of the six, and in seventeen pages captures the spirit and sense of irony of the region's history. The first half of the book emphasizes cultural contrast in terms of the ideas and forces characterizing the hostile meeting of the two worlds along the Mediterranean. Professor Lewis, head of the department of history in the School of Oriental and African Studies in the University of London, is humble in ascribing causal relationships to the impact of the West. Perhaps for that reason he brushes too lightly, for my taste, over the economic transformations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

While the first three lectures follow a dialectic of Islamic culture, the Western impact, and the response of the Middle East, the final half of the book attempts to measure the dimensions and depth of the current synthesis in the region. In "Patriotism and Nationalism" the author is especially perceptive, and his distinctions between Turkish and Arab nationalism are among the most useful in the literature. In "The Revolt of Islam" he surveys the politics of religion and extends his analysis beyond the "core"—Turkey, Iran, and the eastern Arab states—to include Indian Islam and North Africa. The essay is rewarding, the more so because these peripheral lands lay outside the historical analysis of the opening chapters of the book.

The final chapter, "The Middle East in International Affairs," is for political scientists both the most pertinent and the most disappointing in the book. Taking the long sweep of history as his perspective, Professor Lewis is able to devastate the prevalent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

myths of American, British, and Russian foreign policy. His prescriptions for a brighter tomorrow, however, consist mostly of injunctions against making things worse. They are useful injunctions but do not do justice to his keen sense of the region's inner life. Perhaps Indiana University, where the lectures were delivered, made an unfair demand in asking him for a new script for the drama between the West and the Middle East.

Professsor Lewis has given us one of the finest interpretive introductions to the Middle East yet written for a Western audience. It illuminates our misconceptions and biases, and offers a more generous but properly critical appreciation of the Middle East. It is an indispensable basic book on the region.

WAYNE WILCOX

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Modern Middle East. Edited by RICHARD H. NOLTE. New York, Atherton Press, 1963.—xvi, 218 pp. $5.95.

The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa. By MANFRED HALPERN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963.—xxv, 431 pp. $8.50.

These two books are welcome additions to the growing literature on the "Middle East"—a region which has not been, and probably cannot be, precisely defined, as the books themselves testify. In the first volume, Dr. Nolte brings together a number of essays by distinguished scholars, dealing with various aspects of the contemporary Middle East. Charles Issawi provides a thought-provoking historical analysis in terms of Christian-Muslim relations across the Mediterranean; D. Rustow attempts a theoretical investigation of Middle Eastern, and generally non-Western, politics; A. Hourani reviews Western-Middle Eastern power tensions and conflicts; and the other essays discuss questions relating to local administration (W. H. Wickwar), peasant life (M. Quinn), women's attitudes (I. A. Muhyi), the intelligentsia (H. Sharabi), and law and jurisprudence (M. Khadduri, R. Nolte, and J. Shacht). These essays give, from their angles of vision, certain valuable insights into the complex Middle Eastern scene, and, on the whole, help to enhance our understanding of the problems involved and provide starting points for further research. In this reviewer's opinion, it is mostly in this last area that their value lies, because of the rapid changes which are taking place and which demand a continuous reappraisal of judgments and methodology.

Professor Halpern's work is a systematic study centered on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the politics of the Middle East within the context of social change. To this difficult and rather virgin field the author brings the exeprience derived from his first-hand knowledge of the region and his study and teaching of the subject. The result is a worthwhile contribution, notable both for its comprehensiveness and its methodological approach. The author deals consecutively with the traditional Islamic order and the tensions to which it is subjected by the forces of modernism, the new elite —particularly the "new middle class"—which these forces are bringing to the fore, the ideological choices which are open to this elite, the political instruments at its disposal, and the consequences of the choices, both present and future.

As far as methodology is concerned, the chief mark of the book lies in its call to policy-makers and to students of the subject to think of politics in its social setting and to view both in dynamic terms. Basically the author is right in his approach, and in the emphases which arise from it, notably the following: that the politics of the Middle East "from Morocco to Pakistan" cannot be divorced from social changes or from the general processes of "Westernization" or "modernization" which are invading the region; that this region is undergoing, as a result, a deep and rapid revolution, or rather "a multiple revolution in telescoped time" (p.136); that we have to view this revolution in all its dimensions, particularly in terms of the changing social structure and the rising ideologies and priorities, and that consequently Western terms and concepts such as "conservative," "extremist," "radical," "innovation," "revolt," and the like have to be redefined when used in this context.

All this, and much more, is right and timely, but it does not, in the reviewer's mind, go far enough. Limitation of space does not allow more than two or three cursory observations with regard to the process of Westernization which lies at the core of the book and also forms the "central theme that runs through all the essays" of the volume edited by Dr. Nolte (p. viii).

Although this process is the prime factor in the Middle East, one cannot explain everything in its terms. For example, in neither of the two books is adequate account taken of the effects of the establishment of the state of Israel on the attitudes and changes in the Arab component of the Middle East which, in Professor Halpern's own terms, extends "from Morocco to the Sudan and thence to Iraq" (p. xvi). Also, except for one single reference in this work (p. 117), no hint is given that the Westernizing process is universal in character, involving not only the Middle East but the whole "non-Western" world and that the basic tensions and choices are similar throughout. Finally,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

no indication is made that the ultimate effects of Westernization depend on the direction of Western culture itself. Any study of Westernization should include an introspective look and a reappraisal of Western policies and values. Only in this way can a genuine dialogue be initiated between the two worlds and their particular and common choices achieve positive results.

C. K. ZURAYK

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. Edited by K. SWAMINATHAN. Delhi, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Goverment of India. Vol. I: 1958.—xxx, 404 pp., $2.50; Vol. II: 1959.—xv, 398 pp., $2.50; Vol III: 1960.—xxii, 498 pp., $6.00; Vol. IV: 1960.—xxii, 520 pp., 30 s; Vol. V: 1961.—xxiii, 520 pp., 35 s; Vol. VI: 1961.—xxii, 560 pp., 35 s; Vol. VII: 1962.—xxi, 576 pp., 35 s; Vol. VIII: 1962.—xxii, 603 pp., $6.00; Vol. IX: 1963.—xxiv, 668 pp., $6.00; Vol. X: 1963.—xxvi, 580 pp., $6.00.

The first ten volumes of a projected series of approximately fifty volumes containing the collected writings of Mahatma Gandhi have now been published by the Publications Division of the Government of India. These volumes authoritatively bring together Gandhi's letters, pamphlets, newspaper writings, and notes. Each volume has been assembled with great care and contains, in addition to the text, chronologies of Ghandi's activities, glossaries, gazetteer notes, maps, and appendices of documents essential to an understanding of Gandhi's writings. The volumes are all indexed and carefully printed and bound. Each document included is carefully labelled as to date, source, whether translated or not, and where the documents are now located. The prices range from $2.50 for the first volume to $6.00 for the most recent. The Publications Division is to be congratulated for the quality of the work performed by its staff.

These ten volumes cover Gandhi's life from 1884, when he was a fifteen-year-old schoolboy, to 1909, at the height of his political activities in South Africa. The accounts of his youth are brief and add little to what Gandhi wrote later in his *Autobiography.* His early years in London (from ages nineteen to twenty-two) are described briefly in the fragments of a diary he kept along with a number of articles published in *The Vegetarian* of London. Gandhi's shyness, his many fears, his powerful desire to maintain his Indian identity all emerge in these writings.

Except for this small portion of the first volume, the remaining volumes deal with Gandhi's experiences in South Africa as the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leader of the Indian community. It is in these writings that the two facets of Gandhi's life become apparent: his practical concerns for the rights of the Indian community and his own quest for personal values. As the "practical" politician Gandhi was the organizing secretary of the Natal Indian Congress, pressed the British for franchise for the Indian population, raised funds in South Africa and England, wrote political pamphlets (including in Volume 2 the famous "Green Pamphlet" on the grievances of the Indians in South Africa), and fought law cases. The "other" Gandhi organized a small utopian settlement of his newspaper staff in Johannesburgh, campaigned for the spread of vegetarianism, and translated Ruskin's *Unto this Last* into Gujarati under the title *Sarvodaya* or "the welfare of all." The two streams begin to converge in 1907 with the *satyagraha* movement against the Transvaal Asiatic Registration Act. But the turning point is dramatized in a letter to a friend written with great passion in October 1909, in which he attacks modern civilization as "purely material," condemns medical science as "black magic," and expresses his belief that "East and West can only and really meet when the West has overthrown modern civilization." "The railways, telegraphs, hospitals, lawyers, doctors and such like have all to go," wrote Gandhi, "and the so-called upper classes have to learn to live conscientiously and religiously and deliberately the simple peasant life."

Gandhi sensed, more clearly than most Indians, the total degradation which colonialism implied, and sought not simply freedom from colonial rule but freedom from cultural degradation. He rejected the English as a model and modernization as a goal. "The future," he concluded, "lies not with the British race, but with the Indians themselves, and if they have sufficient self-abnegation and abstemiousness, they can make themselves free this very moment." Gandhi thus converted, in one brilliant stroke, what some saw as the deficiencies of Indians into an asset. This was his great triumph: to free Indians from the gnawing feeling that their beliefs and behavior were unsuited for modernization by suggesting that modernization itself was undesirable and that the qualities which Indians possessed were suitable for the religious values upon which civilization ought to rest. In 1909 Gandhi published *Hindi Swaraj,* an important essay included in the tenth volume, in which he makes explicit his attack against modernization and pleas for returning to ancient paths. Though many Indians were critical of Gandhi's anti-modern bent, his sense of pride in his own identity and his own values and in the Indian tradition which he appeared to personify was reassuring to a generation of Indians.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Though Gandhi remained esteemed, Gandhiism has made little impression on the generation of Indians who rose to adulthood after 1947, for Gandhi's main concern was in demonstrating that India's heritage was appropriate for an anti-colonial and above all, anti-modern path, whereas today's generation is concerned with relating the traditional heritage to the goals of modernization. It was Nehru, therefore, not Gandhi who began the task of trying to build continuity between a traditional past and a modern future. For most educated Indians, the emotional bridge is still not well constructed.

MYRON WEINER

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Mass Persuasion in Communist China. By FREDERICK T. C. YU. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.—viii, 186 pp. $5.00.

Soviet Foreign Propaganda. By FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.—ix, 329 pp. $6.00.

The Captive Press in the Third Reich. By ORON J. HALE. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.—xiv, 353 pp. $6.50.

In his brief but comprehensive study of *Mass Persuasion in Communist China,* Frederick T. C. Yu sets out to interpret the broad design underlying the massive campaign by the Communist leaders to mold opinion and to show concretely how the system actually operates. The overall impression left is one of tremendous saturation: the Chinese Communists have successfully penetrated with their propaganda just about every area of life in China. Many of his illustrations are by now familiar, others are not. Separate chapters are devoted to the organization and operation of the press, radio, and film, to art and literature, and to poster campaigns. The most noteworthy aspect of the system, however, is the effective coupling of oral propaganda with the official media. One learns of newspaper reading and radio listening done in groups and under the proper guidance, of memory meetings and story-telling meetings, and of the persistent day-to-day efforts on the part of a countless number of local propagandists to insure that campaigns from above not only reach the masses but are also in so far as possible complied with.

Yu makes considerable use of published Chinese sources, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his account is factual as well as cautious and balanced in its conclusions. He reminds us, for example, that the Chinese did not invent an entirely new communication system but merely applied the design developed by the Soviets with an unusual intensity. In its efforts to keep the masses of people in continuous contact with the central government and to exclude alien communications, the system is judged reasonably effective. Evaluation of its success in other respects is difficult on the basis of open sources alone. But the fill of complaints and exhortations in the press is taken as a symptom of important areas of resistance, while continuous shifts in the line of efforts to tighten the propganda machine show that the Chinese leaders are periodically troubled by weaknesses they perceive. Clearly no reliable evaluations can be made from such data. It nevertheless stands to reason that the persistent recourse to an atmosphere of crisis to mobilize revolutionary enthusiasm must after a while produce emotional adaptation.

As indicated by its title, Barghoorn's *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* is confined to the study of the content and means by which the Soviet leadership communicates to the West and to uncommitted countries in order to promote their foreign policy objectives. There is a broad similarity to Yu's study with respect to the book's organization and approach. Both rely heavily on published and official statements, though not to the exclusion of other sources. Yet Barghoorn's book somehow appears more topical, mostly because he gives more attention to the general Soviet propaganda line as embodied in a number of specific themes, many of them employed by Soviet representatives during recent events almost all of us will remember. Indeed, Barghoorn reminds us several times that policy and propaganda are indistinguishable in official Soviet statements and that even personal communications are frequently colored by the official line. Stratagems and tricks of Soviet propaganda also come in for brief discussion.

Some decline in the ideological component of Soviet foreign propaganda, which in the past has caused some rigidity, meant an increased flexibility that facilitated the adaptation of content to the dispositions and sentiments of target audiences. But despite an appearance of relaxed control, Soviet foreign communications still constitute an essentially closed system. While ideological purity may be sacrificed in return for some specific advantage (for example, manipulation of the universal desire for peace to support unrealistic proposals which, if accepted by the West, the Soviets would be forced to reject), ideological slogans still play an important part in legitimating changes in the party

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

line. Its increased flexibility has gained Soviet propaganda considerable, though not unlimited successes.

The account of the progressive encroachment on the journalistic freedom of the German press by the Nazis given by Hale in his *The Captive Press in the Third Reich* is definitive without being encumbered by unnecessary detail. The author had access to captured German documents and archives. Besides, he was able to interview several of the principals. The story of this encroachment is traced against the background of the German press as an industry—in particular, the proliferation of small dailies and their economic problems. Among the key figures responsible for the reorganization, Max Amann emerges as the major one. He and Dietrich, who represented Goebbels and the policy of the Propaganda Ministry, differed in their approach to control of the press. Their maneuverings against one another and the overlap in their assumed area of competence once again corroborate a thesis first advanced by Trevor-Roper to the effect that the Nazi regime resembled much more closely a Byzantine court with its many intrigues than it did a modern totalitarian state. Certainly its control of mass communications, though sufficient to insure ideological conformity, was far from being exercised from a single unified center. Amann himself appears far less an ideological fanatic than a robber baron intent on expanding a party publishing enterprise into a newspaper trust operated as a profitable business. In some instances through outright confiscation, but more often through mergers and sales forced under duress and through the strategic distribution of government printing contracts, which for many of the small entrepreneurs were a matter of life and death, publishers were gradually forced into line.

The contrasts between Nazi Germany, on the one hand, and the Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes, on the other, are striking in this regard. Though Hitler permitted Amann to disturb existing property relations in the press—undoubtedly because it fitted his political purposes—Amann's personal ambition and greed were also important factors in how the structure of the German press developed. If the pictures of China and the Soviet Union as drawn by Yu and Barghoorn leave little room for personal motives and interests competing within the system, one wonders how much of this is due to lack of knowledge of these details and how much of it actually reflects basic ideological differences concerning property and concerning the leeway to be given to entrepreneurs whose actions are in line with basic policies.

In any event, the importance of direct coercion in narrowing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the latitude of choice should never be minimized. Because control over all communication networks permits a political leader to exploit more fully the potentialities of propaganda, totalitarian governments have always striven to achieve such control as a first policy goal. As Hale notes, the successes of the Nazi press came after and not before the Nazi accession to power. In China, likewise, the exhortations of propaganda are always backed up by the possibility of severe punitive sanctions to be invoked in cases of non-compliance or alleged subversion. Even in foreign propaganda, threats and promises contained in communications gain in impact and persuasiveness because of the very demonstrable reality of Soviet military power. No totalitarian polity has scored its most notable successes without some element of intimidation. The very real potential as well as the limitations of totalitarian propaganda need to be understood in this light, and each of the three volumes contributes to that understanding in some definite way.

KURT LANG

STATE UNIVERSITY OF
NEW YORK, STONY BROOK

Twentieth Century China. By O. EDMUND CLUBB. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1964.—xii, 470 pp. $7.95.

China and the Helping Hand, 1937–1945. By ARTHUR N. YOUNG. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963. —xx, 502 pp. $10.00.

Where Arthur Young's able monographic study takes a close look at a significant episode in China's modern drama, Edmund Clubb, one of our distinguished China career officers, serves up the story in its entire sweep since the turn of the century. As a political history it is the most satisfyingly detailed work yet to appear in English, notably for the bewildering kaleidoscope of power shifts from 1911 to 1949. The deft summary clarifies where the maze is thickest: the Yüan Shih-k'ai era of the first revolution (1911–16); then, from 1916 to 1928, the efforts of the Peiyang and Anfu cliques to control the Peking government, along with Sun Yat-sen's maneuverings with the southern generals centered on Canton; and finally, from 1928 to 1937, Chiang K'ai-shek's complicated struggle with rival military figures and the Communists. Clubb skillfully dovetails foreign issues with this domestic *Realpolitik,* and in the last section—nearly a third of the book—reviews the first decade of Communist rule. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

underlying social and cultural changes, needed for greater depth, are unfortunately scanted.

In the brief historical introduction space is again a problem, but here the China historian would wish to qualify some of the generalizations in any case. No doubt a pattern traceable through the Confucian empire's two millennia is ethnocentrism, yet exceptions are notable, most of all in the T'ang, and it was the Ming, who (p. 10) "tried to close the doors on the new influences," that admitted the Jesuits. To characterize China and the Chinese as "aggressively expansionist," virtually by nature, also invites reservation. True, the Chinese were often expansionist vis-à-vis the frontier "barbarians," but this issue was not entirely one-sided: the nomads also pressed in on China, and a passive Great Wall defense was not the most effective response to such a threat. Today the same two-sidedness still exists; the ever more devastating nineteenth- and twentieth-century pressures on China have extorted a comparably severe response. The difficulty with a blankly "aggressive" or "expansionist" characterization is that it supports those who argue that still more pressure is the sole appropriate contemporary policy. Peace requires change on China's part, too.

In his superb account of the complex events of early 1946, Clubb might have filled out and further stressed an essential item of detail. For Marshall's mission the political rather than the military aspect was decisive. A military truce meant little without continuous progress toward a political settlement. After the extraordinary set of positive agreements reached in the Political Consultative Conference (PCC) of January, where did the crucial breakdown occur? In this reviewer's opinion it came on March 1–17 when the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee unilaterally rewrote basic clauses in the PCC agreements. This event signaled the collapse of Marshall's effort. It marked also a conspicuous lapse in Marshall's normal political acumen, since on March 11, when the CEC deliberations were reaching their climax, he left Chungking for the United States. Clubb notes (p. 267) that "the net result of the Kuomintang conference [of March 1–17] was nominal approval but practical subversion of the PCC agreements." Here, if ever, details are needed to show the substantial nature of the changes made in the governing PCC agreements, but they are not given, nor is Marshall's departure during the conference noted.

Arthur N. Young's long service as financial adviser to Chiang Kai-shek's government has given him an inside view of Kuomintang finances. Its international aspects during the war related

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

primarily to dealings with the United States. The two parts of his study divide equally between the 1937–41 and 1941–45 periods, before and after the United States entered the war. Each part comprises nearly two hundred pages, suggesting the detailed nature of the treatment. Although developments are set in the military-political context, the work is essentially technical and should particularly interest economic specialists.

On the key issue of possible misuse of the large sums advanced, the author tends to disclaim knowledge, but he offers generous criticism of the American side, especially for the delays attending dispatch of funds from the five hundred million dollar loan. Apart from the loan, lend-lease aid to China had reached $1.3 billion by 1945. Against the feeling on this side that Chiang did not fully mobilize and apply his resources in the war, Young thinks that Americans have never recognized the extent of China's contribution to the war effort, measured mostly in things other than money. For the prewar period, he rightly stresses the striking improvements in Chinese central finances achieved by the Nanking government. Against these gains he sets such items as the "domination of government by the military, and failure to require from them an accounting of payments and supplies," the failure to "reform land tenure and the land tax," and the lack of "reform of local government . . . so largely dominated by landlords and money lenders" (pp. 3, 5)—truly a formidable list. Basically it was these ills, not the limitations of external aid, that sapped China's strength later, both in the war and in the contest with the Communists.

T. A. Bisson

Western College for Women

The Pattern of Australian Culture. Edited by A. L. McLeod. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1963.—486 pp. $7.50.

This useful book is an effort, cast in the form of a collection of essays by several hands, to fill a gap in the history of the Australian experience. No general study of Australian cultural history has ever been written. While there are comprehensive studies of the history of literature (by the late H. M. Green) and of painting (by Dr. Bernard Smith), there are no comprehensive histories of science and technology, music, architecture, law, medicine, education or recreation, though there are available fragmentary accounts of aspects of all of these—and such "literature" is indeed today accumulating at a rapid rate. There are, above all, no syntheses of the cultural adventure like, say, Merle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Curti's *The Growth of American Thought.* Not only are the several cultural categories so under-explored that no good synthesis is yet possible, but many vital themes have hardly yet been more than broached: the interrelation and interaction of the colonial and metropolitan cultures (Australia versus Britain), the academic versus the lay approach to cultural activities in successive "environments," the successive balances of the Australian evaluations of accomplishments in relation to metropolitan or international standards, and so on—the themes indigenous to the establishment and reordering of a culture overseas from its source.

Dr. McLeod's symposium reflects both the absence of adequate histories of the dozen or so "subject matters" explored and the prevailing underexploration of themes and interpretive ideas. Its orientation is definitely toward the present day and the operative idea or bias is the assumption that Australia is rapidly becoming, or now is, culturally "mature." Certain essays, not least the editor's own, are marred by the impatience of expatriates with the local "situations" from which they have by deliberate choice fled and also, especially on the part of the editor, by a rather precipitate adoption of the proposition that things criticized can readily be set right by government subvention and the placing of academics in charge. (Almost all the contributors are academics, perhaps a tribute to academic vitality, but nevertheless definitely a reflection of the precarious position of the layman in Australia today.) Dr. McLeod's conviction that government subvention is a certain remedy is in itself an element of the Australian cultural "pattern" no place in his book illuminated.

In this reviewer's opinion the essays that contribute most to the outsider's illumination (assuming he has earlier looked into books like those of Green and Smith) are those on philosophy (a really excellent job), law, recreation, and "The Culture of the Aborigines," with the essays on language, science, historiography, and education very useful runners-up. This is a good book, but because of the "state of the field" necessarily imperfect. I would hazard a guess that it has been undertaken at least a decade too soon. I am shocked and dismayed by the dismissal of religion as an element of the Australian cultural "pattern," but Professor Manning Clark is currently publishing an extended commentary on that element.

C. HARTLEY GRATTAN

KATONAH, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. By MORRIS JANOWITZ. Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1964.—vii, 134 pp. $4.50.

In this volume Morris Janowitz, professor of sociology at the University of Chicago and author of the well-known study, *The Professional Soldier: a Political and Social Portrait* (1960), does essentially two things. First, he creates models which he uses to establish the different patterns of civil-military relations in the developing nations. Second, he provides a framework for comparisons or contrasts between the military of the new states and those of the older, more technically advanced nations.

Given the brevity of the study Janowitz has done a remarkable job of synthesizing the pertinent ideas which have appeared in Western European languages on the role of the military in the political development of the emergent states of Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Latin America receives only incidental attention.

Shortcomings are inevitable in a treatise which attempts so much at such an early moment in the study of social groups in developing nations, but this does not make such studies any less necessary. On the contrary, they are badly needed, and Professor Janowitz is to be commended for performing the service. Moreover, he artfully avoids most pitfalls. He occasionally pushes beyond what his evidence seems to justify, but for the most part he is well aware of the limitations that his materials impose upon him. The end result is a major contribution. Serious scholars will do well to digest it before undertaking extensive research projects on the military, or for that matter of any modernizing social group in the developing nations.

The lasting value of the volume is not in the questions it answers—in most cases, the answers, or what seem to be answers, must be considered tentative until much more research is reported—but in the kind of questions the author poses. The explicit and implicit questions he raises about the extent to which civilians may be responsible for involving the military in politics, clique formation in the armed forces, and the importance of social-economic-regional backgrounds and of professionalism and/or group consciousness on members of the elites are vital, as are his observations of and questions about the modernizing process. In short, he covers most of the areas that scholars must have in mind if they are to produce purposeful studies of emergent peoples who are determined quickly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to create something for themselves and to attain greater status in the world.

Like nearly everyone with an intellectual interest in the armed forces of the new and developing nations, including this reviewer, Janowitz largely neglects the non-commissioned officers and conscripts. Given the expanding role of the popular masses in countries in the throes of rapid change, these elements may in some instances influence decision-making sooner than is anticipated and, where this occurs, make largely meaningless much of the research that has been done and is being done on the political role of the armed forces.

JOHN J. JOHNSON

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. By S. E. FINER. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. —268 pp. $6.50.

This is an important and timely contribution to the growing literature on the military in politics from a general and historical perspective rather than from that of a specialist in underdeveloped countries or a particular area. This broader perspective accounts for many of its achievements, but also for some of its weaknesses. Among the first we can list the many useful classifications, hypotheses about the conditions under which the military intervene in politics, and the typologies of such interventions and the regimes emerging from them. Perhaps the most interesting part is an analysis of the processes of change that such regimes can undergo: their breakdown and in rare cases their transformation into "civilianized" rule.

Finer is skeptical of the military in politics, not only in view of the historical record but starting from the need for legitimacy as the basis of power at least in any semi-developed society. His focus on the difficulties encountered by the military in power in making their rule legitimate (particularly to other sectors of the armed forces that may question it) leads to many fruitful propositions. The analysis of Mexico and Turkey as cases where new regimes emerged out of military intervention should have been supplemented by case studies of Portugal and Spain where stable regimes emerged under quite different ideological influences. In this context, Nasser's Egypt may have deserved a more careful analysis and perhaps a slightly more sympathetic treatment. This reader, for one, would have liked to see a more detailed analysis of situations where civilian authority could resist military intervention, in comparable crisis situations, or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

where such breakdown or power vacuum situations led to a civilian dictatorship rather than a military one. It would have been interesting to study the case of Italy at the time of the rise of Fascism from this perspective.

It would be futile to summarize here the many useful distinctions and hypotheses advanced to account for the intervention of the military in politics. These are organized around the following themes: (1) the strengths of the military: organization and coherence, control of arms, emotional and symbolic status, and military virtues; (2) the motives for intervention: from identification with a "national interest" (conceived as standing above parties and particular governments or even constitutions) to identification with sectional interests (class, regional, or corporate self-interest, if not almost individual self-interest); (3) the "mood" to intervene, created by feelings of self-importance or morbidly high self-esteem, particularly when linked with professional or national humiliation and frustration. The author notes that neither the capacity for intervention, nor the motivation to do so, nor the mood triggering off action would be sufficient without "opportunity to intervene," created by increased civilian dependence on the military, particularly in latent or overt crisis situations or by the creation of a power vacuum, combined with the popularity of the military. It is this interplay of disposition and opportunity that constitutes the key to the success or failure of various types of military intervention—from influence and pressure to displacement and supplanting of civil authority. Both disposition and opportunity are closely linked to the level of development of the political culture. Perhaps more reference to the social (and economic) and institutional structures associated with the different types of political cultures and to the ways in which these factors in turn affect the outcome of military intervention would be desirable. This part of the book, excellent as it is, could gain by a more exhaustive analysis of comparable situations (over a period of time) to locate deviant cases: that is, where despite a low political culture intervention was weak or unsuccessful, or where despite a developed political culture such interventions occur. This would mean the testing of hypotheses rather than the exemplification of propositions.

More attention to the interaction between military mentalities and ideologies and those of the civilians, particularly the dominant ideologies of an era, would be helpful. An explanation of why sometimes liberal-democratic-republican, sometimes fascist, sometimes socialist elements are incorporated into the manifestos, speeches, and decrees of the military—and what dif-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ference this makes—would be interesting. It would be too rash to explain such different syncretisms only in terms of the social origins of the officers, without reference to the social context in which they operate and to the international situation at the time.

At a time when much is said about the military as a modernizing elite, emphasis on the importance of legitimacy for political stability, on some of the less functional aspects of military intervention particularly in the long run, and on the political mystifications used by such regimes (pp. 242–43), are also welcome.

JUAN J. LINZ

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Military and Society in Latin America. By JOHN J. JOHNSON. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964.—xii, 308 pp. $7.00.

In 1958 John J. Johnson, professor of history at Stanford, published a path-breaking study of *Political Change in Latin America.* In 1962 he edited a volume on *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries.* The current work combines these two earlier interests in a panoramic survey of the social roots of militarism in Latin America. The book is divided into three sections, more or less equal in length. Two deal with the military in Spanish American countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively, the third with the military in Brazil. Unlike some authors, Professor Johnson does not look for the explanation of the social and political roles of the military primarily in the military themselves. Rather he focuses on the nature of the society of which they are a part. In all three sections of the book considerable attention is given to the image of the military in art and in literature and to the attitudes toward the military of other classes in society. This approach gives his work great breadth, but it also at times leads him into strange fields. He seems, for instance, inordinately concerned with the refusal of upper-middle-class urban ladies to accept officers' wives as social equals. On the other hand, he also seems to overlook some of the more concrete political causes of the political problem which is at the heart of the book: the persistent interventions of Latin American armies in the politics of their countries.

To many North Americans military intervention is a constant of Latin American politics. One chief value of Johnson's book is that it demonstrates conclusively that this intervention has taken a variety of forms in different countries and at different

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stages in Latin American history. This history implicitly poses a grim model of what could be in store for the more recently independent states of Africa and Asia. In Latin America, as in these new states, militarism was a product of independence. From roughly 1825 to 1850 the dominant figure in Latin America was the local caudillo who (like the current leaders of the Congo) combined military and political power on a regional basis. In a second phase in the latter part of the nineteenth century, military power was nationalized, and the dominant figure became the military commander (Ayub Khan, Ne Win) who used his personal control of the armed forces to take over the government. After World War I the rise of the urban middle strata and the professionalization of the military led to a third form of intervention. The military became more anxious to wield indirect influence rather than direct control, and the single all-powerful military chieftain was replaced by the junta (Turkey, South Korea, South Vietnam) representing the institutionalized interests of officers in all three services. Professor Johnson expects the military to play a key role in future Latin American politics, but he hopes that this may take the form of civic action programs for national development. He warns that with the rise to political awareness of the peasants and the urban workers, the Latin American military will also move in a radical direction.

This is a book of broad scope and many themes. What it lacks in consistent focus and analytical precision, it more than makes up for in the richness and diversity of its ideas and perspectives. It joins Edwin Lieuwen's *Arms and Politics in Latin America* as an indispensable source on the history and nature of Latin American militarism.

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Bandeirantes and Pioneers. By VIANNA MOOG. Translated from the Portuguese by L. L. Barrett. New York, George Braziller, 1964.—316 pp. $6.95.

This is a translation of Moog's *Bandeirantes e Pioneiros,* published first in Portuguese in Brazil in 1954. The present edition incorporates no new materials. Moog attempts to describe the national cultures of Brazil and the United States, highlighting the contrast between the two in terms of the master symbols of their respective colonial heritages. Bandeirantes—far-flung slave and gold hunting expeditions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—stand for the average Brazilian's "proclivity for rapid wealth," "addiction to the past," "racial tolerance," "exacerbated

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

individualism," and "prejudice against useful labor," while pioneers stand for Mr. Average American's "break with the past," "spirit of community," "racial discrimination," "puritanism," "cult of economic virtue," and "dignity of labor."

Because Moog writes in the charming but muddled style of the Latin man of letters, complete with flashes of wit and insight, it is not clear that he really expects to convince a scholarly audience of the validity of his major facts and theories. For the record, however, it should be noted that Moog's method suffers from all of the usual defects of the national character approach. He makes only the most feeble attempt to qualify his generalizations in terms of class, region, or community type. In most of what he says about Brazil, the behavior and attitudes of his own class are the model. He exhibits little interest in lower class rural Brazilian life, and that is a pity because most Brazilians are members of a widely dispersed peasantry. In the case of the United States, his character portrait is not assisted by the vast relevant literature in sociology and social psychology which was available in 1952. (Much data of a comparable sort have become available since then on Brazil.) Statistics, samples, surveys are all conspicuous by their absence.

If Moog would write merely as a traveler, expositing his casual encounters, there would be no complaint. But his pronouncements tend to be very weighty, and he has an unfortunate desire to explain things whose complexity and significance demand more than feelings and hunches. If Moog really believed that "History is life, and life has, rather than causes, an origin, a past . . ." (p. 59), why should anyone take his many explanations seriously, since obviously one origin is as good as another in "matters in which it is not strictly proof that establishes conviction" (p. 168).

Although Moog seems to believe that he is an eclectic and gives the materialist devils their due, he has remained sadly isolated from modern techno-environmental and ecological points of view. In Moog's intellectual circle all economic determinist interpretations are apparently equated with Marxism, and the only Marxists he knows conveniently slit their own throats by insisting that there is "just one explanation for the fact, the economic one" (p. 51). As if that were not sufficiently fantastic, Marxists are even supposed to single out one economic factor —coal—as the key to the different rates of industrial growth (p. 52). These misrepresentations are inadequate reason for neglecting such subjects as the contrast between the Brazilian and United States economy in terms of sixteenth-century sugar plan-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tations versus nineteenth-century cotton plantations, white yeomanry versus half-caste retainers, labor migration, rates of capital investment during the nineteenth century, direction of capital flow, and the effects of international competition on the establishment of world market prices and agricultural and industrial specialties

Apparently Moog believes that only a Marxist could object to such incredibly simplistic notions as "in the middle ages economic factors were completely subordinate to ethics" (p. 54), because property, money, usury, accumulation of wealth, commerce, and the like were "regarded" with "distrust and alarm" (p. 55)! (Why, then, are all those poor primitives who have no money, usury, commerce for profit, or accumulation of private wealth without economies?) For one who professes that "where there is life there is no exhausting knowledge and its causes" (p. 59), Moog seems to have surprisingly strong convictions. One of the most choice specimens: "In Catholic countries strictly speaking there is no racist nationalism" (p. 61). Try telling that to the Angolans and Mozambicans, the Congolese, the Algerians, or the Vietnamese. Another choice example of what the literary imagination can do for social science: "The pioneer . . . saw no other recourse for the moment than to advance upon the territory of the Indians and decimate them . . . not a very pious solution, to be sure, but in perfect consonance with his Calvinist credo . . ." (p. 140). Moog avoids mentioning that as late as 1910 professional *bugreiros* were employed to kill off the Kaingang and Xokleng remnants who were holding up the settlement of Sao Paulo, Santa Catarina, and Parana. When clothing from deceased small pox victims was scattered along the forest trails as gifts to the Indians, shall we say it was in perfect consonance with Catholic credo? Another rather lurid insight, one among many, is found during the course of Moog's attempt to sugar coat the Brazilian slave system: "For the white man—the Catholic white, naturally—was troubled by the injustice of what he was doing, while the Negro, with a thousand years of slaveholding cultural tradition behind him, was not always troubled by the consciousness of the injustice he was suffering." Moog obviously has not been talking to the right slaves.

Let us pass to a few lighter examples which may serve, nonetheless, to illustrate the less obvious but more weighty of the doubtful convictions which Moog dispenses. "The American never ceases to regard the country as only an extension of his own home, always being on the alert, vigilant, demanding of his representatives, of the President, congressmen, and senators an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accounting . . ." (p. 131). Or how about this one: "The American would rather be called crazy than emotional" (p. 196). Many cops and bartenders will be delighted to learn that among us "rarely does one encounter . . . the 'mean drunk' " (p. 197). This ingratiating, if somewhat novel, point of view is cancelled later on by the characterization of the United States as ". . . a national drama, the pathetic drama of a country that, having the best schools of music, does not produce a great musician; or, having the best professors of philosophy, produces no great philosophers; or, having the best teachers of plastic arts, produces no truly great painter or sculptor" (p. 268).

But Moog reserves his best efforts for the epilogue. Here the eighteenth-century Brazilian sculptor, Aleijadinho, is paired with Abraham Lincoln in order to show both Brazilians and Americans what is lacking in their national psyches. A digression during which Moog argues at length that chaste Roman Catholic priests make better psychiatrists than worldly doctors, and that Catholic grace, confession, and penitence are the equivalent of psychoanalysis, contains many spendid analogies, insights, and erudite exegeses. The poetic splendor mounts steadily until the ultimate conclusion: St. Francis of Assisi is the true example of "full maturity and full normality."

MARVIN HARRIS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A Cross-Polity Survey. By ARTHUR S. BANKS and ROBERT B. TEXTOR. Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1963.—ix, 1416 pp. $20.00.

This book should cause quite a stir. Its size, its price, the fact that it consists largely of computer printouts, and, above all, its scope and audaciously comparative nature will probably intrigue some readers and repel others. The authors have taken all of the world's 115 independent polities and coded them on fifty-seven political and social characteristics—quantitative demographic characteristics as well as qualitative cultural, social, and political ones. The characteristics were dichotomized and, through the use of an ingenious computer program developed by Textor, each dichotomized variable was cross-tabulated with every other one. The computer is programmed to select those two-by-two tables which show a reasonably strong association between the two variables and to print out both the tables as well as sentences describing them.

The task is an important one. As comparative politics have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

become more comparative, various scholars have become interested in the possibility of using the large number of independent polities for testing hypotheses that have rarely been tested in more than a few cases. And such world-wide comparative research requires innovation and the imaginative use of technical advances in data processing. This work clearly is innovative. The format of the book may prompt facetious remarks about computers as authors (one of my colleagues responded to my complaint that I was having trouble reading the book by suggesting that I program a computer to read it), but the format ought not to obscure the long and imaginative work that went into preparing the computer for its literary role.

The computer's statistical manipulations are, however, only as good as the data it manipulates. And this presents one of the major problems of the book. Though it demonstrates great courage for a single individual to code all 115 polities without any systematic use of other experts or reliability checks (apparently Banks did the coding), the results are somewhat dubious. Many of the categories are rather vaguely defined (this is partially the fault of the discipline, since the categories are taken from the literature) and the means of assigning particular nations to particular categories are often unclear. The authors are right in saying that some of this problem is eliminated by using relativistic coding, but far from all of it is.

The authors believe that their results are meaningful, nevertheless, because many more two-by-two tables with strong associations are found than one would expect by chance, and because these form an internally consistent pattern. They compare this with the pattern generated by variables in which polities have been assigned to categories at random, where there are few strong associations and no consistent pattern. But if the coding was the source of error one would expect many associations rather than few and much pattern rather than little. Since one person was doing the coding, the consistency may all be in the coder's mind.

Another problem that arises with the use of a computer program of this sort is that the computer is too indiscriminate. Since it can easily generate so many two-by-two tables one is likely to use it as a crutch to generate data that have no theoretical underpinnings. Perhaps an advantage of the old style IBM machines was that their operation was so laborious that they forced one to test previously suggested hypotheses rather than letting all the relationships emerge from the data. But it must be pointed out that this book is meant to be more of a source book than a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contribution to theory, and that one of the authors is currently writing an analytical book based on the data.

This book may generate one of two extreme reactions in the reader. He may accept the data and relationships at face value and assume that he now has a source for the testing of many hypotheses about comparative politics. Or he may, at the other extreme, reject the work out of hand. Neither position is appropriate. The data—especially that based on qualitative characteristics—are dubious, but the enterprise is too serious to dismiss. The approach is an important one, and the attempt to use qualitative variables, though it causes most of the coding problems, is to be applauded. One looks forward to further work along these lines, indeed to the second edition of this volume. For the next edition, one would hope that more work will be done on the development of the variables and on the systematic coding of the nations in terms of the variables; that more refined categories may replace the dichotomies; that more theory will be brought to bear in planning the analysis; and that, perhaps, sub-national differences can be brought into the same analytical framework. This would be an enterprise of great value to political science and, indeed, it may take the cooperation of many political scientists to accomplish it.

SIDNEY VERBA

CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDY IN
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Winning Without War. By AMITAI ETZIONI. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1964.—xiii, 271 pp. $4.95.

Professor Etzioni offers here his impressions of recent tendencies in world politics, his forecasts of future trends, and his strategy for the creation of a disarmed world. His anaylsis involves no tests of empirical theories and is based upon the techniques of logic, analogy, and historical illustration. The key concepts—"bipolarity," "duopoly," "deterrence," "neutralization," "first-strike," "second-strike," "inspection and verification," and the like—provide an unusually representative sampling of the language of contemporary military policy discussions. Etzioni, however, is a concept-coiner of some skill and adds a few of his own: "remote deterrence," "flashlight force," "bomber bonfire," to name a few.

The general thesis is this: the United States and the Soviet Union as the principal nuclear superpowers, have led tightly knit alliances since the end of World War II. The result has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been a nuclear stalemate in a bipolarized world. Over the years, the American policies of "containment" and "deterrence" have merged into a "strategy of duopoly," which seeks to freeze the existing spheres of influence between the two superpowers. The Soviet response to the duopolistic internationl contest has been a gradual shift toward greater use of low-risk international political techniques; that is, avoidance of armed invasions, decreasing use of armed subversion, and greater use of political, educational, and economic influence. On both sides, the superpowers have begun to move decisively away from unlimited conflict and toward "competition under rules," as illustrated by the promulgation of the Test Ban Treaty.

But, according to Etzioni, biopolarity is a disappearing condition of world politics. China and France are surging back into the arena as unruly junior partners in the biopolarized alliance system. Nonaligned nations, somewhat akin to the "floating vote" that influences the two major political parties in American domestic politics, are forming third blocs. Declining biopolarity makes the strategy of duopoly obsolescent; something new is needed, and Etzioni proceeds to offer recommendations.

At this point, the author embarks upon a major *non sequitur*. Having discerned a trend toward the disappearance of bipolarity, he proceeds to recommend policies which assume a persistence of that bipolarity. Thus, he favors "remote deterrence," that is, a bipolar embargo upon arms shipments to nonaligned third areas, almost completely ignoring the Chinese and French interest in acquiring allies in these areas. The author urges a strategy of "intervention for progress," that is, a more vigorous American employment of its political, educational, and economic resources, but offers no grounds for confidence that the Chinese and French will close shop to view a bipolar contest. He also presents a plan for arms reduction by *both* sides.

In presenting the arms-reduction plan, the author acknowledges that a *non sequitur* is in progress, but he defends it on the assumption that "the more the two superpowers cooperate in reducing their [armed] forces, and the more they learn to work with each other for global security arrangements, the more ready and willing they will be to apply pressure on their allies to participate in the arms-reduction scheme" (p. 210). He further argues that the *non sequitur* "seems justified, since for at least the next five years the nuclear forces of countries other than the two superpowers will remain, in comparison, highly limited" (p. 210).

The Etzioni arms-reduction scheme is as follows: First, "the United States might declare that under no circumstances would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it be the first to use nuclear or atomic weapons, calling on Russia to make the same commitment" (p. 182). This reviewer would recommend that the United States wait upon the day when the term "aggressor" is adequately defined. Possibly a good operational definition of "aggressor" would make such a declaration unnecessary; it might also help us cope with the somewhat aggressive Chinese, French, and, occasionally, Indians.

A second step in the scheme: The United States "could stop the production of more missiles and nuclear bombs . . . ; the Russians would then be expected to stop their production after building a force that gave them a comparable sense of secure *retaliatory* capacity" (p. 184). This reviewer shares the author's observations about the difficulties of such a policy. "The point at which both sides have quite invulnerable second-strike but no hope of gaining 'acceptable' first-strike forces would be the most likely moment to stop the present upward spiraling of nuclear weapons, accept the second-strike-only position, and move toward multilateral arms reduction. . . . One rather important 'technical' difficulty must be faced here: it is difficult to distinguish a first- from a second-strike force" (p. 188). Nor are the second-strike views of the Chinese and the French explored in this book.

The third step in the plan is "arms reduction, in the process of which strategic parity [presumably accomplished in step two] will be maintained so as not to give any side an advantage" (p. 195). Since Etzioni offers little evidence that verification procedures are likely to facilitate arms reduction as such, this reviewer would risk the prediction that the entire inspection-verification approach to arms control will probably go the way of the Hatch Act approach to control of political campaign financing, that is, out the window.

And what of China and France during step three? "China, France, and other large powers would have to participate in reduction of forces, or the United States and the U.S.S.R. could not be expected to reduce their own until an international force, with their support, became strong enough not just to counter an invasion of India into Goa or Egypt into Yemen, but of China into India, which is a long way off" (p. 212). But two pages earlier, Etzioni premises *all* his proposals upon the five-year lead that, in his opinion, the two superpowers have in the nuclear race.

In the final stage, global institutions will be the predominant source of security. Such institutions should be developed gradually and "in the direction of competition under rules." They would include global legislature, judiciary, executive, police

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

force, economic regulatory machinery, and a sense of world community.

The author expresses the hope that "the dictates of realism have . . . prevailed in these pages" (p. 224). As a scientist, Etzioni must appreciate that the inescapable test of reality is successful prediction based on substanial evidence. In producing a vaccine, must not laboratory observations permit confident prediction of successful disease prevention when applied to humans? In building a bridge, must not laboratory observations of materials' strength permit confident predictions of successful support of traffic? And must not designers of strategies for nonviolence in international affairs meet the same empirical and predictive tests of realism before confidence can be placed in their proposals? The rules for betting on arms control plans must be the same as for wagering on vaccines and bridges; in all three, the price of unsuccessful prediction comes too high.

RALPH M. GOLDMAN

SAN FRANCISCO STATE COLLEGE

Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. By EDWARD S. MASON. New York and Evanston, Harper and Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1964.—ix, 118 pp. $3.50

The effectiveness of foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy has spawned many hotly debated questions. Some are glib and denunciatory, implying that all foreign aid is a foolish failure. Others are analytical, searching for criteria by which to judge to what degree foreign aid furthers economic development and advances America's foreign policy objectives. Edward S. Mason's brief study of *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy* deals with questions of the latter variety.

The study begins with a deceptively simple query about what may properly be called foreign "aid." A probe beyond banalities shows that roughly two thirds of the resources which Western nations send abroad with the "aid" label attached involve transactions primarily intended to benefit the donor country. Self-defense or economic advantage, not disinterested aid, is the principal objective. Professor Mason does not quarrel with the self-interest motive. He does object to the bloated image of charity because it conceals from Congress and the public that little can be pared from foreign aid appropriations without cutting into the flesh of vital American defense policies.

Professor Mason is optimistic about the use of foreign aid to bring about lasting economic progress whenever it is given to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nations whose social conditions are propitious for economic development. He includes much of Latin America in this group. Coming from an economist, with extensive experience in foreign aid administration, this judgment should carry great weight. Professor Mason is much less certain about the political benefits which a donor country can expect to reap in return for its assistance. Unfortunately, it is this uncertainty which lies at the heart of congressional and public unwillingness to support the foreign aid program indefinitely. The program will remain "Operation Rathole" to large segments of the American public as long as there is little verifiable proof that economic development changes a nation's internal political development and foreign policy orientation in a manner which is beneficial to the United States. Educated guesses, such as Professor Mason's, that economic maturation does make nations more resistant to external and internal communism, are not convincing enough.

Among many other interesting issues, lucidly discussed, the book raises the question whether America's allies are dragging their feet in supporting foreign aid efforts of mutual concern. What is a "fair" share of the aid burden? When nations differ in economic ability, diverge in their foreign interests, and disagree about the value of foreign aid in furthering the common defense, this is difficult to decide. Is it equality of sacrifice, or a fixed proportion of national income—and how does one set either of these standards? More fundamentally, since aid is a clumsy and hard-to-wield tool of foreign policy in America's hands alone, how much more clumsy would it become in the joint hands of several nations, each seeking to use it for its own purposes? To ask questions such as these of course does not provide the needed answers. But it is a first step. For stimulating thought, and, hopefully, much needed further investigation, Professor Mason deserves plaudits.

DORIS A. GRABER

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. By HERBERT FEIS. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1964.—vii, 246 pp. $5.00.

Herbert Feis has again placed us in his debt with a knowledgeable and perceptive examination of certain relationships between economic developments and political action. In a sense, he began his cultivation of this field thirty years ago with the publication of his classical study, *Europe, the World's Banker: 1870–1914,* which studied the connection between foreign private investment and the foreign policy of various European powers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In his current study, he contrasts effectively the relatively firm world outlook prior to World War I when both private investors and governments acted upon very similar calculations of international prospects with the present situation in which the lack of firm expectations is one of the influences inducing governments to attempt to replace the private flow of capital by loans and grants to countries in which private investors now largely fear to tred.

There is no doubt in Feis' mind that the primary motivation for aid programs of the present size is political, to offer the possibility to the less developed countries of alternatives other than communism. This is despite the fact that "a conscience more sensitive about the wretched plight of many other peoples; the wish to uphold the United Nations; an inclination to help other countries to achieve or maintain democratic political order and freedom; and the longing of our farmers, manufacturers and traders for foreign markets" would have led to a foreign aid program of some size even in the absence of a cold war environment.

The rather obvious decline of confidence in the American foreign aid program both in Congress and in the public suggests to the author no pronounced change in an assessment of the intentions or capabilities of communism but rather growing doubts of the value of the instruments that foreign aid has at its disposal. Can government loans, grants, and technical assistance make a decisive difference to the rate of economic growth of the less developed world? Even if they can, does it follow that political evolution accompanying economic growth will be in a direction favorable to the interests of aid-giving countries? Is not the nationalist urge to independence strong enough to keep these countries nonaligned, if not favorably disposed, even without massive assistance? These are all debatable questions and the author exhibits no reluctance in grappling with them.

In general, he feels that aid can make a decisive contribution to economic development and that development does promise political alternatives to the Soviet pattern that would not exist without favorable economic prospects. In fact, he is somewhat more optimistic concerning the contribution of aid to development than I am.

> Small additional amounts of capital and accruals of knowledge can have a greater productive potential in poor and undeveloped countries than in more advanced ones. The introduction of even slightly more efficient means and methods into a primitive system can have a higher proportionate and quicker impact on productivity than in countries already utilizing superior ones.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This is no doubt true in some less developed countries. But in others, and among them some of the largest and poorest, the returns to investment seem disappointingly small. There are "long haul cases" where only large amounts of aid and technical assistance persisting over a very long time can be expected to produce decisive results. Nevertheless, such differences as I have with the author are differences of degree and I wholly subscribe to his summing up: "These are all persuasive reasons for the belief that the task which the American people have taken upon themselves is manageable in satisfactory measure."

EDWARD S. MASON

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The Managed Economy. By MICHAEL D. REAGAN. New York, Oxford University Press, 1963.—ix, 288 pp. $6.00.

Thank heaven, books are beginning to appear dealing with the American economic system as it really is, instead of describing unrealist theoretical constructs.

> The American economy no longer functions in accord with Adam Smith's concept of the invisible hand but is increasingly administered by corporate executives and government officials. . . . The theme is that more—and more effective—public control over the economy is essential, both to achieve such economic goals as full employment and a higher growth rate and, more importantly, to retain our self-respect as masters of our fate (p. 1).

This is Professor Reagan's stated thesis. It accords with the observations developed by this reviewer in *The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution* and, more recently, *The American Economic Republic.* It seems solidly based on factual data.

In the American system, "free enterprise" is constricted by corporate concentration. Individual entrepreneurs have been reduced to a minor position. "Administered prices" are the rule rather than the exception (although such administration implies only a measure of control). The goals of full employment, full purchasing power, and continued growth set up in the Employment Act of 1946 imply conflicts between non-statist planning of corporations and public planning into which we are inevitably moving.

Like most modern commentators, Reagan believes that there is individual freedom only where the individual has effective control over that on which he depends—that is, his job. This ideal of freedom never fully existed—perhaps never will—but a higher degree of freedom than exists now can certainly be achieved. Nor do I agree with Reagan's acceptance of one of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the late C. Wright Mills' formulas that corporate property is "class" property, but then Mills' artificially constructed "classes" have little justification anyhow. That wealth and property control are the primary sources of business (that is, corporations') power is another of Reagan's generalizations. This goes somewhat farther than the facts warrant. A few hundred great corporations unquestionably do control a vast deal of property—and to some extent influence wealth. But their control over property is limited by the whole functioning of the system, while their power to affect "wealth" ("the personally-owned financial wealth" described by David Bazelon in *The Paper Economy*) is incidental. His resulting assumption that corporate executives really administer the nation's resources overstates the case. Yet there can be little quarrel with Reagan's conclusion that the acts of corporate executives necessarily compel economic decisions in the public sector and none at all with his attack on the system by which advertisers control what goes into mass media such as television.

The conclusion, that we are in an age of planning, that the corporate system must—voluntarily if possible, involuntarily if necessary—be reconstructed to accord with a strengthened national policy-planning system is, it seems to me, wholly sound. Professor Reagan proposes (as has this reviewer) that the institutional nucleus for such a planning system should be the Council of Economic Advisers, given primacy over the Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, the Federal Reserve Board, and other government agencies. It should be under the authority of the President, and implemented by an "Office of Policy Planning." A far higher delegation of economic function should be granted by the Congress to the President, institutionalizing the President's role as "Chief Legislator."

While I should disagree with some of the generalizations, and some of the emphasis, I salute this volume as a penetrating and constructive analysis of realities. Particularly to be commended is Professor Reagan's willingness to suggest institutional solutions. The book should have wide attention.

ADOLF A. BERLE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1812–1848, 2 Volumes. Edited by FRANCIS E. MINEKA. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, and London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963.—xxvii, 784 pp. $20.00.

One of the giants in political, economic, and philosophical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

speculation is, without question, John Stuart Mill. Few have made so many contributions in so many fields as this nineteenth-century British thinker. His writings covered practically the entire realm of the social sciences, and the field of philosophy. His influence on public policy especially in the Anglo-American world has seldom been equalled. His *Autobiography* is a classic account of the emotional and intellectual development of a great thinker.

The value of the letters of such a person is fairly obvious. Heretofore only the two-volume *Letters of John Stuart Mill,* edited by Hugh Elliot in 1910, has been available in collected form. This work, based on Mill's papers, included only 268 letters, most of which were written in the last twenty-five years of his life, and no letters previously published anywhere were included.

In the early nineteen-forties Professor Friedrich Hayek began assembling Mill's letters for a definitive edition. He turned over the task of editing and annotating these letters to Professor Francis E. Mineka who, at the same time, continued to add to the collection. The first fruits of the project are the two volumes, *The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1812–1848.* Eighteen-forty-eight is, of course, the year when the landmark *Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy* appeared.

The numerous additions in the collections of letters in the volumes under discussion should prove extremely useful to scholars in practically every phase of Mill's interest. His letters written as a child are an important find. The first letter is dated 1812 when Mill was six years old, and is addressed to Jeremy Bentham. He states that he has finished reading the first two volumes of Nathaniel Hooke's *The Roman History, From the Building of Rome to the Ruin of the Commonwealth,* and would now like to borrow the last two volumes. Another letter, written at the age of thirteen to Bentham's younger brother, the inventor and naval engineer, Sir Samuel, gives a detailed year-by-year account of his studies since the age of eight. This letter serves to supplement what we already know from the *Autobiography* of the amazing education of the infant prodigy.

Mill's contemporary caustic comments on the failure of his fellow philosophical radicals in the reformed House of Commons to carry out their program should prove a valuable supplement to the urbane discussions in the *Autobiography.* In the most interesting of the new letters on economics, he recognizes that the area of monopoly is quite large. Writing to the American economist Henry C. Carey in 1845, he states that "In the case of all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

useful articles which admit of indefinite increase by means of labour, the labour required for producing them is, no doubt, the regulator & measure of their value," as Ricardo has so well shown; but "a different law governs all cases of either natural or artificial monopoly, & . . . cases partaking more or less of that character are so far from being exceptions, that they constitute a full half of all the cases which arise; land & its produce being the most conspicuous, but very far from the sole, example."

There are also some new letters to Thomas Carlyle and to the St. Simonian, Gustav D'Eichthal. While the letters to Auguste Comte on positivism and to Alexis de Tocqueville on democracy have been available in separate publications, it is good to have them together in these volumes. The editor is to be congratulated for the excellence of his annotations which required much labor and ingenuity on his part. We look forward to the concluding volumes of Mill's letters.

JOSEPH DORFMAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

International Business. By HOWE MARTYN. London, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.—xiv, 288 pp. $5.50.

Professor Martyn has chosen an important subject. Never before in American history has business been as internationally oriented as it is today. More than three thousand Ameican corporations have subsidiaries abroad. A number of large American firms earn over fifty per cent of their profits outside the United States. Sales from foreign subsidiaries of American companies now are greater than the latter's exports, and direct foreign investment by corporations exceeds international private foreign portfolio investment. Professor Martyn goes so far as to argue that the proliferation of international firms "may prove to be second only to Keynesian national monetary and fiscal policies in influence over general economic conditions."

Professor Martyn now teaches at the American University in Washington, D. C. He has had thirty years of experience as a businessman in the United States and abroad, and he continues to write from the standpoint of a practical businessman. His book will be more useful to the novitiate in international business than to the political scientist. A political scientist who wants a clear presentation of topics discussed in international business circles might also find this book of interest.

Professor Martyn puts international business in the context of varying political practices, legal constraints, economic growth,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

state trading, as well as such business functions as organization and control, personnel, research and development, and advertising.

His subject is not limited to American-based international business, but he considers such foreign-headquartered companies as Nestlé, Dunlop, and especially Unilever. Professor Martyn makes a praiseworthy effort to give a historical background, although his summary contains a number of mistakes.

The relation between international business and economic growth takes two chapters and is alluded to frequently throughout the volume. The large industrial international companies, Professor Martyn claims, make important contributions to the growth of less developed countries: "The significance of the growing number and size of foreign subsidiary companies in many countries is that they give substance to hopeful analogies between those countries and the advanced countries by increasing the number of points of similarity." New and improved products stimulate development; education of customers to use farm implements and chemicals likewise is helpful; food processing innovations introduced by international firms encourage increased standards of living; skill and know-how of the giant companies aid the poorer nations; even advertising is praised as "fostering development in backward areas." International firms stimulate ancillary industries and provide catalysts for domestic capital formation. They contribute to diversified growth. They offer new machinery and equipment to less favored countries. They provide a training ground for foreign personnel. Professor Martyn believes that government intervention in international business activity and economic development is apt to increase. The role of the businessman is to be in a position of "mutual respect and cooperation with governments."

In his opinion, international business along with the United States and foreign governments must contribute to economic growth in underdeveloped countries. He acknowledges certain obstacles: "There is some question whether or not the present policies of international firms make adequate contributions to the foreign exchange earnings that developing nations need." He is critical of international manufacturing companies for not encouraging exports from the less developed countries and feels international firms could sponsor more research by their subsidiaries. But in total the former businessman writes sympathetically of the potentialities of international business in world-wide economic development.

In short, this primer of international business is concerned

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with international business and the environment; the book appropriately concludes with a discussion of the difficulties facing businessmen engaged in multinational enterprises.

MIRA WILKINS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Power, Politics, and People. By C. WRIGHT MILLS. Edited and with an introduction by IRVING C. HOROWITZ. New York, Oxford University Press, 1963.–xiii, 657 pp. $8.50.

An assessment of the work of C. Wright Mills is bound to take account of the aura of controversy that surrounded him. The editor of this posthumous volume of essays calls him America's greatest sociologist. But many of his peers were more reserved. He has been translated into a number of languages and read widely outside the United States. He was, for example, translated in Russian and welcomed there, but a prominent American Communist has written a negative evaluation of his work. He in fact lived his career as he preached: as an independent, critical intellectual doing research on what he considered the central problems of his era and stating his conclusions most forcefully.

This collection (not selection, the editor insists) of his essays allows the reader to get an overall picture of Mills' work, from his early concentration on social psychology and the sociology of knowledge, to his later concern with changing stratification systems, and especially the American system, to the embracing interest in the ways of power, both national and international, toward the height of his career (which was at the same time the end of his life).

There is a remarkable consistency in these essays. They all start with the Weberian assumption that a relentless rationalization and bureaucratization of the world is taking place, something which is both wonderful and highly dangerous to human freedom. In the face of this threat, we must resist. The first task of a liberal education, he says, is "to keep us from being overwhelmed" (p. 367). Men are free to make history, as we have been taught, but if they do not, others shall make it for them and therefore the only "realistic politics" is an "affirmation of one's self as a moral and intellectual center of responsible decisions" (p. 235).

But how and what shall we decide? Here Mills is considerably less helpful. He tells us that "our major orientations–liberalism and socialism–have virtually collapsed as adequate explanations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the world and of ourselves" (p. 236). He has little patience with faith in the working class as an agency of progress. He calls this a "labor metaphysic" and "a legacy of Victorian Marxism" (p. 256). The only possible agency of truth and therefore of progress is for Mills, as it was for Mannheim, the unattached intellectual who "ought to be the moral conscience of his society, at least with reference to the value of truth, for in the defining instance, that *is* his politics" (p. 611).

Mills never shows us the face of truth—he was perhaps too wise and far too uncertain for that—but he tells us how to arrive at it, through that highest human ideal: craftsmanship. "Human society . . . ought to be built around craftsmanship as the central experience of the unalienated human being and the very root of free human development" (p. 386).

The craftsman is no longer honored in America—perhaps least of all in America, says Mills. It is here most clearly that Mills places himself in one central American intellectual tradition, the *cri de coeur* of Henry Adams and of Thorstein Veblen and of the Lost Generation novelists. "America—a conservative country without any conservative ideology . . . appears before the world a naked and arbitrary power" (p. 230). Without *even* a conservative ideology! He diagnoses our moral uneasiness.

> There is in America today no set of Representative Men whose conduct and character are above the taint of the pecuniary morality. . . . Frankly, I do not believe such a set of Representative Men will emerge in the United States of our time. . . . But I do believe that the creation of such Representative Men should be a major aspiration of our collective political life (pp. 336–38).

Mills was controversial because Mills was a moralist. He had (and has) his adepts. He has his derogators. Coming out of the secular version of the Judeo-Christian heritage, he couched his morality in very traditional terms. The world is sinful and we are condemned. There is, however, a ray of hope. "In our present situation of the impoverished mind and lack of political will, United States intellectuals, it seems to me, have a unique opportunity to make a new beginning. If we want to, we can be independent craftsmen" (p. 231). Of course the intellectual by himself cannot successfully use mind to shape human affairs. He can do so "only when there exists a free and knowledgeable public, to which men of knowledge may address themselves, and to which men of power are truly responsible" (p. 613).

We end, with Mills, as all sociological thought has ended for a hundred years, in that curious nether land between men's actions being determined by the social structure and cultural

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

traditions of which they are a part and the intense faith in voluntarism which is the mark of modern man.

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Rank-and-File Leader. By SIDNEY M. PECK. New Haven, Conn., College and University Press, 1963.—vii, 398 pp. $6.00.

Class Structure in the Social Consciousness. By STANISLAW OSSOWSKI. Translated from the Polish by Sheila Patterson. New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.—viii, 202 pp. $5.00.

Both of these volumes written by sociologists deal with a subject of profound importance in modern industrial society, social class. Here the similarity ends. Peck is an American who sought to discover the meaning of class consciousness among rank-and-file leaders in the workshop. Ossowski is a Polish professor who set out to recast a variety of concepts as they relate to class structure. The former is an empiricist who collected his data as a participant observer. The latter is a theorist and typologist who derives his inspiration from the work of the great social thinkers of history including Marx, of course.

Peck was concerned about working-class ideology. His question was explicit: What is the level of consciousness that characterizes the ideological perceptions of rank-and-file leaders? He wondered whether it was true that worker class consciousness had been disappearing since the thirties with the rise in living standards, the movement of workers to suburbia, and the improvements in working conditions. Answers to the question he asked would, he modestly recognized, be important for an understanding of the future of the labor movement and of the workers' future as a political force in our society.

Not only did he personally go to work in at least six different jobs over extended periods of time; he joined unions, was a shop steward, and held other official positions in union organizations. He used an interesting German technique of the group interview to elicit spontaneous discussions among the shop stewards. A fictitious report of a German trade unionist was introduced to groups of stewards for their comments on a range of specific topics related to political and social ideologies. Peck's report is convincing evidence of the success of this research technique.

The substance of his findings rings loud and clear. Consciousness of class by rank-and-file stewards is a fact of life. It is a stronger motivator of behavior than one's mental set toward race

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or religion. The representatives of labor at the grass roots are not inclined to overthrow the capitalistic system, but they certainly feel that they belong to a *class* of second-rate citizens. They perceive management fundamentally as an exploiter. The author believes that labor's present frustrations are also due in large measure to the bureaucratization of unions themselves and to the diminishing role played by a key figure, the shop steward. "The steward has lost his voice. He has no power. He is a glorified messenger boy" (p. 353). Peck implies that the union movement itself is threatened unless mechanisms can be found to allow grass-roots leaders of labor to strengthen their role as spokesmen for men in the shop vis-à-vis management and as better communicators to those setting political and social policy at the higher union echelons. He concludes with several recommendations for strengthening the role of the shop steward in order to solidify the ties between industrial workers and their leaders. He avoids speculation as to what might happen to the pent up class consciousness among workers should they find themselves leaderless at the primary group level.

Ossowski's book seeks to examine systematically ways in which class structure has been interpreted by European philosophers and social thinkers. Several references are made to the work of American sociologists who have specialized in the study of class consciousness. He then draws up a model for interpreting class structure in both capitalist and socialist societies. Considering that some of his work was written in the Stalin era the author feels remarkably free to criticize party line postulates of Marx and Lenin. He admits that "the scope of the applicability of the Marxian criterion has undergone important changes" (p. 182). He frankly labels many Marxist-Leninist conceptions of class as out-of-date and inadequate. The author's model for the sociological study of class attempts a framework that would leave room for interpretations by Adam Smith, Small, Giddings, and many others. Man's relation to and control over the use of property and the means of production are still fundamental to any definition of class. It also would include the concept of both estate and caste. But Ossowski suggests that social status, hence class differentiation, can arise in any society and that class differences are the result of other societal forces. Even in a system where the people "own" the means of production and distribution class differences can emerge as they have in all society throughout history.

Unfortunately the author's writing or its translation blurs the thoughtful scholarship which went into its production to the extent that the reader is never quite sure whether his work is a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

polemic or an impartial proposal for a new look at class structure. Most of it does reflect the freedom that scholars have enjoyed in Poland since the 1956 Poznan riots. Ossowski admits that one of the important consequences of these events "was the destruction of the official myth which concealed our reality" (p. 193).

ROBERT H. GUEST

AMOS TUCK SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

Justice on Trial: The Case of Louis D. Brandeis. By A. L. TODD. New York, Toronto, and London, McGraw-Hill, 1964. —275 pp. $6.50.

It took the United States Senate five months, from January to June 1916, to confirm President Wilson's appointment of Louis D. Brandeis to the United States Supreme Court. The political struggle that took place during this time was described in Alpheus T. Mason's biography of Brandeis. Mr. Todd presumably intended to discuss those aspects of the campaign that were left out by Mason.

The author did indeed bring to light fascinating new data on the fight over Brandeis' appointment. It is, therefore, unfortunate that he did not always adhere to the canons of historical research. In spite of the wealth of original citations quoted from unpublished primary sources—averaging one quote for each of the book's 275 pages—we are nevertheless presented with a partial account. Instead of objectively examining this political struggle, Todd fancied it as a fight between men representing all that was elevating in human nature and those driven primarily by petty personal grievances to prevent the Senate from confirming Brandeis' appointment. The quotes, incidentally, would have been of great use to researchers had the author footnoted their sources.

One of Todd's arguments, repeated over and over again, was that many opposed Brandeis because, having lost their law suits against him, they "thirsted for revenge." From the material he presented, however, only their anti-radical and anti-Semitic bias could be inferred.

Furthermore, the author's efforts to present Brandeis as the idealist who, in contrast to his less scrupulous opponents shied away from political machinations, led him to a number of errors of judgment. For example, Todd asserts that the struggle within the Jewish community between Brandeis and the American Jewish Committee, and the fight over his appointment, were totally

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unrelated. This reviewer is of the opinion that, had Todd examined events in the Jewish community more carefully and with an open mind, he would not have reached such a conclusion.

Did he, however, aim at an objective account? In his efforts to favor Brandeis the author even weakened the opposition's strongest case against Brandeis, involving his relations with the United States Shoe Machinery Company. We are told that, as the company's lawyer, Brandeis supported its monopolistic practices. A few years later Brandeis changed his mind and, on behalf of other clients, opposed the company's same practices. But Todd never mentions that when Brandeis represented the company and supported its monopolistic practices, he was an investor in the company and a member of its board of directors. In response to public pressure he severed his connections with the company and, a few years later, was attacking it. It was this fact, omitted by Todd (but discussed by Mason in his biography of Brandeis) which made the affair the "stickiest" part of the campaign against Brandeis.

It is to be regretted that Mr. Todd did not succeed in writing a balanced and objective account of the fight over Brandeis' appointment to the Supreme Court. Had he been able to do so, the author would have contributed to our understanding of American history and politics, while Justice Brandeis would undoubtedly have won our sympathy and admiration. Such a study is still to be written.

YONATHAN SHAPIRO

TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY

An Introduction to the Law. By C. GORDON POST. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1963.—185 pp. $3.95.

"Introductions" to the law have not been notably successful. Most are either so oversimplified as to be misleading and, worse, boring, or too technical to be helpful to the layman. Although approached here with a law teacher's skepticism about books of this sort, this small volume proves to be a surprisingly happy exception to the general rule.

Dr. Post treats the law on essentially two levels. On the more jurisprudential plane he raises and discusses with sophistication questions of the nature and sources of law and the Anglo-American legal system. His thesis is that the law is a human institution and that the principal determinant of whether it is good or bad in any particular aspect is the quality of the lawyers and judges who administer it. It takes wise and skillful statesmen

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to maintain the essential balance between stability and change that a dynamic legal system requires. In describing the role of *stare decisis* and the techniques employed to bend that doctrine to the use of an evolving society, Dr. Post is particularly impressive. Probably the chapter on "Stare Decisis: The Use of Precedent" and the concluding one entitled "The Judge and His Decision" are the high spots of the book. In the latter, drawing heavily on Cardozo and Learned Hand, Dr. Post argues persuasively that Jerome Frank oversimplified when he asserted that decisions are the product of judicial hunch and that opinions are mere rationalizations. On the other hand, Post does not suggest that the other extreme is true, that decisions are the result of pure syllogistic reasoning. Decisions are formed according to the hunch of the judge. But that hunch is the result of his having been steeped in the law and in learning about man and society. Judges are faced every day with the most agonizing kinds of decisions, such as, for example, what does "good moral character" mean in the context of The Immigration and Naturalization Law. Any answer to that problem is bound to be tentative, but the good judges, the civilized ones, are most likely to arrive at an answer society will respect. The problem, as the author suggests at the outset, is to increase the number of civilized judges.

On another level, the book is not quite so successful, but still better than most. The historical treatment of the development of the common law is necessarily sketchy but nevertheless adequate. Two institutions are singled out for special consideration, neither very satisfactorily. Habeas corpus, "The Great Writ," is treated almost as an historical oddity. Its modern importance is practically ignored. It just happens that one of the most serious problems of federalism centers on the use of federal habeas corpus to vindicate constitutional rights in state criminal prosecutions. The contemporary reader ought to know this.

Likewise, I find the treatment of jury trial lacking in perception. It is suggested that jury trial has been "subjected to a searching examination and re-evaluation and has been found wanting." Well, that has been happening almost since the birth of jury trials, yet the institution persists. There must be many reasons for this but at least one is that so many who doubt the jury's utility misconceive its function. It is not simply to find the facts. It is to exercise *judgment*. One example from this book will illustrate. Dr. Post flatly asserts that in a criminal case "to leave the matter of the sanity or insanity of a defendant to a jury is the height of absurdity." But the jury's function is not to determine sanity or insanity. It is to judge whether un-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

der all the circumstances, including medical, he was *responsible*, and that is a moral and social judgment. The question is not whether the jury is best fitted to diagnose mental illness but whether it is the appropriate agency to dispense social judgment as to criminal responsibility. Those who see the issue too narrowly understandably answer the wrong question.

There are other minor defects in the book. The description of the procedure of a trial is in some ways outdated and a little less than breathtaking. The author sometimes succumbs to his own interest in an intricate legal question that will hardly enlighten the general reader. Few will see the importance of whether Black or Frankfurter were right as to the precise construction of the 1939 amendment to the Federal Employers Liability Act.

In summary, this is a very useful book. The general reader will find it helpful and provocative. At least one law teacher would recommend it highly to every pre-law student.

CHARLES E. ARES

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOK NOTES

"A politician, like a clergyman, is wise not to jest too freely about the mysteries of his vocation. The piety of a ribald priest and the honesty of a cynic statesman are always suspect, though occasionally the ribaldry of the one and the cynicism of the other are no more than thin veneers." Thus F. S. Oliver in the first volume of *The Endless Adventure* (1930)—the adventure of governing men. Nikita Khrushchev's vulgar joshing may have been a factor in his ouster, but other men who have perched on high rungs of the political ladder have displayed a sense of humor which has not made them lose favor. Abraham Lincoln, Benjamin Disraeli, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, John F. Kennedy, Adlai Stevenson—the most solemn in the electorate never seemed to object. In *Humor: The Politician's Tool* (New York, Washington, and Hollywood, Vantage Press, 1964; 210 pp., $3.95) F. Hodge O'Neal (a Duke University law professor) and his wife (Annie Laurie) ignore for the most part holders of eminent offices who have said humorous things. Their collection comes largely from representatives and senators (relatively few well known), members of state legislatures, and several governors who have wanted to see their "favorite stories" get into the public domain. Practically all of the contributors ignore the maxim that brevity is the soul of wit and the publishers are not likely to receive many requests for permissions to reprint. The best entry is old, English, and will startle readers who know anything about statesmen of the eighteenth century.

> Robert Walpole, Earl of Oxford, and William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, engaged in the following exchange after a bitter debate in Parliament.
>
> Walpole, livid with anger, said to Pitt: "Pitt, you will either die on the gallows or of some unspeakable disease."
>
> "That, my lud," calmly replied Pitt, "depends on whether I embrace your policies or your mistress."

The interchange is not in character, but there is another reason why any compiler should have been suspicious of the identity of the interlocutors. The Earl of Orford (not Oxford) died twenty years before Pitt received his Earldom. The devastating reply was in fact made by John Wilkes, riposting to the Earl of Sand-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wich, whose life had been notoriously profligate, and whose nickname was "Jemmy Twitcher," the treacherous highwayman in *The Beggar's Opera.*

In a different category is *A Treasury of American Political Humor,* edited by Leonard C. Lewin (New York, Delacorte Press, 1964; 480 pp., $6.50). Mr. Lewin has culled his tidbits from people who wrote about, rather than were, practicing politicians: H. L. Mencken, Heywood Broun, Frank Sullivan, Finley Peter Dunne, Ring Lardner, and Westbrook Pegler (who, on occasion, could be very humorous) and many others. But most readers, I suggest, will think that Will Rogers is tops even though the editor does not include one of his best and briefest cracks. Making a campaign speech he urged his audience to vote for Ogden Mills because "he would be the only member of Congress who can enter a Fifth Avenue home without delivering something." There are half a dozen specimens from Russell Baker, the relatively new New York *Times* columnist who currently demonstrates that George S. Kaufman may not have been right when he defined satire as "what closes on Saturday night." Many readers will rejoice that pieces they remember having seen in periodicals now appear between bound covers.—LINDSAY ROGERS, New York City.

Professor John F. Due, in *Taxation and Econmic Development in Tropical Africa* (Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1963; 172 pp., $6.00), has produced a very informative and well-organized study of the current tax systems of the eight countries in tropical Africa that are, or have been, British colonies or protectorates: Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Although certain similarities are apparent, the reader is also impressed by the wide range of rates and the differences in definition of tax base for each of the important taxes among the eight countries. Differences in administrative techniques are also significant. Professor Due's organization of his material facilitates an appreciation of these differences; a chapter comparing the several tax structures is followed by chapters devoted to particular taxes. The treatment is detailed enough to be quite useful to the specialist in public finance; it should also prove useful to anyone specializing in one or more of the countries. The general reader, on the other hand, may find that the amount of technical detail creates some difficulties for him, but this is unavoidable. Even the generalist, however, will gain much from the two concluding chapters, "Financing Federation"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and "Tax Policy and Economic Development." This is an authoritative book covering a subject that has hitherto remained almost entirely unexplored.—CARL S. SHOUP, Columbia University.

Over twenty-three hundred years after the death of Plato, the idea of a dictatorship by the talented elite still finds many supporters. Among them is H. Wentworth Eldredge, professor of sociology of Dartmouth College, who expresses his contempt for popular democracy in *The Second American Revolution* (New York, William Morrow, 1964; 403 pp., $6.95). According to Professor Eldredge, the United States is being rapidly surpassed in practically everything by authoritarian societies. Other than comparisons between GNP figures of the Soviet Union and the United States, Professor Eldredge offers little more than vitriolic invective against all who might oppose his view that traditional democracy is "near collapse." To destroy the democratic argument, Professor Eldredge contends that, far from being equal, individuals are quite diverse—which is of course not what Thomas Jefferson and Company were talking about at all. Far from being rational (another essential pro-democratic argument, according to Professor Eldredge), people are generally quite stupid clods. Gloomy though this looks for the traditional democratic point of view, the Soviets and fascists have no solution to offer, because their social stratifications are inhuman and are based on brute power, not rational allotment according to talent. Since the United States is the intellectual garbage can of the world, it will surely dissolve unless national standards of excellence are set by a centralized educational system for the creation of a ruling aristocracy of talent. As for federalism, local government, and the roles of Congress and the Supreme Court, etc., we should throw all that eighteenth-century junk out the window, in favor of unlimited executive power. The excited style of this book is entertaining, and some of the chapters are full of challenging ideas and useful background data. Most scholars will agree that we must take vigorous steps to improve our educational opportunities and to raise the quality of our government operations. But Professor Eldrege seems almost totally oblivious to the dangers of uncontrolled power. The alternatives are worse, he asserts. The extreme proposals he favors demonstrate an outrageous inattention to some of the most elemental problems of human behavior—whether dominated by an "aristocracy of talent" or by a gang of political thugs.—JAMES L. BUSEY, University of Colorado.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ernst Fraenkel's recent book on the American polity—*Das amerikanische Regierungssystem*—(Köln und Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 2nd ed., 1962; 399 pp. DM 27) was written primarily for German readers, but is an impressive contribution beyond this framework. Drawing upon his wide experience on both sides of the Atlantic, the author, now professor of political science and director of the American Institute of the Free University of Berlin, presents a comprehensive analytical treatment of American political institutions. With great clarity of expression and conceptualization, Fraenkel integrates descriptive material within a framework of attention to the American political process and the principles of tradition, popular sovereignty, federalism, and limited government in the United States. Fraenkel is particularly concerned to contrast "totalitarian" and "anti-totalitarian" political principles and practices. The work is characterized by great sympathy for the American political system. In this respect, it partly betrays its origins in lectures given to German students of the post-Nazi era. The purpose, at least partly, was to contrast the spirit and institutions of the American polity with the spirit and institutions of a totalitarian system, even though Fraenkel gives due attention to comparing American and German democratic practices. Thus, the darker sides of contemporary American development—especially the evidence of increasing disjointedness between social tensions and the ability of the political system to resolve them—are given less attention than they deserve.—GEORGE K. ROMOSER, Connecticut College.

Russian Political Thought: A Concise History (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964; xvi, 320 pp., $6.00), by S. V. Utechin, research fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford, unwittingly confirms the opinion that Russia—at least prior to the advent of communism—had few political thinkers of distinction and influence. This may well be the reason for "the complete absence of English-language textbooks on the subject" noted by the author. Utechin states, with some exaggeration, that "on the whole, Russian political thought is strikingly similar to that of Western Europe," and he adds modestly that "there is little that is original" in his survey covering the period "from the inception of the recorded Russian political tradition to the present day." The concise presentation of a subject as vast and ill-defined as that of Russian political theory inevitably raises thorny problems of selectivity. The author, moreover, has deliberately given little attention to "theories that have recently been extensively

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

treated in English-language literature." Even with this reservation in mind, one may well wonder why no reference is made, for instance, to Catherine II's celebrated Instruction or to the Petrine statute (*Glavnii magistrat*, 1721) which triumphantly proclaimed that the security police was "the very soul of citizenship," a notion which has profoundly influenced the theory and practice of the Russian government to this day. On the other hand, Utechin summarizes the views of several writers (Kozelsky, Kablits, Yadrintsev, Machajski, Ilin, K. M. Leontev) who are hardly known outside a narrow circle of the initiated and who, contrary to his assertions, exercised no appreciable influence on Russian political thought. Broadly speaking, the author favors the nationalistically-minded Russian political thinkers. Surprisingly, he suggests that the Freemasons had a part in promoting the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. He is rightly critical of Russian communism, but would seem to go too far when he writes that Stalin "revived such archaic social institutions as slavery and serfdom," a rather extreme interpretation of the administrative methods used in labor camps and on the collective farms.—MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY, Vevey, Switzerland.

Soviet-type economies are incapable of rational economic calculation and thus of making the best possible use of their economic resources. It is the absence of markets (either actual or simulated), rather than the use of economic planning as such, that is the root of the problem. That is the main thesis of Stanislaw Wellisz's compact introduction to the study of *The Economies of the Soviet Bloc* (New York and London, McGraw-Hill, 1964; vi, 245 pp., $6.95). The reader is introduced to the subject by a focus on processes of "decision-making and resource allocation," to quote the subtitle. Hence institutional and historical materials, which are drawn primarily from Polish sources, are confined to the minimum needed to develop the economic analysis. The study first explores the roles of both the planners and the planned (in their capacity as workers and consumers). It then takes up the plan-making process itself, proceeds to the problems of plan implementation, and concludes with an evaluation of efficiency and waste in the total system. The chief source of waste is the absence of a mechanism for determining true costs and prices, without which it is impossible to allocate resources efficiently. The waste is compounded by the absence of an automatic error-correcting mechanism such as well-functioning markets provide, but is offset to some extent by the system's success in mobilizing resources and maintaining full employ-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment. Competently anchored in economic theory, the book thus analyzes the economic losses due to the dominance of "political decisions" over "economic rationality." The author does not, however, explore in depth the political benefits sought by the use of political rather than economic criteria, which leaves open the possibility that in the eyes of the decision-makers the economic losses may be worth the political gains.—JOSEPH S. BERLINER, Brandeis University.

A useful concern with the relationships between policy and its instruments has led, of late, to an increased interest in the Navy in the Pacific during the years of rivalry with Japan. Regrettably, however, Thaddeus V. Tuleja's *Statesmen and Admirals: Quest for a Far Eastern Naval Policy* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1963; 256 pp., $5.95) makes but the minimal contribution in this field. The book traces the story from the beginning of the century to the attack on Pearl Harbor, with emphasis on the Hoover and Roosevelt years. In his attempt "to analyze the interplay of those forces which worked in so many devious ways to fashion and foil the naval policy of the United States in the Pacific" the author has accumulated a sizable bibliography of published items and has worked in the Leahy and Yarnell papers and in the records of the General Board. Some of the material is not without interest, but its presentation is such that the reader ends up little the wiser. Organization seems to have stopped once the chapters received their headings; the larger framework is lacking, the forest invisible through the underbrush. The text is a welter of disorganized paragraphs, false antitheses and false equivalents, irrelevancies, and *mots injustes*. Curiously, although the book ends with the outbreak of war, the end paper maps illustrate the campaigns of 1941–45.—JAMES A. FIELD JR., Swarthmore College.

A winner of the prize of the Society for Italian Historical Studies and of the Unità d'Italia award, *A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity: The Italian National Society in the Risorgimento* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963; xiii, 500 pp., $10.00) by Raymond Grew is a major contribution to the history of Italian unification. The author has done an exhaustive research job in published and unpublished sources and he writes with great force and clarity. His major objective is to give a detailed description of the aims, beliefs, organization, methods, and accomplishments of that little group of men, numbering somewhere between four and eight thousand, who constituted the Na-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional Society. But he also throws considerable light on the whole social, political, and intellectual atmosphere in the most stirring days of the Risorgimento. Grew points to the major role played by the liberal aristocrats and the professional men of Italy; rarely did peasants and artisans find an important place in the Society. It was most successful in the field of propaganda. The Society was an important ally of Cavour and Piedmont and may have pushed Cavour on to a more nationalist policy. It was an instrument for calm, moderation, and patience which rallied public opinion without giving the masses a voice in making policy. From 1857 to 1862 it published a newspaper, the *Piccolo Corriere d'Italia*. It played a major role in rallying volunteers to Piedmont in 1859 and in leading revolutions and establishing interim governments in the towns of central Italy. It supported Garibaldi's expedition in 1860 and Cavour's invasion of the Papal States and had a major role in the plebiscites and elections which followed unification. After the South had been won, the Society became more conservative and intolerant. It came to an end in 1864. Daniele Manin, Marchese Giorgio Pallavicino Trivulzio, and Giuseppe La Farina, each in his own way, played leading roles in the Society.—WILLIAM C. ASKEW, Colgate University.

Interviews in 1959 with a random sample of Washington lobbyists and with persons in Congress who are the customary recipients of lobbying (thirty-eight congressmen and congressional staff members) provide the data from which the findings reported in Lester W. Milbrath's *The Washington Lobbyists* (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963; xiv, 431 pp., $5.00) have been drawn. From the book's four parts—Introduction, the Lobbyist as Political Actor, Lobbying as a Communication Process, and Lobbying in American Democracy—the Washington lobbyist emerges as a figure quite different from the party-giving, corrupting, and sinister personage of popular myth. Despite a widespread distrust of lobbying it was found that those practicing it are usually unable to buy or steal government decisions; in Washington, if not at state capitols, bribery is rarely resorted to; the deception and venality of the "old lobby" are no longer generally practiced. As one engaged in a communication process, the lobbyist spends more than half of his time in his office; interacts with staff aides and committee staffs more than with officials; deals regularly with fellow lobbyists; works less with party officials than is usually supposed; all the while cultivating a reputation for honesty, integrity, capability, agreeableness, manipulativeness, facility for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

expression, and persistence. In general, congressional respondents agree that such characteristics are likely to contribute to success in lobbying. Even when successful, however, the lobbyist's efforts are only one of a number of factors entering into the making of decisions by congressmen. Their need for facts gives the lobbyist his best opportunity to influence decisions and to be of most service, especially in the clash of viewpoints in which creativity is stimulated with resulting benefits to public policy. *The Washington Lobbyists* is a research report with the limited value of most such reports. The sample may have been representative and the responses typical in 1959. But with the novel tactics of the civil rights movement five years later and the innovations introduced in space and defense contracting, it is doubtful that the definition of Washington lobbyist (p. 22) or the random nature and the composition of the sample (Table III-1, p. 31) take adequate account of new dimensions in lobbying. Moreover, in the nature of the project, lobbying by the executive branch and by "pressure politicians" in Congress are excluded. In any study of Washington lobbyists these are serious omissions. Nevertheless, within the limitations of the project this is an excellent book, a needed addition to the literature on lobbying, and one which all students of the making of public policy warmly welcome. A selected bibliography running to twenty-two pages is a helpful feature.—DONALD C. BLAISDELL, The City College of the City University of New York.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IN MEMORIAM

Harry J. Carman

With Harry J. Carman's death on December 26, 1964, the Faculty of Political Science lost a colleague who had served it with distinction as scholar, teacher, and man of wise counsel. Yet the loss that will remain most deeply etched in the memories of those who knew and worked with Harry Carman is the passing of a personality whose impact on the world about him somehow transcended specific titles or talents or functions. Some years ago a colleague described him as being "as nearly selfless as a man can be." That was a good part of it, but it must be added that Carman's economy of concern for himself freed his abundant energies to stimulate, encourage, and, frequently, do battle for individuals of every age and background who sought fulfillment of their own capacities for growth.

From this concern for others stemmed Carman's conviction that he was, beyond all other things, a teacher. Teaching was his first salaried occupation and when, long years later, he had retired from formal classroom instruction, he was still giving unstintingly of his knowledge and experience to shape the lives of others. Carman remained a teacher because, like all true teachers, he kept vibrant the capacity to learn. From books and documentary sources, from people, from reflection, the living well of his resources was constantly refreshed.

Harry James Carman was born on a farm in Greenfield, New York, on January 22, 1884. Young Carman attended a one-room district school through the secondary grades and then took over as teacher for several years. Encouraged by a local school official, he passed the entrance examinations for Syracuse University and received his bachelor's degree in 1909. After four years' service as principal of Rhinebeck High School, he returned to Syracuse for his master's degree and, from 1914 to 1917, taught there as instructor and assistant professor of political science.

Harry Carman's connection with Columbia University began in the fall of 1917, when he arrived on Morningside Heights to undertake his work for the doctorate and, soon afterwards, his duties as instructor in history in Columbia College. His Ph.D. came in 1919, followed by promotions through the academic grades to a full professorship in 1931. Eight years later he was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

named Moore Collegiate Professor. In March 1933, he was appointed to a seat on the Faculty of Political Science.

Carman was quickly attracted to the proposals for constructing a fresh and intellectually challenging liberal arts program for the college, based, where feasible, upon interdepartmental cooperation. He helped to launch the Contemporary Civilization course in 1919 and continued as an active participant for many years. He strongly supported the introduction of the Humanities sequence in the nineteen-thirties, as well as other educational innovations which placed the college in the forefront of the general education movement. His lecture courses, graduate and undergraduate, were heavily attended, but his greatest satisfaction was derived from the small section or seminar, where the individual could play his part in an active exchange of ideas. He gave generously of his time and energy and his students responded with a regard and an affection that has become legendary. Yet he remained the discriminating judge of youth and of scholarly promise.

Carman's scholarly interests were numerous and varied. Among his publications were *Social and Economic History of the United States,* 2 Volumes (1930–34); *Jesse Buel: Agricultural Reformer* (1947); *Lincoln and the Patronage,* with R. H. Luthin (1943); *A History of the American People,* with H. C. Syrett (1960); *Guide to the Principal Sources for American Civilization, 1800–1900, in the City of New York,* 2 Volumes, with A. W. Thompson (1960); *A Short History of New York State,* with D. M. Ellis, J. A. Frost, and H. C. Syrett (1957); and *Preparation for Medical Education in the Liberal Arts College* (1953). He edited *American Husbandry* (1939) and Terence V. Powderly's *The Path I Trod* (1940). With Rexford G. Tugwell he was editor of the Columbia University Studies in the History of American Agriculture.

In November 1943, Harry Carman became Dean of Columbia College upon the death of Herbert E. Hawkes. The war was at a critical stage and the university had recently become a participant in the Navy's College Training Program. Carman, working closely with Associate Dean N. M. McKnight and his decimated faculty, maintained the liberal arts curriculum, in spite of the pressures of the time, and even preserved the tradition of small teaching sections.

In 1950, at the age of sixty-six, Harry Carman retired from the deanship, but continued, as Moore Professor, to teach graduate and undergraduate courses for another two years. Yet, as Frank Hogan remarked, "No one can retire Carman." So it was to be. "Education," Carman once wrote, "must emphasize

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not only learning, but action as well. Knowledge is not enough; it must be translated into attitudes and behavior." For years he had followed that precept.

It would be an exhaustive exercise to attempt a listing of Harry Carman's activities in the educational world beyond Morningside Heights, or in the fields of race and labor relations, civic improvement, and assistance to political exiles. He himself regarded his quarter century of service on the New York Board of Higher Education as one of his most important contributions. He was a member of the New York State Board of Mediation from 1941 to 1955 and educational adviser of the Joint Board of the Electrical Industry for ten years. He was a trustee of Freedom House, of the American Council for Emigres in the Professions, chairman of the Board of Trustees of the National Scholarship Fund and Service for Negro Students. He was senior educational consultant to the John Hay Whitney Foundation. He was a trustee of six institutions of higher learning. He directed a program for the exchange of intellectuals between Japan and the Western world and helped to found Manhattanville Community Centers, Inc. This is but a representative sampling, but it must do.

Recognition came to Harry Carman in profusion. The holder of honorary degrees from sixteen colleges and universities, he has been further honored by medal, medallion, and bust. He received the Arents Medal from Syracuse University, the Alexander Hamilton Medal from the Alumni of Columbia College, the James Robinson Award, and the Medal of the City of New York.

Yet our loss is not measured by the titles and honors Harry Carman held. The gap is left by the absence of the man himself. We shall miss his generosity, his quick nod of understanding, and the sly gleam of humor in his eye. Harry Carman was a fighter—and we shall miss that, too. When, on one occasion, the late Mayor La Guardia objected in his volcanic way to an action of the Board of Higher Education, he slammed his hand on the table and announced that "This shall never be done!" Carman brought his agrarian hand down hard beside the Mayor's, fixed him with his eye, and stated, "And I say it shall be done!" A colleague has remarked that he had at various times seen Harry Carman angry, but, he added, "never over anything that had been done to him."

More frequently, however, Harry was a man of fun. He knew the zest of life, he liked people and loved the soil and the flowers he raised so abundantly at his home in Schuylerville, New York. We shall remember the stories well-told, the songs, and, above

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all, the full-throated laughter. As he remarked on his eightieth birthday, "Harry Carman has had a wonderful time here."

Carlton J. H. Hayes

Carlton J. H. Hayes was born in 1882, in Afton, New York. He graduated from Columbia College in 1904 and received his M.A. degree in 1905. Further graduate studies led to his doctorate in 1909. His teaching career had begun two years earlier, in 1907, when he was appointed instructor in the college. He reached the rank of professor in 1919. Except for his service as a captain in the Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff in 1918–19, and as Ambassador to Spain in 1942–45, Carlton Hayes spent his active life at Columbia, from which he retired in 1950. He passed away on September 3, 1964.

As lecturer, director, and guide of the research endeavors of his graduate students, and as the author of a long list of articles and books, Hayes stands out as a major figure—some would say the major figure—in the annals of Columbia's history department during the past half century. He was the author of perhaps the best known American textbook in modern European history, and unquestionably was the pioneer in American studies of the baffling phenomenon we call nationalism. We who were privileged to work under and with him knew him as a cultivated gentleman of massive intellectual fastidiousness, profoundly interested in large-dimensioned historical concerns and ever responsive to the challenges his own generation presented to the liberal conscience. And he was able to impress his colleagues in the department, not by exhortation but by example, that to serve the department and Columbia means more than richly rewarding professional opportunity; it means a distinction that should be proudly guarded and jealously cherished. This was surely a part of his legacy to the department he served so well, and it is one of the reasons why, in contemplating Carlton Hayes' life and accomplishments, we see not only an enviable human biography but also sense a challenging commentary on man.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The first open wire line (linked here at the Nevada-Utah border) could carry only three calls and was vulnerable to interruptions.

50 years ago a transcontinental phone call took 23 minutes to complete

Today, when you dial it yourself, that same call goes through in about 25 seconds (and costs about one-tenth the price)

Telephone service has come a long way since that historic call in 1915. It has grown in scope from 9,000,000 phones and a single open line spanning the continent to 88,000,000 phones and a huge network of several hundred thousand channels including 24,000 that cross the continent, via several different routes, from the east to the west coast.

Accomplishment has been the keynote since the first coast-to-coast telephone call over open wire. Improvements in local exchanges and Long Distance circuits have led to increasingly better and more efficient telephone service.

These developments have been effective in reducing the cost of calls. Fifty years ago, the cost of a three-minute call from New York to San Francisco was $20.70. Today, that same call costs you as little as $1. (Rate for 3-minute, station-to-station call, after 8 P.M. and all day Sunday, plus tax.)

And still the future is full of promise. New phones will be introduced, technology will be improved and advances made that will open up a whole new world of communications.

Bell System
American Telephone and Telegraph and Associated Companies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VULCAN, A.D. MCMLXV

If the Roman god, Vulcan, were around today, that extraordinary ironworker might be astounded by the feats which his modern counterparts are performing —and *without* the use of supernatural powers.

At Central Foundry Division's Saginaw plant, he would find skilled metal-molding technicians using a specially designed electric induction furnace which keeps molten metals at 2750 degrees Fahrenheit. The metals are poured into molds which produce an amazing variety of vital automotive components with superior quality and dependability.

More than 25,000 General Motors people are employed in various phases of metal casting. This is not surprising because metals are basic to the manufacture of all GM products. Actually, these workers are but a small fraction of the total of 660,000 employes on the General Motors team. Each is a highly important factor in the progress of a most progressive company.

General Motors Is People...

making better things for you

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congo 1964

Political Documents of a Developing Nation, in the original French

CENTRE DE RECHERCHE ET D'INFORMATION SOCIO-POLITIQUES of Brussels. This volume contains the most comprehensive collection of annotated political documents relating to all phases of Congolese activity during the year, and places particular emphasis on the crucial rebellion which became an international crisis in 1964. Documents are in French; the Introduction has been translated and expanded for the English-speaking audience by Professor Herbert Weiss of New York University. *450 pages. $12.50*

Wilson

Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917

By ARTHUR S. LINK. Volume 5 of Professor Link's authoritative biography of Woodrow Wilson covers events from the beginning of the presidential campaign of 1916 to the entry of the United States into the First World War. *478 pages. Illus. $8.50*

Political Development in Pakistan

By KARL VON VORYS. This analysis of Pakistani politics under Ayub Khan focuses on the practical limitations of that leader's ability to mobilize mass backing even when he is supported by a powerful army. *350 pages. $6.50*

The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan

No. 2, "Studies in the Modernization of Japan"

Edited by W. W. LOCKWOOD. Dealing with the extraordinary economic modernization that has been taking place in Japan since 1868, this is an analysis of Japan's historical opportunities and how men used them. Prepared under the auspices of the Association for Asian Studies. *735 pages. $12.50*

Government Risk-Sharing in Foreign Investment

By MARINA VON NEUMANN WHITMAN. Since World War II six risk-sharing institutions to stimulate foreign investment have been established by the United States government and several international organizations. Professor Whitman makes a thorough study of these institutions and evaluates the importance and effectiveness of each. *370 pages. $8.50*

Princeton University Press

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oxford University Press

Germany: Yesterday and Tomorrow

By PETER H. MERKL, *University of California, Santa Barbara.* This balanced, understanding appraisal of West Germany is based solidly on Germany's past as well as the present. Professor Merkl discusses the underlying forces in the nineteenth century that provided the setting for Hitler's rise to power and that helped make Germany what it is today. He then considers how West Germany's political structure was revitalized after the war, giving a brilliant evaluation of Adenauer and the opposition parties. He takes a close look at how successful the new Germany has been in shaking off the vestiges of the old Germany. *Published September 30.* $7.50

Defender of the Faith

William Jennings Bryan: The Last Decade 1915-1925

By LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, *University of California, Berkeley.* "This painstaking examination of Bryan's later years will do much to correct the distortion of the man that has come down to us. And it is a book that is long overdue."—*Christian Science Monitor.* "A convincing, multifaceted reassessment that contradicts the long-standing image of Bryan as compromising turncoat. Bryan emerges instead as a man of honest but often paradoxical and inflexible convictions."—*The Booklist* $7.50

Equality and Liberty

Theory and Practice in American Politics

By HARRY V. JAFFA, *Claremont Men's College. Introduction by* CHARLES H. PERCY. Concerned with political realities, Professor Jaffa examines the way the Declaration of Independence has been interpreted by succeeding generations of Americans. "Professor Jaffa's wide-ranging essays on the American political system throw new light wherever they touch. . . . A most helpful and stimulating book."—FRANK S. MEYER $5.75

The Springtime of Freedom

The Evolution of Developing Societies

By WILLIAM MCCORD, *Stanford University.* Is the prevailing notion that dictatorships are inevitable in developing nations really valid? With illustrations from 19th-century Europe, post-1917 Russia, modern Japan, Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt, India and Indonesia, the author demonstrates how the democratic, pluralistic approach is far more viable. $6.00

Oxford University Press / New York

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oxford University Press

The Arab Cold War

A Study of Ideology in Politics

By MALCOLM KERR, *University of California.* This essay is an interpretation of inter-Arab affairs since 1958, the year of the creation of the United Arab Republic. Since then there has been a complicated series of shifts in alignments, e.g., Syrian withdrawal from the union with Egypt, the civil war in the Yemen, and the two Arab summit conferences of 1964. The author explains these and other events in the light of divergent political and ideological forces operating in the Arab world and the tactical requirements of the Egyptian revolution.

Chatham House Essays $1.40

The Struggle for Syria

A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1958

By PATRICK SEALE, *Middle East Correspondent, The Observer (London).* The author, who spent fourteen months doing research in the Middle East, clarifies the complexities of Syrian politics and demonstrates the key role which Syria has played in Arab affairs since the war. Mr. Seale contends that post-war Arab politics, and the whole problem of Arab unity, cannot properly be understood without close reference to events in Syria. *R.I.I.A.* $6.75

Republic Under Pressure

A Study of South African Foreign Policy

By J. E. SPENCE, *University College, Swansea.* The isolation of the Republic of South Africa and the hostility directed at its domestic policies by the outside world have had few parallels in the twentieth century. In this study, the author stresses the link between domestic and foreign policy and discusses the probable effect of external pressures on the South African Government. *Chatham House Essays.* $1.70

The Glass Curtain Between Asia and Europe

A Symposium on the Historical Encounters and the Changing Attitudes of the Peoples of the East and the West

Edited by RAGHAVAN IYER, *St. Antony's College, Oxford.* This important collection of essays stems from a radio discussion of 1959 between Dr. Arnold Toynbee and Dr. Raghavan Iyer. Dr. Iyer believes that it is only realistic to recognize the presence of some sort of Glass Curtain between Asia and Europe, "a distorting sense of distance, if not actually of alienation." His distinguished contributors have been invited to participate from a variety of viewpoints in an informative inquiry. $6.75

Oxford University Press / New York

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Systems of Latin America

by Martin C. Needler,
University of Michigan, and Contributors

This survey of the twenty independent nations of Latin America follows a country-by-country approach to the political systems of the continent. Each chapter, written by a well-qualified authority, contains a discussion of the social and economic background factors which help shape the nations politics. Major emphasis falls upon governmental organization and political processes. The contributors also discuss domestic and foreign policies, and political history, for each country, bringing to light factors peculiar to the country being discussed.

1964, 560 pp., $9.50

State and Local Government
SECOND EDITION

by Russell W. Maddox, Jr., and Robert F. Fuquay,
both of Oregon State University

This revision contains new material on education, budgets, civil rights, the 1964 state elections, state taxation, and reapportionment, for both state and local government.

January, 1966.

Soviet Institutions and Policies: Inside Views

by William G. Andrews, Tufts University

Readings from original Soviet sources reveal the current political system of that country. *Early 1966.*

VAN NOSTRAND Princeton, N. J. 08540

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"To have lived through the transition stage of modern Japan makes a man feel preternaturally old; for here he is in modern times, . . . and yet he can himself distinctly remember the Middle Ages."—BASIL HALL CHAMBERLAIN.

The Modernization of Japan

"The modernization of Japan is a phenomenon which cannot be viewed casually by any serious observer. Whether one looks upon it as some Westerners have done as the first phase in the rise of a new "peril from the East" or, on the contrary, as a miraculous example of progress from out of an Oriental Middle Ages; whether one sees it as the Japanese themselves have done as the triumph of their unique national will against great odds or as the dark story of autocratic domination leading to imperialist war, the observations are highly colored and strongly lined. For the observer who would maintain his impartiality, the facts of the last hundred years or so of Japanese history are available in great abundance and in rich detail. Yet the efforts to find meaning in these facts have been bafflingly varied."—John Whitney Hall, vol. 1*

STUDIES IN THE MODERNIZATION OF JAPAN, a five volume series published for the Conference on Modern Japan of the Association for Asian Studies, brings together in a systematic fashion the results of the variegated and intensive studies of Japan which have appeared since the end of the war.

*CHANGING JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD MODERNIZATION, Edited by Marius B. Jansen. 546 pp., $9.00
THE STATE AND ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE IN MODERN JAPAN, Edited by William W. Lockwood. 732 pp., $12.50
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN JAPAN, Edited by R. P. Dore. Forthcoming
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN JAPAN, Edited by Robert E. Ward. Forthcoming
TRADITION AND MODERNIZATION IN JAPANESE CULTURE, Edited by Donald H. Shively. Forthcoming

Subscription orders for the series are invited

Princeton University Press

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marxism in the Modern World

Edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch. Bertram D. Wolfe, Merle Fainsod, Adam Ulam, and Theodore Draper are among the scholars and writers who analyze the various political forms taken by Marxism in the 20th century, notably Leninism, Stalinism, Khrushchevism, Maoism, Titoism, and Castroism. *Hoover Institution Publications.* $5.95

Nationalization in British Politics

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

E. Eldon Barry. Beginning with the earliest demand for nationalization by the Chartist-Radicalists in the 1830's, and continuing through the fulfillment of prewar promises by the third Labour government of 1945-51, this study presents the full story of one of the most important and controversial issues of British politics. $8.50

Party Politics in Puerto Rico

Robert W. Anderson. Covering the period from 1940 to the 1964 elections, this work has the special distinction of viewing the political structure of Puerto Rico through its own party system, rather than, as is customary, through its relationships with the United States. *October. About* $6.75

Order from your bookstore, please

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR BOOKS

THE FIRST NAME IN QUALITY PAPERBACK PUBLISHING

THE GREAT DEBATE

Theories of Nuclear Strategy

by Raymond Aron; translated from the French by Ernst Pawel.

"A philosopher of distinction, a noted sociologist, a student of history, M. Aron . . . transcends the controversies which form the headlines of the day, to distill the positive contribution of both sides."—HENRY A. KISSINGER, *Book Week* 95¢

THE BERKELEY STUDENT REVOLT

Facts and Interpretations

Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Sheldon S. Wolin.

Two political scientists from Berkeley, themselves in disagreement over the meaning of the revolt, here present a wide range of opinions from participants, faculty members and outside observers, plus a detailed chronology and a sampling of the pamphlets and manifestos handed out by both sides. *An Anchor Original.* $1.95

THE ERA OF TYRANNIES

by Elie Halévy; translated by R. K. Webb, with a Note by Fritz Stern.

First publication in English of this important collection of essays by one of the greatest of modern historians. Written between 1907 and 1936, the essays on the nature and development of socialism include Halévy's brilliant analysis of World War I. *An Anchor Original.* $1.45

THE REFORM OF PARLIAMENT

by Bernard Crick.

This critical examination of the British Parliament's legislative role discusses current Parliamentary functions, attitudes, and institutional machinery, and sets forth positive proposals for the reform of both Houses. *An Anchor Original.* $1.45

CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION

by Joseph P. Harris.

A thorough study of the controls Congress attempts to apply to Executive departments and agencies. *Originally published by the Brookings Institution.* $1.45

DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC.
Garden City, New York
including LAIDLAW BROTHERS, River Forest, Illinois,
publishers of textbooks for elementary and secondary schools.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Coming in Early '66

UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN POLICY

Martin C. Needler, University of Michigan

A straightforward survey of U. S. foreign policy—with a point of view free of bellicosity. Balanced and timely, the book deals with every relevant topic, from European integration to the rise of Castro. Excellent as an undergraduate introduction to the field and important reading for the interested layman.

January 1966 *288 pp.* *$4.95 tent.*

New This Year

POLITICAL UNIFICATION: A Comparative Analysis of Leaders and Forces

Amitai Etzioni, Columbia University

Professor Etzioni seeks to determine what forms of leadership and what conditions will make a political union succeed or fail. He develops a paradigm—"more than a prespective but less than a theory"— for the study of unification; then examines four contemporary supranational communities on a comparative basis: The United Arab Republic, the Federation of the West Indies, the Nordic Union, and the European Economic Community.

May 1965 *368 pp.* *$3.95 paper* *$6.00 casebound*

INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A Social-Psychological Analysis

Edited by Herbert C. Kelman, University of Michigan
Sponsored by SPSSI

Presents the ideas and research findings of 19 leading social and behavioral scientists about national and international images, and processes of interaction in international relations.

July 1965 *640 pp.* *$12.95*

Published Recently

THE HUMAN DIMENSION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Otto Klineberg, The University of Paris

A timely and original study that draws on recent research, and surveys the concepts and discoveries of social psychology to illuminate such critical questions as: the reasons for war, how public opinion is shaped, the nature of leadership, and the racial question.

1964 *185 pp.* *$2.95 paper*

HOLT, RINEHART and WINSTON, inc.
383 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017

In Canada:
833 Oxford Street,
Toronto 18, Ontario

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REVIEWS (*Continued*)

Zolberg, One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast
Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties ..... *L. Gray Cowan* 465
Ingham, A History of East Africa ..... *Margaret L. Bates* 467
Lewis, The Middle East and the West ..... *Wayne Wilcox* 469
Nolte (ed.), The Modern Middle East
Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa ..... *C. K. Zurayk* 470
Swaminathan (ed.), The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 10 Volumes ..... *Myron Weiner* 472
Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China
Barghoorn, Soviet Foreign Propaganda
Hale, The Captive Press in the Third Reich ..... *Kurt Lang* 474
Clubb, Twentieth Century China
Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937–1945 ..... *T. A. Bisson* 477
McLeod (ed.), The Pattern of Australian Culture *C. Hartley Grattan* 479
Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations ..... *John J. Johnson* 481
Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics ..... *Juan J. Linz* 482
Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America *Samuel P. Huntington* 484
Moog, Bandeirantes and Pioneers ..... *Marvin Harris* 485
Banks and **Textor**, A Cross-Polity Survey ..... *Sidney Verba* 488
Etzioni, Winning Without War ..... *Ralph M. Goldman* 490
Mason, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy ..... *Doris A. Graber* 493
Feis, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy ..... *Edward S. Mason* 494
Reagan, The Managed Economy ..... *Adolf A. Berle* 496
Mineka (ed.), The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill, 1812–1848, 2 Volumes ..... *Joseph Dorfman* 497
Martyn, International Business ..... *Mira Wilkins* 499
Mills, Power, Politics, and People ..... *Immanuel Wallerstein* 501
Peck, The Rank-and-File Leader
Ossowski, Class Structure in the Social Consciousness ..... *Robert H. Guest* 503
Todd, Justice on Trial: The Case of Louis D. Brandeis *Yonathan Shapiro* 505
Post, An Introduction to the Law ..... *Charles E. Ares* 506

BOOK NOTES

O'Neal and **O'Neal** (eds.), Humor: The Politician's Tool
Lewin (ed.), A Treasury of American Political Humor ..... *Lindsay Rogers* 509
Due, Taxation and Economic Development in Tropical Africa *Carl S. Shoup* 510
Eldredge, The Second American Revolution ..... *James L. Busey* 511
Fraenkel, Das amerikanische Regierungssystem *George K. Romoser* 512
Utechin, Russian Political Thought: A Concise History *Michael T. Florinsky* 512
Wellisz, The Economies of the Soviet Bloc ..... *Joseph S. Berliner* 513
Tuleja, Statesmen and Admirals: Quest for a Far Eastern Naval Policy ..... *James A. Field Jr.* 514
Grew, A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity: The Italian National Society in the Risorgimento ..... *William C. Askew* 514
Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists ..... *Donald C. Blaisdell* 515

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

President
ARTHUR F. BURNS

Vice-Presidents
GRAYSON KIRK — DAVID B. TRUMAN

Treasurer
ALAN TEMPLE

Secretary
LAWRENCE H. CHAMBERLAIN

Director
BEN SCOTT CUSTER

DOUGLAS M. BLACK
W. RANDOLPH BURGESS
DOUGLAS DILLON
ARTEMUS L. GATES
THOMAS S. GATES
B. BREWSTER JENNINGS
FREDERICK R. KAPPEL
JOHN J. MCCLOY
PHILIP E. MOSELY
FRANZ SCHNEIDER
ARTHUR HAYS SULZBERGER
JUAN T. TRIPPE

HONORARY MEMBERS

† THE RIGHT HON. SIR WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
LEWIS W. DOUGLAS
THE RIGHT HON. LORD LAYTON
SHEPARD MORGAN

The Academy of Political Science, founded in 1880, is composed of men and women interested in political, economic, and social questions. The annual dues are $6; life membership, $200 (deductible on federal income tax). Members and subscribing members (libraries, institutions, etc.) receive as part of their membership privileges the current issues of the *Political Science Quarterly*, the *Proceedings* of the Academy and invitations to Academy meetings.

The *Political Science Quarterly* is published in March, June, September, and December by the Academy of Political Science and is edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University. Single issues of the Quarterly, to nonmembers, $1.50; of the *Proceedings*, $2.50. Prices on back numbers and bound volumes will be quoted on request.

Members and subscribing members are urged to notify the Academy office of any change of address.

If members and subscribing members wish to discontinue membership in the Academy, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise it is assumed that the membership will be continued.

Communications regarding the Academy should be addressed to the Director of the Academy of Political Science, Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York, N. Y. 10027

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED